Bassett v. Saunders
Decision Date | 31 December 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 1D01-4098.,1D01-4098. |
Citation | 835 So.2d 1198 |
Parties | Lisa Mary BASSETT, Appellant, v. Alfred Lagran SAUNDERS, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appellant, pro se.
Paula L. Walborsky, Mari M. Presley, and Mary A. Kane of Walborsky, Presley and Kane, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Appellant, Lisa Mary Bassett, appeals an amended final judgment on an amended petition to determine paternity initiated by Alfred Lagran Saunders. Appellant raises five issues on appeal, three of which we find have merit: (1) retroactive child-support; (2) a discrepancy between the court's oral and written rulings; and (3) the residency restriction. The remaining issues are affirmed.
The parties entered into a written agreement regarding the raising of their unborn child. Although the mother refers to this agreement as a "sperm donor" agreement, the trial court correctly found that because the father impregnated the mother in the "usual and customary manner" the agreement was invalid and unenforceable under the sperm donor statute. See Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
(. ) The mother is not appealing this decision. Despite the provisions in the agreement allowing the mother, appellant, discretion to give the father, appellee, visitation, the parties could not agree on a visitation schedule. As a result, the father filed an amended petition for paternity seeking various relief including shared parental responsibility and child support.
The trial court ordered the father to pay retroactive child support in a lump-sum amount of $1,630.50, retroactive to the date the court found the parties' agreement void and unenforceable (March 6, 2001) rather than retroactive to the date of the birth of the child (June 29, 1997), based on the court's finding that the mother was estopped by her hindrance of the father's visitation, that the parties to some extent relied upon the agreement which the trial court subsequently found void, and that the retroactive support was not needed:
I find that based on the unreasonable and restricted actions of Bassett [mother] in limiting Saunders' [father] contact with the child and the fact that the parties, at least to some extent, may have thought that the agreement they had entered into was valid and binding on them, Bassett is estopped from arguing entitlement to child support retroactive to the birth of the Minor Child. This is not a case in which the receiving party (Bassett), an attorney, has ever had the need to receive child support. To the contrary, she testified that she never wanted it which was evidenced by the agreement she entered into with Saunders. While child support is to be paid for the benefit of the child, given the circumstances of this case, I find that child support began to accrue as of the date of my order finding the parties agreement to be invalid and unenforceable, i.e., March 6, 2001.
While we commonly refer to an award of child support prior to the date of the order as "retroactive," the issue is not so much "legal retroactivity" as "the extent to which the law will enforce, or conversely, excuse the past due obligations" for the obligation owed by both biological parents to their child from the child's birth. State, Department of Revenue on Behalf of Carbonaro v. Carbonaro, 712 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Here, under that guiding principle, we determine the trial court erred in three respects: (1) determining that retroactive child support may be denied based upon unreasonable restrictions on visitation; (2) failing to address all the elements of estoppel and determining that estoppel existed based solely upon the parties reliance on the void agreement; and (3) focusing on the needs of the mother rather than the needs of the child in determining whether to award retroactive support.
The restraint on visitation rights does not excuse a parent from child support obligations. See section 61.13(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2000) ( ); Gore v. Peck, 800 So.2d 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ( ); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Sandidge, 651 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). This case is similar to Richards v. Ryan, 655 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), where this court reversed the trial court's decision denying retroactive child support in a paternity action based on the following reasoning:
Id. at 1185-1186 (quotations and citations omitted). Based on this court's reasoning in Ryan, the trial court in the instant case erred in denying retroactive support based on the mother's failure to allow visitation.
The trial court also erred in relying on the agreement as a basis for estopping the mother from seeking child support. In Budnick, the court addressed a situation similar to this case. There, as here, the parties had entered into a "Preconception Agreement" which provided that the parties intended that the father be the biological father of her child, but that he would have no responsibilities. In turn, the agreement provided that the mother would not file a paternity action against the father or "burden him with the responsibilities of being a father in any way." Id. at 1113. Ten years later, the mother in Budnick, filed a Petition for Paternity and Child Support claiming the agreement was against public policy. The father argued that the mother should be equitably barred from seeking child support in part based upon the "Preconception Agreement."1 The trial court sided with the father because it found "the delay between the child's birth and the claim deprived the respondent of his rights because he had relied on the agreement during this time." Id. at 1114. On a motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc, the appellate court in Budnick reversed, finding that the rights of support and meaningful relationship belong to the child, not the parent; therefore, neither parent...
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