Bash v. Truman
| Decision Date | 13 October 1934 |
| Docket Number | 33455 |
| Citation | 75 S.W.2d 840,335 Mo. 1077 |
| Parties | Thomas B. Bash, Sheriff of Jackson County, v. Harry S. Truman, Eugene I. Purcell and Battle McCardle, Judges of the County Court of Jackson County, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Motion for Rehearing Overruled October 13, 1934.
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Emory H. Wright Judge; Opinion filed at May Term, 1934, July 17, 1934; motion for rehearing filed; motion overruled at September Term October 13, 1934.
Reversed and remanded (with directions).
Fred A. Boxley, Rufus Burrus, Leo B. Parker and Elmer B Hodges for appellants.
Jacobs & Henderson, M. J. Henderson, Thos. E. Deacy and Lee D. Seelig for respondent.
John C. Meredith, amicus curiae.
In the circuit court the respondent obtained a peremptory writ of prohibition, debarring the appellants as the members of the County Court of Jackson County from putting into operation certain provisions of the county budget law, found in Laws 1933, at pages 340 to 351. Final judgment was rendered on demurrer and the case is here on defendants' appeal.
The parties have treated the issues as joined upon the petition for the preliminary writ and the demurrer of the defendants filed thereto, and we shall do likewise.
Sections 9 to 22 of the county budget law apply to Jackson County and all other counties in the State having a population of more than fifty thousand inhabitants. The following outline of the salient provisions of the questioned sections will, we think, be sufficient for our consideration of the case:
(Section 9) The presiding judge of the county court shall be the budget officer of the county, or the county court may designate the county clerk as budget officer.
(Section 10) The annual budget of any such county shall present a complete financial plan for the ensuing budget year. It shall set forth all proposed expenditures for the administration, operation and maintenance of all offices, departments, commissions, courts and institutions; the actual or estimated operating deficits or surpluses of prior years; and in detail the anticipated income and other means of financing the proposed expenditures, etc.
(Section 11) This section places certain duties on various officers, agents and employees in the collection of information and in the enforcement of the act. It also provides that the budget officer, after reviewing the estimates of the needs of the various operating agencies as reported by them, and the probable income for the year, shall prepare a budget document and transmit it to the county court. The section also provides that "the budget officer shall have power to recommend and the county court shall have power to fix all salaries of employees, other than those of elective officers, except that no salary for any position shall be fixed at a rate above that fixed by law for such position." (Italics ours.)
(Section 12) This section relates to the budget document and designates what the document shall contain. Among other matters it shall contain an "appropriation order" which shall be drawn in a form to authorize an appropriation for expenditures.
(Section 13) This section provides that the county court shall hold a public hearing on the document before taking final action thereon.
(Section 14) Authorizes the county court, after such public hearing, to "revise, alter, increase or decrease the items contained in the budget and may eliminate any item or add new items," and requires the court to make provision for the necessary income to balance expenditures. And at the time of making the appropriation order the court shall tentatively fix the tax rate necessary to finance and balance the budget, and shall fix the final tax rate after final action by the State Board of Equalization on the assessment made by the county assessor.
Respondent's petition charges that the appellants in their capacity as judges of the county court are attempting to enforce and put into operation this county budget law. Next, the petition undertakes to outline the provisions of the sections assailed, and then proceeds to state respondent's special grievance, which is, in substance: The appellants are threatening to adopt a budget wherein -- (1) they are fixing a tentative tax rate for the year 1934; (2) they are attempting to dictate the expenditures of respondent for said year in the performance of the duties of his office as sheriff; (3) they seek to limit the number of respondent's deputies; and (4) seek to fix the salary, or compensation, to be paid his deputies. The petition then alleges that said threatened acts are in violation of various provisions of the State Constitution, which provisions and the subject matter thereof are properly designated in the pleading.
Although the demurrer specified several grounds, only one of them is urged in this court, namely, "that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants for the relief prayed." However, another stated ground of the demurrer reads: "That the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action." Appellants also, in their motion in arrest of judgment, charge that upon the record said judgment is erroneous.
It is the law that where judicial tribunals have no jurisdiction of the subject-matter on which they assume to act, their proceedings are absolutely void. [7 R. C. L., p. 1042, sec. 75.] And it is a maxim of the law of procedure that litigants cannot by consent confer jurisdiction of the subject matter. It is essential to orderly procedure that the legal remedies which the law provides be confined each to its rightful province. This court is, therefore, in duty bound, before considering the constitutional, and only, questions of law raised, to determine this question of jurisdiction which, upon an examination of the record, obtrudes itself on our notice. This duty we undertake in the light of Section 36 of Article 6 of the Constitution. It provides: "In each county there shall be a county court, which shall be a court of record, and shall have jurisdiction to transact all county and such other business as may be prescribed by law," etc.
We start then, from these two postulates: The county court is a constitutional body with judicial powers; the circuit court being a constitutional court of general jurisdiction, unquestionably has general jurisdiction of proceedings in prohibition. But the question of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Missouri Electric Power Co. v. City of Mountain Grove
... ... 7, pp. 150, 151, 162, 164, 174, 182, ... 191, 355, 246 247; Debates of the Constitutional Convention ... of 1875, Vol. 8, pp. 238, 246, 257; Bash v. Truman, ... 75 S.W.2d 840, 325 Mo. 1077; Marsh v. Bartlett, 121 ... S.W.2d 737, 343 Mo. 526; State ex rel. v. Harlman, ... 96 S.W.2d 329, ... ...
-
State on Inf. of Wallach v. Loesch
... ... quo warranto proceeding. State ex inf. McKittrick v ... Bode, 342 Mo. 162, 113 S.W.2d 805; State ex rel ... Pickett v. Truman, 333 Mo. 1018, 64 S.W.2d 105; Laws, ... pp. 465-489; State ex rel. Cannon v. May, 106 Mo ... 488; State ex rel. Cameron v. Shannon, 133 Mo ... 835; State ex rel. West ... v. Clark, 41 Mo. 44; Wood ex rel. v. Henry, 55 ... Mo. 560; Miller v. Iron County, 29 Mo. 122; Bash ... v. Truman, 335 Mo. 1077, 75 S.W.2d 840. (4) The Act of ... 1941 does not violate Subsections 2, 5, 6, 15, 17 and 26 of ... Section 53 of ... ...
-
State ex rel. Donnell v. Searcy
...executive and judicial functions. (e) Prohibition will not lie to restrain respondents from exercising legislative powers. Bash v. Truman, 75 S.W.2d 840, 335 Mo. 1077; State ex rel. Guaranty Co. v. Harty, 208 S.W. 835, 276 Mo. 583; Greir v. Taylor, 4 McCord 206; Robertson v. State, 10 N.E. ......
-
State, on Inf. of McKittrick v. Williams
... ... 714, 296 S.W. 776. Jurisdiction of the ... subject matter is never waived, and cannot be conferred by ... consent, acquiscence or silence. Bash v. Truman, 335 ... Mo. 1077, 75 S.W.2d 840; State ex rel. v. Douglas, ... 339 Mo. 187, 95 S.W.2d 1179; United Cemetery Co. v ... Strother, ... ...