Bates v. Dallas Independent School Dist.
| Decision Date | 20 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-95-01563-CV,05-95-01563-CV |
| Parties | 121 Ed. Law Rep. 414 Wilfred BATES, Appellant, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; Chad Woolery, in his official capacity as superintendent of the Dallas Independent School District, Clarence C. Russeau, individually and in his official capacity as principal of Carter High School of the Dallas Independent School District; and The Board of Trustees for the Dallas Independent School District, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Daniel A. Ortiz, Ortiz & Robinson, L.L.P., Arlington, for Appellant.
Dennis J. Eichelbaum, Schwartz & Eichelbaum, P.C., Dallas, for Appellees.
Before LAGARDE, KINKEADE and MALONEY, JJ.
This case is an appeal by former public school teacher Wilfred Bates of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Dallas Independent School District (DISD); Marvin Edwards, in his official capacity as superintendent of DISD; 1 Clarence C. Russeau, individually and in his official capacity as principal of Carter High School; the DISD board of trustees; and Yvonne Ewell, Kathlyn Gilliam, Thomas Jones, Dan Peavy, John Rogers, Mary Rutledge, Richard Curry, Rene Castilla, and Betty Vondracek, in their official capacities as members of the board of trustees. Bates claims that the school district violated certain of his constitutional rights, that it constructively discharged him, and that his principal tortiously interfered with his contractual relationship with the school district. In one point of error, Bates contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Bates was a math teacher at Carter High School in Dallas. Russeau was principal of Carter. Russeau transferred a failing math student/athlete out of Bates's class and into another teacher's class. Russeau instructed Bates to give the student a passing grade. As a result of an anonymous telephone call, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) and the University Interscholastic League (UIL) began investigating Carter's grading policies. Following their investigations, which included public hearings at which Bates testified, the commissioner of education disqualified Carter from the state football playoffs. DISD later obtained a court order that allowed Carter to participate in the playoffs. By a letter dated January 3, 1989 and signed by then assistant superintendent Chad Woolery, DISD informed Bates that the district was transferring him to a middle school, placing him on probation for one year, freezing his salary during probation, giving him an unsatisfactory rating for the 1988-89 school year, and prohibiting him from teaching math while on probation. Bates alleges that these acts were in retaliation for his testimony at the hearings.
Bates appealed to an administrative panel of DISD. That panel upheld DISD's decision with the exception of the prohibition against teaching math. Bates appealed the panel's decision to the DISD board of trustees. The board, by a 3-3 vote, purportedly upheld the administrative panel's decision. Bates appealed the board's decision to the TEA, abandoning the issue of involuntary transfer. The TEA granted all relief Bates sought, holding that the board's 3-3 vote actually overturned the administration's decision. Despite the TEA's favorable ruling, Bates filed this suit in district court in 1991. Bates resigned from teaching in 1993. 2
Bates asserted multiple claims, including several constitutional violations. Bates claimed that appellees deprived him of his liberty and property interests in his rights to freedom of speech, free association, and academic freedom under the First Amendment 3 and state law; his liberty and therefore his right to procedural and substantive due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 4 and his Fourteenth Amendment 5 right to equal protection. Bates further claimed that appellees acted arbitrarily and capriciously, with no rational basis or compelling reason for discrimination.
Bates asserted that Russeau, Edwards, and the board of trustees acted as policymakers for DISD. Bates claimed that appellees' conduct violated their own written policies and practices. Bates's petition, however, also asserted that appellees acted pursuant to the official policies and customs of DISD and sought a court order declaring the DISD policies and practices violative of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 6
Bates also asserted claims of breach of contract, constructive termination, and tortious interference with his employment contract. Bates further argued that appellees violated an implied covenant to deal with him fairly and in good faith. 7
Appellees answered, contending that Bates had not exhausted his administrative remedies; the First Amendment does not guarantee a teacher the right to give a student a particular grade; Bates's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest and due process claims failed; appellees were protected from this suit by governmental immunity; Russeau was not a policymaker; Bates's appeal from the TEA decision should have been filed in district court in Travis County; and Bates's claim was barred by the statute of limitations, collateral estoppel, and res judicata.
Appellees then moved for summary judgment, claiming that Bates's administrative appeals completely restored him; Bates failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; assigning grades is not protected by the First Amendment; Bates had no property interest in assignment to a particular school; no DISD custom or policy deprived Bates of any rights, privileges, or immunities; a principal is not a policymaker; all appellees enjoyed immunity from Bates's claims; these matters were not matters of public concern; and Bates was not constructively discharged.
As summary judgment evidence, appellees presented Bates's original petition; Bates's December 9, 1994 and January 5, 1995 depositions; three of Bates's employment contracts with the DISD; DISD's letter informing Bates of his transfer, probation, prohibition from teaching math, and salary freeze; and the commissioner's decision in Bates's administrative appeal.
Bates responded to appellees' motion for summary judgment, contending that appellees supported their motion for summary judgment with an unverified copy of Bates's deposition; Bates did exhaust his administrative remedies; the speech at issue was public; he was denied a property right because he was constructively discharged after the year in question but in the middle of a five-year contract; Russeau was not immune because he abandoned his official duties and became a mere intermeddler; and DISD was not immune from claims of breach of contract. In support thereof, Bates offered his own March 28, 1995 affidavit; Dr. Bailey M. Marshall's January 13, 1994 deposition; Walter Rambo's January 8, 1993 deposition (in which Rambo states that the tip to the UIL was anonymous); DISD's letter informing Bates that Carter's grading policies were under investigation and that Bates was being placed on administrative leave; DISD's letter informing Bates of his transfer, probation, prohibition from teaching math, and salary freeze; the board of trustees' findings and decision; the commissioner's decision; Bates's March 20, 1992 teaching contract; and several DISD announcements regarding teaching contracts.
Bates also moved for summary judgment, contending that appellees acted in contravention of their own policies and thus breached his employment contract. In support of this motion, Bates offered his January 26, 1995 affidavit; the DISD administrative council hearing panel's judgment and order; the commissioner's decision; and DISD's letter informing Bates of his transfer, probation, prohibition from teaching math, and salary freeze.
Appellees responded that Bates failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; Bates elected his remedy by appealing to the TEA; Travis County was the proper venue; DISD did not violate its policies; and DISD ruled in favor of Bates and thus Bates was estopped from claiming that DISD breached his contract, constructively discharged him, or discriminated against him. Appellees claimed that either fact issues remained or contrary facts favorable to them were conclusively established.
On July 7, 1995, the district court denied Bates's motion for summary judgment and granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on all causes of action relating to involuntary transfer, prohibition from teaching math, Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code, First Amendment, tortious interference, and mental anguish. The trial court also granted Russeau summary judgment on all claims of involuntary transfer, probation, salary freeze, and prohibition from teaching math. The court specifically denied all other relief. After Bates nonsuited his breach of contract claim, this appeal followed. 8
In his only point of error, Bates argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as a matter of law. Bates contends that these issues include whether appellees retaliated against Bates for his exercise of protected free speech, whether appellees deprived Bates of a property right in the remainder of his teaching contract, whether Bates was constructively discharged, and whether Russeau acted outside the scope of his authority in dealing with Bates, thereby tortiously interfering with Bates's continual relationship with the DISD.
Appellees argue that the district court properly granted summary judgment because Bates was not constructively discharged, but, instead, retired from teaching upon doctors' orders. Appellees also contend that the disciplinary actions did not...
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