Bates v. Paramo

Decision Date21 August 2020
Docket NumberCase No.: 18cv1563 MMA (AHG)
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California
PartiesGILBERT JOSEPH BATES, Petitioner, v. DANIEL A. PARAMO, Respondent.
ORDER:

(1) DENYING FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF No. 5]

(2) DENYING REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING, AND
(3) DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Gilbert Joseph Bates ("Petitioner") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a First Amended Petition ("FAP") for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 5.) Petitioner claims he is in custody in violation of the federal constitution arising from the denial of his Proposition 36 resentencing petition with respect to his 2006 sentence imposed following his conviction in San Diego Superior Court case number SCD192318. (Id. at 1-2.) On June 23, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to a stipulated sentence of 25 years to life in state prison under California's Three Strikes Law after a guilty plea to corporal injury to a spouse/domestic partner and admitting to having two strike priors. (ECF No. 5 at 2; see also Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 33-5 at 9-11, 27-33.)

After Proposition 36 passed by California voter initiative in 2012, Petitioner unsuccessfully sought recall of his indeterminate life sentence and resentencing to a determinate sentence under the newly enacted California Penal Code § 1170.126. (See Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 33-5 at 34-50, ECF No. 33-6 at 1-42.) In the sole claim remaining in the FAP, Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding he would present an unreasonable risk to public safety as the basis for denying his petition for recall and resentencing, violating his right to federal due process and requiring remand, and alternatively argues that he is entitled to a new hearing based on the change in law to the definition of unreasonable risk to public safety pursuant to Proposition 47. (ECF No. 5 at 6-12, 21-74.) Respondent has filed an Answer to the FAP and has lodged portions of the state court record. (ECF Nos. 32, 33, see also ECF No. 13.) Respondent maintains that habeas relief is unavailable because (1) Petitioner's claim fails to present a cognizable federal question and (2) even if the claim presents a federal question, the state court adjudication is objectively reasonable. (ECF No. 32 at 2.) On July 14, 2020, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 36.) Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 5 at 12; see also ECF No. 36 at 5.)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the FAP, DENIES Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing, and DENIES Petitioner's request for a Certificate of Appealability.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In an Information filed August 4, 2005, Petitioner was charged with three counts arising from events occurring on or about July 10, 2005, including one count of corporal injury to spouse and/or roommate in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 273.5 and two counts of false imprisonment by violence, menace, fraud and deceit in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 236 and 237(a). (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 33-5 at 5-6.) It was alleged he had twoprior felony convictions, suffered July 30, 1996 and January 3, 2001, which constituted probation denial priors, prison priors, and strike priors. (Id. at 6-7.)

On February 21, 2006, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to one count of corporal injury to spouse and/or roommate in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 273.5 and admitted he had suffered two prior strike convictions under Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i) and 1170.12 pursuant to a plea agreement reflecting as follows: "Balance to be dismissed. Pursuant to '3 strikes' law parties stipulate sentence is 25 years to life in prison." (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 33-5 at 9-11, 27-33, ECF No. 33-8 at 6; see also Lodgment No. 11, ECF No. 33-9.) On June 23, 2006, the trial court imposed the stipulated sentence of 25 years to life. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 33-5 at 27-33, ECF No. 33-8 at 7; see also Lodgment No. 11, ECF No. 33-10.)

On March 25, 2013, Petitioner filed a Three Strikes Lifer Petition for Sentence Recall pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1170.126. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 33-5 at 34-50, ECF No. 33-6 at 1-42); see People v. Johnson, 61 Cal. 4th 674, 679-80 (Cal. 2015) ("[I]n 2012, the electorate passed Proposition 36. The Act authorizes prisoners serving third-strike sentences whose 'current' offense (i.e., the offense for which the third-strike sentence was imposed) is not a serious or violent felony to petition for recall of the sentence and for resentencing as a second-strike case."), citing Cal. Penal Code §§ 1170.126 (f), 667 (e)(1), and 1170.12(c)(1). The People filed an opposition, conceding Petitioner's eligibility but arguing resentencing relief was inappropriate based on an unreasonable risk to public safety. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 33-6 at 43-50, ECF No. 33-7 at 1-3.) Petitioner also filed additional supporting documents and memoranda in support of the petition. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 33-7 at 4-50, ECF No. 33-8 at 1-3.) The trial court held a hearing on May 8, 2014 and denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 11, ECF No. 33-11.)

