Batchelor v. Geico Cas. Co., Case No. 6:11-cv-1071-Orl-37GJK
| Decision Date | 09 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:11-cv-1071-Orl-37GJK |
| Parties | DONNA R. BATCHELOR, Plaintiff, v. GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause is before the Court on the following:
Upon consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiff's objection to the Magistrate Judge's order is due to be sustained and that Defendant's motion to compel is due to be denied.
BACKGROUND
In March 2005, Plaintiff was involved in a car accident. (Doc. 53, ¶¶ 1-2.) She was insured by Defendant under a $30,000 uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM") policy. (Id. ¶ 1.) In December 2005, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in state court, seeking benefits under the policy. (Id. ¶ 3.) That suit was tried in April 2011; the jury returned a verdict finding that the other driver was negligent and that Plaintiff suffered damages of approximately $1.8 million. (Id. ¶ 4.) After the trial, Defendant moved the court to reduce the amount of the verdict to the policy limits in the judgment. (Doc. 59-1, p. 8.) The court granted the motion, entering judgment against Defendant in the amount of $30,000. (Doc. 53, ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff then amended her complaint to state a bad faith claim against Defendant. (Id.) Defendant removed the claim to this Court in June 2011. (Doc. 1.) This Court abated the case while Defendant appealed the underlying action. (Doc. 21.) In the appeal, Defendant primarily briefed and orally argued that the trial court erred in permitting certain testimony about damages. (Doc. 59-1, pp. 32-37, 43.) The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam, without opinion. (Doc. 59-3.) In July 2013, this Court lifted its stayand this first-party bad faith action proceeded. (Doc. 33.)
In September 2013, Defendant served interrogatories seeking Plaintiff's response to a number of questions about her damages. (Doc. 53, ¶¶ 5-15.) Plaintiff objected on the ground that damages were tried and fixed in the underlying action and therefore that such information is irrelevant to this action. (Id.) Defendant moved to compel Plaintiff's responses, arguing that the underlying verdict did not determine the damages for this bad faith claim. (Id. at pp. 5-10 .) Plaintiff responded, and Defendant replied. (Docs. 59, 63.)
Magistrate Judge Gregory J. Kelly entered an order granting Defendant's motion to compel, relying on Harris, King, and the Bottini concurrence. (Doc. 72.) Plaintiff objected, contending that the Magistrate Judge's order was contrary to law. (Doc. 75.) Defendant responded, Plaintiff replied, and Defendant surreplied. (Docs. 79, 86, 92.) The Court heard oral argument on the objection. (Doc. 107.) This matter is now ripe for the Court's adjudication.
STANDARDS
When a party objects to a magistrate judge's pretrial order, "[t]he district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
DISCUSSION
In an action for UM benefits, the court is required to limit an excess verdict to the amount of the policy limits in the judgment. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. St. Godard, 936 So. 2d 5, 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (); see also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Voigt, 971 So. 2d 239, 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). District courts of appeal only have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments and orders, see Fla. Const. art. 5, § 4(b)(1), and a jury verdict is not an appealable final order, see Norm Burg Constr. Co. v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 514 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 1987).
Based on these principles, Defendant argues that state appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to review the amount of the excess verdict, and therefore, allowing the unreviewed excess verdict to be binding in this case denies Defendant due process. (Doc. 53, pp. 7-8.) For this proposition, Defendant relies primarily on Judge Altenbernd's concurrence to the Second District Court of Appeal's opinion in Bottini, in which he posits: "I am unconvinced that we have a scope of review that allows us to rule on issues that do not and cannot affect the judgment on appeal." 93 So. 3d at 478 (Altenbernd, J., concurring). This Court must respectfully disagree, as Judge Altenbernd's opinion—which is wholly unsupported by authority—is contrary to Florida law and, indeed, to the Bottini majority opinion itself.1
The Bottini majority entered a per curiam affirmance with a brief opinion holding that "even if Geico were correct that errors may have affected the jury's computation of damages, in the context of this case and the amount of the judgment, any such errors were harmless." Id. at 476 (majority op.). Logic dictates that in order to hold an error harmless, one must consider it—and that is precisely what the majority did. Judge Altenbernd's concurrence thus improperly conflates a lack of jurisdiction with harmless error review.2
In fact, while parties may not appeal from verdicts, appellate courts can and regularly do consider potential errors in verdicts. For instance, orders granting remittiturs are reviewed for abuse of discretion; on review, the appellate courts must look at whether the verdict was so high as to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Normius v. Eckerd Corp., 813 So. 2d 985, 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Similarly, orders granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict are reviewed de novo; there, appellate courts must look to whether any reasonable jury could have rendered the verdict. See, e.g., Duclos v. Richardson, 113 So. 3d 1001, 1003-04 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). In both of these instances, even though there is a judgment that is different than the verdict, the appellate courts can and must review the verdict and the evidence supporting the verdict to determine whether the judgment was appropriate—just as in Bottini, the majority had to review the verdict and potential errors affecting the verdict in order to find that thoseerrors were harmless.3 See 93 So. 3d at 476 (majority op.).
These cases demonstrate appellate courts' well-settled powers of plenary review. "[A]n appeal from a final order calls up for review all necessary interlocutory steps leading to that final order, whether they were separately appealable or not." Saul v. Basse, 399 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Just because verdicts themselves are not appealable does not mean that appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to consider the verdicts in conducting plenary review of potential trial errors. They do; they must.
Thus, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in the instant case, presented with briefing and oral argument on potential errors affecting the jury's damages award, had jurisdiction to review those errors, even though the judgment was reduced to the policy limits. The appellate court rejected those arguments and affirmed.4 This Court cannot discern any due process violation from this procedural posture. Defendant fully litigated the issue of the extent of Plaintiff's damages, argued that issue on appeal, and obtained a ruling from the appellate court.5 It has received all of the process to which it is due.
Defendant further contends that issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel) does not bind it to the underlying verdict because the verdict is not a final judgment. (Doc. 53, p. 9.) The Court need not resort to that judicial doctrine, however. Rather, the Florida Statutes and Florida Supreme Court case law mandate that the underlying verdict fixes the total amount of damages in the later bad faith claim.
Florida Statutes § 627.727 provides: "The damages recoverable from an uninsured motorist carrier in an action brought under s. 624.155 shall include the total amount of the claimant's damages, including the amount in excess of the policy limits . . . ." Fla. Stat. § 627.727(10) (emphasis added). The Florida Supreme Court has held: "Absent a determination of the existence of liability on the part of the uninsured tortfeasor and the extent of the plaintiff's damages, a cause of action cannot exist for a bad faith failure to settle." Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 1991) (emphasis added). The "extent of the plaintiff's damages" is thus a necessary element of successfully pleading a first-party bad faith claim. See Porcelli v....
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