Bastien v. Goddard

• Decision Date: 01 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-2224.,00-2224.
• Citation: 279 F.3d 10
• Parties: Delanot BASTIEN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. William GODDARD, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

279 F.3d 10

Delanot BASTIEN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. William GODDARD, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 00-2224.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard January 8, 2002.

Decided February 1, 2002.

Aderonke O. Lipede, with whom Stephen B. Hrones and Hrones & Garrity were on brief, for appellant.

Austin M. Joyce, with whom Edward P Reardon was on brief, for appellee.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellant Delanot Bastien claims that he is entitled to a new trial on his claim of excessive force against appellee William Goddard because the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that liability on an excessive force claim depended upon a finding of "serious" injury. We agree that the jury was improperly instructed and that the error was not harmless. We therefore reverse and remand for a retrial on that claim.

I. Factual Background

We briefly review the facts as the jury could have found them, see Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 730 (1st Cir.1999), limiting our recitation to only so much of the episode underlying this case as is necessary to set the stage for our discussion. Appellant was ushered out of the Algiers Night Club in Worcester, Massachusetts, in the early hours of January 1, 1990 by four bouncers from the club and appellee, a Worcester police officer who was assigned to the club that night. The men told appellant that he had had too much to drink, although he maintained that he had drunk only half a beer. Appellant, who is black and of Haitian descent, complained to the men that he was being unfairly ejected from the club because of his race.

Outside the club, verbal interaction between appellant and the officer continued. A friend of appellant and another acquaintance came out of the club, and appellant repeated his allegation that he was unfairly forced to leave. Appellant realized that he had left his coat inside, and someone went in to retrieve it. A short time later, as appellant prepared to leave the scene, he asked for appellee's name and told the officer that he was going to the hospital for a blood test to prove that he was not intoxicated. Some additional words were exchanged,¹ and appellee then placed appellant under arrest. He was charged with disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace.

Appellant immediately complained that the handcuffs placed on him were too tight and causing pain. No adjustments were made,² and appellant testified that he experienced additional harm during the ride in the patrol wagon to the Worcester police station because the driver of the van continuously applied the brakes abruptly, causing him to bounce about the vehicle.

At the police station, appellant remained handcuffed for approximately four more hours, although he repeatedly requested that the cuffs be removed or loosened. A videotape of appellant's booking was shown to the jury as evidence of his physical condition after the handcuffs were removed.³ After posting bail, he went to the hospital and was diagnosed with probable "post traumatic/occlusive loss of sensation [in] both hands of temporary nature." Follow-up treatment was recommended. Other medical records indicated that he may have suffered a rotator cuff injury. Appellant testified that he experienced pain in his wrists for a few months.

About six months after the incident, the charges against appellant were dismissed. He subsequently filed this suit claiming that appellee had violated his constitutional rights by falsely arresting him and using excessive force.⁴

At trial, the court instructed the jurors that they must find that appellant suffered "serious injury" to find appellee liable for excessive force. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant on the false arrest claim, but found no liability on the excessive force claim. On appeal, Bastien challenges only the court's instruction on excessive force.

II. Discussion

Appellant argues that the district court erred by imposing a "serious" injury requirement on the excessive force claim. His counsel initially pressed this argument at a charging conference outside the jury's presence, asserting that that was not the standard for excessive force. The trial judge disagreed, noting that he nearly directed a verdict on that claim "because of the issue of serious, permanent injury." Counsel renewed the objection following the charge: "I would also like to state an objection as to the Court's charge that Mr. Bastien be required to prove that he had a serious injury as a result of the excessive force used by Mr. Goddard."

Preliminarily, we address appellee's contention that the issue was not properly preserved. He contends that appellant "stated no grounds for the objection" and failed to direct the court to any authority that might cause it to reconsider. We disagree that counsel's effort to alert the court was deficient. An attorney's obligation is to "stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection," see Fed.R.Civ.P. 51, so that the trial judge has the opportunity to reconsider and correct any error, Drohan v. Vaughn, 176 F.3d 17, 21 n. 1 (1st Cir.1999); see also Wilson v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 150 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1998) ("The emphasis is not on the form of objections, but rather on ensuring that the trial court had actual notice of the nature and grounds of the objection.").

At the conference, counsel directly asserted that the standard for excessive force did not include a finding of serious injury. There was no imprecision in the objection and no confusion on the part of the court; to the contrary, the judge contradicted counsel's statement of the law, to which the attorney responded, "Okay. Note my objection." When the court actually gave the charge, appellant's attorney repeated her objection to the requirement that Bastien show serious injury.

Appellee has cited no cases holding that, in addition to a clearly stated objection, counsel must provide the court, on the spot, with the legal research underlying her position. It would be ideal, of course, if an attorney lodging an objection offered the court photocopies of cases or citations to the precedent substantiating her contention that the court had erred. Placing such an obligation on an attorney immersed in daily trial preparations, however, strikes us as wholly unreasonable. By its terms, Rule 51 does not require an attorney to be prepared at the time of trial to fully litigate his objection; the crucial requirement is to provide the court with an adequate understanding of the asserted flaw in its charge. That obligation was met here.

Having concluded that appellant sufficiently preserved his objection, we turn to the merits and review the contested instruction de novo. See Ponce v. Ashford Presbyterian Comm. Hosp., 238 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir.2001). Our inquiry quickly reveals that appellant is correct that liability may be imposed for the use of excessive force even in the absence of a serious injury. Excessive force claims arising out of arrests are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), and the plaintiff

must demonstrate that the police defendant's actions were not objectively reasonable, viewed in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him and without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.

Alexis v. McDonald's Rests. of Mass., 67 F.3d 341, 352 (1st Cir.1995) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865). The relevant circumstances include "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Although the severity of the injury also may be considered, see, e.g., Dean v. City of Worcester, 924 F.2d 364, 369 (1st Cir.1991),⁵ we have stated explicitly that a "serious injury" is not a prerequisite to recovery:

[A] trialworthy "excessive force" claim is not precluded merely because only minor injuries were inflicted by the seizure. See Lester [v. Chicago], 830 F.2d [706,] 714 [(7th Cir.1987)] (finding reversible error in district court "excessive force" instruction which required jury to find "severe injury," thus may have led jury to find for defendant where plaintiff's physical injuries consisted only of bruises); see also Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that plaintiff need not prove "significant injury" to assert Fourth Amendment "excessive force" claim).

Alexis, 67 F.3d at 353 n. 11.⁶ That view is widely held. See, e.g., Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir.2001) (excessive force claims can be maintained regardless of whether injuries "left physical marks or caused extensive physical damage," including, as in that case, when individual's wrists are cuffed too tightly); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir.2001);⁷ Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds by ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 24, 151 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) ("[W]hether the use of force poses a risk of permanent or significant injury is a factor to be considered in evaluating the need for the force used in a particular case — but it is certainly not dispositive."); Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 936 (8th Cir.1999) (circuit has rejected the "significant injury" requirement for excessive force claims, requiring instead "actual injury"); Rambo v. Daley, 68 F.3d 203, 207 n. 2 (7th Cir.1995) (significant injury not required for Fourth Amendment excessive force claims); Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1304 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1993) (severity of injury a "relevant factor," but "we do not suggest that an individual must suffer significant injuries in...