Bassett v. Connecticut River R. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 October 1887 |
| Citation | 13 N.E. 370,145 Mass. 129 |
| Parties | BASSETT v. CONNECTICUT RIVER R. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Luther White, for plaintiff.
The question raised by the case stated is whether goods which have arrived at their destination, and are stored by the carrier to await removal by the owner, who is not directly notified of their arrival nor requested to remove the same are included in the indemnity furnished by the general and broad terms of Pub.St. c. 112, § 214. The plaintiff so contends, and submits the following reasons:
The common law provides a remedy for those who suffer by the negligent use of locomotives. The remedy so provided extends to all who suffer from that cause, whether the damage falls on property for which the railroad is responsible as bailee or on property beyond their control. Story, Bailm, § 450a. The statute is remedial, and, by the general rule of construction of statutes, should receive a liberal interpretation. Gray v. Bennett, 3 Metc. 527; Quigley v. Railroad Co., 8 Allen, 440. See Ross v. Railroad Co., 6 Allen, 87; Railroad Co. v Richardson, 91 U.S. 454. If the legislature intended to have the statute applied in any restricted sense, it seems strange they did not add some qualifying word or clause. Hart v. Railroad Co., 13 Metc. 99.
The judicial interpretation given to the statute has been continuously in the line of a liberal application of the remedy, and in accordance with the general rule for the interpretation of remedial statutes. Lyman v. Railroad Co., 4 Cush. 288; Trask v. Railroad Co., 16 Gray, 71; Perley v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 414; Safford v. Railroad Co., 103 Mass. 583; Daniels v. Hart, 118 Mass. 543; Davis v Railroad Co., 121 Mass. 134. The same liberal principle of interpretation has been affirmed in Pierce v. Railroad Co., 105 Mass. 199. Similar statutes of other states have received a liberal interpretation. Railroad Co. v. Richardson, supra; Hooksett v. Railroad Co., 38 N.H. 242; Rowell v. Railroad Co., 57 N.H. 132; Pratt v. Railroad Co., 42 Me. 580. The only exception is found in Chapman v. Railroad Co., 37 Me. 92; but see BIGELOW, C.J., in Ross v. Railroad Co., 6 Allen, 87. The language of the supreme court of New Hampshire is still stronger. See Rowell v. Railroad Co., 57 N.H. 132; Smith v. Railroad Co., 63 N.H. 25. If we consider the subject from another point of view, we are brought to the same conclusion. The enactment of the statute seems to be a return to the ancient doctrine, so far as railroads are concerned, in regard to the liability of the master of any premises on which fire is kindled, for damages caused by it, as the law stood prior to the act 6 Anne, c. 31, §§ 6, 7. See Comyn, Dig. "Action upon the Case for Negligence," A; Rolle, Abr. "Action sur Case," B; 1 Add. Torts, 365. See Jones v. Railway Co., L.R. 3 Q.B. 733.
The expression in the Massachusetts statute, "upon its route," is certainly as favorable to the plaintiff as in the Vermont statute cited in Railroad Co. v. Richardson, ubi supra. The absence of decisions exactly in point, which was one of the defendant's arguments in the superior court, proves nothing. It was claimed Nichols v. Smith, 115 Mass. 332, tended to favor the defendant's view, as otherwise the action would have brought under the statute. But the fire occurred in Vermont, where the railroad may show it has used suitable expedients to prevent such injury; consequently the remedy at common law was certainly preferable in that case. It was also doubtful at that time if the action could be sustained against receivers, which as an additional reason for bringing the action at common law. So in Barron v. Eldredge, 100 Mass. 455, the fire occurred in New York, where no such statute exists. Grissell v. Railroad Co., 54 Conn. 447, 9 Atl.Rep. 137, was cited, but we fail to see any force in its argument.
George M. Stearns and Gideon Wells, for defendant.
Defendant contends that goods to which it holds the relation of common carrier or warehouseman are not within the protection of Pub.St. c. 112, § 214. The statute is remedial. Its manifest purpose is to furnish protection to owners of property along the line of railroads from the dangers incident to its exposure to the sparks driven from the locomotives. At common law, they had no redress unless negligence was proved. A partial remedy was provided by Acts 1837, c. 226, § 9, whereby the burden of showing the exercise of care was put upon the corporation. General liability was first imposed by Acts 1840, c. 85, § 1. The manifest reason for this legislation is given in many of the decisions. It is because the railroad companies have the right to take a strip of land from each owner, and without his consent, and traverse the same day and night with locomotives which scatter fire along the margin of the land not taken, thereby subjecting property near the line to extraordinary hazard, in which all the benefit accrues to the railroad, without any advantage to the owner of the property. Grissell v. Housatonic R. Co., 54 Conn. 447, 9 Atl.Rep. 137, (decided February, 1887;) Hart v. Railroad Co., 13 Metc. 99; Hooksett v. Railroad Co., 38 N.H. 242; Lyman v. Railroad Co., 4 Cush. 288; Railroad Co. v. Richardson, 91 U.S. 454. It is submitted that goods wrongfully upon the land of the company are not protected. Quigley v. Railroad Co., 8 Allen, 438; Railroad Co. v. Richardson, supra. This is analogous to the construction given to other remedial statutes of like nature, such as damages on highways, damages for dogs, damages for unguarded elevator wells. Taylor v. Carew Co., 143 Mass. 470, 10 N.E. 308, and cases cited.
The decision by this court that a railroad company is liable under the statute for damages along its line, by fires communicated by locomotives of lessees, (Ingersoll v. Railroad Co., 8 Allen, 438; Daniels v. Hart, 118 Mass. 543,) would seem to be a reason for holding that the law does not apply to goods in the hands of carriers. Otherwise a party might have two independent remedies,--one against the owner of the road in tort, under the statute; and the other against the actual carrier, for breach of contract. Also the lessee corporation might recover from the lessor for damage done by its own locomotives. The goods of Bassett, and such part of the goods of Blaisdell, as had been in the depot a reasonable length of time for their removal, were improperly, if not wrongfully, there. If the statute applies to any goods in the possession of the company received by them as carriers, defendant contends that it does not apply to those which the owners have neglected to remove within a reasonable time after arrival. It was the duty of the plaintiff to remove his goods immediately upon their arrival. The depot is not designed for the continued storage of goods for the convenience of parties, but only for temporary custody until they can be taken away. The plaintiff's goods were therefore without right in the defendant's depot, at the time of the fire, and therefore, in a sense, wrongfully. The fact that Blaisdell had paid for the use of the store-house did not, even while so paying, change the relations of the parties. The payment of rent was only in the nature of a charge for warehousing received goods, ordinarily covered by transportation charges. Norway Plains Co. v. Railroad Co., 1 Gray, 263; Miller v. Mansfield, 112 Mass. 260.
Whatever analogy the plaintiff Blaisdell's occupation on had, was terminated by notice of September 21, 1886, and the subsequent...
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