Bass v. Jones

• Decision Date: 07 February 2018
• Docket Number: H043208
• Parties: ALLISON BASS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. LINDA K. JONES et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

ALLISON BASS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. LINDA K. JONES et al., Defendants and Appellants.

H043208

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

February 7, 2018

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Santa Clara County Super.Ct.No. 1-15-CV275547)

This action arises out of a dispute between family members (mother and daughter) concerning residential property located on Swallow Lane in Gilroy (the Property). Plaintiffs and respondents Allison Bass and Jason Bass (collectively, Plaintiffs or Bass) moved into the Property in 2010 after its purchase by defendants and appellants Linda K. Jones and Frank T. Jones (collectively, Defendants or Jones). Allison and Jason Bass are the daughter and son-in-law, respectively, of Linda Jones. Although not clearly disclosed in the record before us, Plaintiffs asserted in the lawsuit that they had a contract or an option to buy the Property from Defendants for the same price Defendants originally paid for it, i.e., $426,000. After a bench trial, the court granted Defendants' motion for summary disposition of the case (hereafter, the Dispositive Motion); the motion was termed at trial a nonsuit motion, and was described in the subsequent judgment as a motion for judgment. In the formal judgment entered in favor of Defendants, the court found that Plaintiffs had not established the existence of either a contract or an option to purchase the Property. The court found further that any contract was barred by the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624).

Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, which was granted on October 30, 2015, as memorialized in the clerk's minutes. Those clerk's minutes (Minute Order) did not state the ground or grounds upon which the new trial motion was granted as required by section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure.¹ And the court did not file and serve any further order specifying its reasons for granting new trial as required under section 657. But in a December 11, 2015 order (December 11 Order)—which was filed nearly one month after the statutory deadline for deciding a new trial motion (see § 660)—the court recited the parties' respective positions concerning the validity of the prior order granting new trial: Plaintiffs contended the order was valid, while Defendants asserted that the new trial order was invalid and the motion for new trial was, pursuant to section 660, deemed denied. The trial court, agreeing with Plaintiffs, concluded in the December 11 Order that the order granting new trial was valid.

Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the order granting new trial, specifically identifying the December 11 Order as the new trial order. Defendants contend that the order granting new trial is invalid because the Minute Order did not constitute a proper new trial order.

We conclude that the court filed a valid new trial order, but that it was defective because it failed to state the ground(s) or specify the reasons upon which it was based as required under section 657. Based upon our review of the defective new trial order—where it is the respondents (Plaintiffs) who bear the burden on appeal of establishing that the new trial motion was properly granted by the trial court (see Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 900 (Sanchez-Corea))—we conclude that the order cannot be upheldon any of the statutory grounds stated in Plaintiffs' motion. We will therefore reverse the order granting the motion for new trial.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Allison Bass (Allison), who is the daughter of Linda Jones (Linda), testified at trial that she and her husband have lived in the Property since November 2010. It had been purchased at that time by Defendants out of foreclosure for $426,000. Allison testified that at the time of the purchase, she had a number of conversations with her mother, Linda, in which it was agreed that after three or four years, Plaintiffs would purchase the Property from Defendants for $426,000. In October 2010, Plaintiffs gave Defendants $4,000; Allison testified that she understood the money would go toward Plaintiffs' ultimate purchase of the Property. As part of the parties' arrangement, Allison testified, she and her husband would live in the Property and pay to Defendants the full amount of the monthly mortgage payment, property taxes, insurance, and utilities. Plaintiffs signed a rental agreement concerning the Property in January 2011. Allison felt at the time they moved in that it was "our [her husband's and her] home" and they would ultimately purchase it from Defendants.

