Baskette v. Union Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. CA82-416,CA82-416 |
| Citation | 652 S.W.2d 635,9 Ark.App. 34 |
| Parties | Anise Lee BASKETTE, Appellant, v. UNION LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
Laser, Sharp, Haley, Young & Huckabay by Gregory M. Hopkins, Little Rock, for appellant.
House, Holmes & Jewell, P.A. by Robert L. Robinson, Jr., Charles R. Nestrud, Little Rock, for appellee.
Bill Albert Baskette was insured under a policy issued by the appellee, Union Life Insurance Company, which provided triple indemnity coverage for any accidental death which occurred from the use of a pleasure car, subject to certain exclusions set forth in the policy. The appellant, Anise Lee Baskette, wife of the insured, was the named beneficiary under the policy.
On the date of the accident, the insured had removed the bed from the frame of his pickup truck to allow easier cleanup of the rust which had accumulated on the truck's frame. While the insured was in the process of cleaning the rust off, the truck suddenly rolled back and pinned the insured between the chassis and the truck bed. The insured suffered serious injuries which ultimately caused his death. The appellee admitted the policy was in effect and paid the appellant $20,000, less the amount of a policy loan, but denied coverage under the triple indemnity clause because, inter alia, the vehicle which crushed the insured was not a covered vehicle under the policy terms. As a result of the denial of coverage, the appellant filed this action to recover the additional $10,000, plus the statutory penalty and attorney's fee.
Both the appellant and the appellee filed motions for summary judgment, alleging that no genuine issues of fact existed. The trial court granted the appellee's motion, finding that the exclusionary language of the policy was unambiguous and applicable to the facts presented. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred because the language of the policy is ambiguous and should be construed against the appellee.
The policy provision at issue provides:
ADDITIONAL ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT.
In any case where the General Accidental Death Benefit is payable under the provisions of Benefit 1, above, and such death is, (a) in consequence of being struck, run-down, or runover, by an automobile, or (b) a proximate result of operating, driving, riding in or on, demonstrating, adjusting an automobile, or (c) proximately caused by the burning or explosion of an automobile (the automobile ... being restricted to ... the pleasure car type excluding ambulances, trucks, police or fire department vehicles and except that no benefits provided by this Benefit II will be paid if the accident occurs while the Insured is engaged in any race or speed contest, or while performing the duties of a "mechanic or garage employee" in repairing, overhauling or testing an automobile). Or if any such injury was received while riding as a fare-paying passenger on a regular licensed public conveyance operated by a common carrier for the regular transportation of passengers, such as train, airplane, bus, streetcar, or taxicab, the Company, subject to the General Provisions and Limitations contained in this rider, will pay the beneficiary the Amount of Insurance of the Policy IN ADDITION TO THE AMOUNT PAYABLE UNDER BENEFIT I.
Under Arkansas law, the intent to exclude coverage in an insurance policy should be expressed in clear and unambiguous language. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Milburn, 269 Ark. 384, 601 S.W.2d 841 (1980). See also Foremost Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 610 F.2d 551 (8th Cir.1979). An insurance policy, having been drafted by the insurer without consultation with the insured, is to be interpreted and construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Geurin Contractors, Inc. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 5 Ark.App. 229, 636 S.W.2d 638 (1982); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cole, 3 Ark.App. 183, 623 S.W.2d 848 (1981). If, however, the terms of an insurance contract are not ambiguous, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of construction and the policy will not be interpretated to bind the insurer to a risk which it plainly excluded and for which it was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Silverball Amusement v. Utah Home Fire Ins., 93-2043.
...for which it was not paid." Columbia Mutual Casualty Co. v. Coger, 35 Ark.App. 85, 811 S.W.2d 345 (1991); Baskette v. Union Life Insurance Co., 9 Ark.App. 34, 652 S.W.2d 635 (1983). The insurance contract in Utah Home excluded coverage for injuries "expected or intended from the standpoint ......
-
Woods Masonry, Inc. v. Monumental General Cas., C01-4045-MWB.
...of the court to so construe.") (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hyde, 232 Ark. 1020, 342 S.W.2d 295 (1961); Baskette v. Union Life Ins. Co., 9 Ark.App. 34, 652 S.W.2d 635 (1983)). In this case, the interpretation offered by the insured, Woods Masonry warrants consideration.8 See Keller v. Sa......
-
Chamberlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
...not be construed to provide coverage for a plainly-excluded risk, for which no premium was paid. See, e.g., Baskette v. Union Life Ins. Co., 9 Ark.App. 34, 652 S.W.2d 635 (1983). Indeed, we have held that parties are free to contract on terms, and so long as the policy language is clear and......
-
Estate of Sodorff v. United Southern Assur. Co.
...against the insurer. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Worthey, 314 Ark. 185, 861 S.W.2d 307, 309 (1993) (citing Baskette v. Union Life Ins. Co., 9 Ark.App. 34, 652 S.W.2d 635, 637 (1983)). Thus, even where language of exclusion is present in a policy, an interpretation favorable to the insured w......