On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner argued, as he does in Claim One of the instant FAP, that the trial court abused its discretion and violated federal due process in finding he would present an unreasonable risk to public safety and that he was entitled to a new hearing to demonstrate he did not present an unreasonable risk to publicsafety pursuant to the definition of that term as established by Proposition 47, which had been passed several months after the denial of his Proposition 36 petition. (See generally Lodgment No. 1, ECF No. 13-1.) In an order filed on July 16, 2015, the state appellate court rejected Petitioner's contentions and affirmed the order denying his petition for recall and resentencing, concluding the trial court's rejection of his Proposition 36 petition was reasonable and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its denial, and even assuming the Proposition 47 definition of unreasonable risk to public safety applied to petitions filed pursuant to Proposition 36, the definition would not apply in the instant case because his petition was heard and decided prior to the effective date of Proposition 47. (Lodgment No. 2, ECF No. 13-2 at 13, 21.) In an order dated August 5, 2015, the state appellate court modified the opinion and denied a petition for rehearing, with no change in judgment. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF No. 33-4.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, again raising the same arguments previously raised in the state appellate court. (Lodgment No. 3, ECF No. 13-3.) The state supreme court initially granted review and deferred further action pending the outcome of two related cases concerning the Proposition 47 aspect of Petitioner's argument (see Lodgment No. 4, ECF No. 13-4), namely, "whether Proposition 47's definition of 'unreasonable risk of danger to public safety' (§ 1170.18, subd. (c)) applies to resentencing proceedings under Proposition 36" and "whether, if Proposition 47's definition of unreasonable risk of danger to public safety applies to resentencing proceedings under the Three Strikes Reform Act, does the definition apply retroactively to Proposition 36 resentencing petitions that a court has already denied but are not yet final on appeal." People v. Valencia, 3 Cal. 5th 347, 351-52 (Cal. 2017). On November 29, 2017, after that issues were resolved, the California Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review in an order that stated in full: "The above-entitled matter, which was granted and held for People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, is dismissed." (See Lodgment No. 5, ECF No. 13-5); (see also ECF No. 17 at 3.)

On July 31, 2018, Petitioner filed a FAP in this Court, raising six claims for relief, including the previously-raised allegations that the trial court abused its discretion and violated federal due process in finding he would present an unreasonable risk to public safety in its denial of his resentencing petition and that he has a federal constitutional right to the benefit of the Proposition 47 definition of unreasonable risk to public safety. (See ECF No. 5.) After the filing of and briefing on a motion to dismiss, on July 8, 2019, the assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation for Order denying the motion to dismiss, concluding the FAP was a mixed petition, in that Claim One was exhausted and Claims Two though Six were unexhausted, and recommending issuance of an options order instead of dismissal. (ECF No. 17.) On August 16, 2019, the Court issued an Order adopting the Report and Recommendation, denying the motion to dismiss without prejudice, and construing Petitioner's August 7, 2019 "Notice to Withdraw Pending Completion of Unexhausted Claims, But Remain in Federal Court Pending Completion," as a motion to stay. (ECF No. 22, citing ECF No. 21.) Thereafter, on March 26, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Unexhausted Claims and on April 1, 2020, the Court granted Petitioner's motion, dismissing all but Claim One from the FAP. (ECF Nos. 29, 30.) On May 13, 2020, Respondent filed an Answer to the FAP and lodged portions of the state court record. (ECF Nos. 32, 33.) On July 14, 2020, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 36.)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the state appellate court opinion affirming the denial of Petitioner's petition to recall his sentence and resentence him pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1170.126 in People v. Bates, D065983 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15, 2016). (See Lodgment No. 2, ECF No. 13-2.) The state court factual findings are presumptively reasonable and entitled to deference in these proceedings. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981).

In 2005, at the time of the offense for which Bates is currently incarcerated, Bates was in a
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