Allison testified that in the fall of 2014, she and her husband began preparations to purchase the Property by applying for a loan of $426,000. Allison met with Linda in October 2014, and they discussed the fact that Allison and her husband would be getting a loan of $426,000 to buy the Property; Linda expressed no disagreement with that figure at the time. Allison testified that around that time, Linda met with a realtor and learned that the Property was worth over $600,000; Linda did not tell Allison at the time that Plaintiffs would have to pay over $600,000 to buy the Property. Linda, however, after returning to Oregon after visiting Plaintiffs, called Allison and said she (Linda) planned to list the Property for sale for $620,000.

Linda—who was called by Plaintiffs' counsel to testify as an adverse witness under Evidence Code section 776—stated she and her husband Frank bought the Property as a second home in late 2010. She and Frank later filed a dissolution proceeding in Oregon inFebruary 2011. Linda testified that the arrangement with Plaintiffs was that Plaintiffs would rent the Property at below the fair rental rate for approximately three years to give them time to put money aside. The rental rate was a total of the amounts Defendants would pay for the mortgage, insurance, and taxes for the Property. Linda testified that she wanted to rent the Property to Plaintiffs at below its fair rental value to give Plaintiffs—who had lost their prior home through foreclosure—time to get back on their feet. Linda testified that the arrangement was that at the end of three years, Plaintiffs would have the " 'first option' " or "first opportunity" to buy the Property, but there was no discussion in 2010 as to the purchase price. Linda believed the future price would be at the Property's then-fair market value, but she had no idea in 2010 what that would be. Linda specifically denied that she discussed or agreed with Plaintiffs to sell the Property to them for $426,000.

After Plaintiffs rested their case and before the defense presented evidence, Defendants made a Dispositive Motion, which the court granted.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Bass initiated this action on a date not disclosed in the record. Although the essential pleadings (e.g., complaint, answer to complaint, trial briefs) are not included in the appellate record, we surmise from a review of the trial transcript and judgment that Plaintiffs' basic claim was that they had an oral agreement with Defendants under which they were entitled to purchase the Property.

The case proceeded to nonjury trial that commenced on August 18, 2015, and concluded the following day. After Plaintiffs presented their case, Defendants made a Dispositive Motion, one that Defendants termed a motion for nonsuit. After extensive argument, the court granted the motion.

A judgment in Defendants' favor was entered on September 10, 2015. It was reflected in the judgment that after Plaintiffs rested at trial, Defendants moved for judgment under section 631.8, subdivision (a). The court found that Plaintiffs had "failed to establish that a contract to purchase, or alternatively an option to purchase, the [Property] wasformed." It concluded "there was no sufficient cause or consideration . . . [and] assuming arguendo that the essential elements of a contract could be established, the validity and enforcement of any such contract [was] barred by the [s]tatute of [f]rauds" because "the contract alleged by [P]laintiffs involve[d] the sale of real property ([Civ. Code,] § 1624(a)(3)), was not to be performed within one year ([Civ. Code,] § 1624(a)(1)), and [P]laintiffs [did] not establish[] that any valid exception or waiver applie[d]." Defense counsel thereafter served a notice of entry of the judgment on September 15, 2015.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial. Defendants filed written opposition to the motion, and Plaintiffs submitted a reply. The motion for new trial was heard on October 30, 2015, and, as reflected in the clerk's Minute Order, the court granted the motion on that date. The Minute Order did not reflect the ground or grounds upon which the court granted the new trial motion. Nor did it reflect a specification of the court's reasons.² No further order concerning the new trial motion was entered until December 11, 2015.

It was noted in the December 11 Order—which reflected that it was prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel—that the court had conducted a case management conference on December 4, 2015, in which the parties presented their respective positions concerning the validity of the court's order granting new trial. It was recited in the December 11 Order as follows: "Plaintiffs' position is that while the Court should have filed a written order setting forth the grounds and reasons for the Court granting the motion for new trial, the lack of a written statement of reasons did not render the Court's granting the motion for new trial ineffective or void. Defendants' position is that because the Court did not enter a written order within 60 days of notice of entry of judgment,...