People v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 02 July 2015
• Docket Number: S219819.,Nos. S219454,s. S219454
• Citation: 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 794,352 P.3d 366,61 Cal.4th 674
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Timothy Wayne JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Oscar Machado, Defendant and Appellant.

61 Cal.4th 674

352 P.3d 366

189 Cal.Rptr.3d 794

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.Timothy Wayne JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.Oscar Machado, Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. S219454

S219819.

Supreme Court of California

July 2, 2015.

Suzan E. Hier, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Timothy Wayne Johnson.

Larry Pizarro, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Oscar Machado.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, Shawn McGahey Webb, Noah P. Hill, Jonathan J. Kline and Carl N. Henry, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion

CANTIL–SAKAUYE, C.J.

On November 6, 2012, the electorate passed Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36 or the Act). Proposition 36 reduced the punishment to be imposed with respect to some third-strike offenses that are neither serious nor violent, and provided for discretionary resentencing in some cases in which third-strike sentences were imposed with respect to felonies that are neither serious nor violent.

We granted review to resolve two issues related to the Act's resentencing provisions. First, in People v. Johnson (S219454), we address for purposes of resentencing a defendant whether the classification of an offense as a serious or violent felony is determined as of November 7, 2012, the effective date of Proposition 36, or the law in effect when the offense was committed. Second, in People v. Machado (S219819), we address whether an inmate who was convicted of both a serious or violent felony and a felony that is neither serious nor violent is eligible for resentencing with respect to the felony that is neither serious nor violent. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that when a court resentences a third-strike defendant the classification of the current offense is based on the law as of the effective date of Proposition 36, and that the presence of a conviction of a serious or violent felony does not disqualify an inmate from resentencing with respect to a current offense that is neither serious nor violent.

I. FACTS

In 1998, a jury convicted Timothy Wayne Johnson of two counts of attempting to dissuade a witness. (Pen.Code, § 136.1, subd. (a)(2) ; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.) The jury also found that he had suffered three prior convictions—robbery (§ 211), first degree burglary (§ 459), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). Based on Johnson's prior convictions, the trial court sentenced him to two terms of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2) ), to be served concurrently, and an additional term of three years for the three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

In 1998, a jury convicted Oscar Machado of one count of first degree burglary and one count of second degree burglary. (§§ 459, 460.) The trial court found true the allegation that he had suffered two prior convictions, both for robbery (§ 211), and sentenced him to two terms of 25 years to life, to be served consecutively. (§§ 667, subds.(c)(6), (e)(2), 1170.12, subds. (a)(6), (c)(2).)

As noted, in 2012, the electorate passed Proposition 36. The Act authorizes prisoners serving third-strike sentences whose “current” offense (i.e., the offense for which the third-strike sentence was imposed) is not a serious or violent felony to petition for recall of the sentence and for resentencing as a second-strike case. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f) ; see §§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)

Following the enactment of Proposition 36, Johnson filed a petition for recall of his sentence. The trial court denied his petition on the ground that his current offenses are serious or violent felonies, rendering him ineligible for recall of his sentence. Although his current offenses were not classified as serious or violent felonies when he committed them in 1998, the crime of intimidating a victim or witness (§ 136.1 ) was subsequently classified as a serious and violent felony by Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, which the voters approved in 2000. (§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(20), 1192.7, subd. (c)(37).) The Court of Appeal agreed that a prisoner whose current offense was a serious or violent offense on November 7, 2012, the effective date of Proposition 36, is not eligible for resentencing, and affirmed the order.

Machado filed a petition for recall of his sentence for second degree burglary. The trial court denied his petition on the ground that his conviction for first degree burglary, which is a serious felony, rendered him ineligible for resentencing with respect to his second degree burglary conviction, which is neither serious nor violent. The Court of Appeal reversed that judgment, and directed the trial court to reconsider his eligibility for resentencing with respect to his conviction for second degree burglary.

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that when a court resentences a third-strike defendant the classification of an offense as serious or violent is based on the law as of November 7, 2012, the effective date of Proposition 36, and that the presence of a current offense that is serious or violent does not disqualify an inmate from resentencing with respect to a current offense that is neither serious nor violent. Therefore, we affirm the appellate court judgments in both of these cases.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Act

Prior to its amendment by the Act, the Three Strikes law required that a defendant who had two or more prior convictions of violent or serious felonies receive a third-strike sentence of a minimum of 25 years to life for any current felony conviction, even if the current offense was neither serious nor violent. (Former §§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subds. (b), c)(2)(A).)¹ The Act amended the Three Strikes law with respect to defendants whose current conviction is for a felony that is neither serious nor violent. In that circumstance, unless an exception applies, the defendant is to receive a second-strike sentence of twice the term otherwise provided for the current felony, pursuant to the provisions that apply when a defendant has one prior conviction for a serious or violent felony. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C) ; see §§ 667.5, subd. (c) [list of violent felonies], 1192.7 [list of serious felonies], 1192.8 [additional serious felonies for purposes of § 1192.7].)

The Act's exceptions to the new sentencing provisions relate to a defendant's current offense and prior offenses. If the current offense involves controlled substances and specified findings are made concerning the quantity of controlled substances involved, or if the current offense is among specified sex offenses, a defendant with two or more strikes must be sentenced to a term of at least 25 years to life.² (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(i)-(ii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)-(ii).) A third-strike sentence is also required if, “[d]uring the commission of the current offense, the defendant used a firearm, was armed with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury to another person.” (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii).) Finally, a defendant will be excluded from the new sentencing provisions if he or she suffered a prior conviction for specified sex offenses,³ any homicide offense or attempted homicide offense defined in sections 187 through 191.5, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or violent felony punishable in California by life imprisonment or death. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv).) These prior convictions are sometimes referred to as “super strikes.” (See, e.g., People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1092, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362.)

In addition to reducing the sentence to be imposed for some third-strike felonies that are neither violent nor serious, the Act provides a procedure by which some prisoners already serving third-strike sentences may seek resentencing in accordance with the new sentencing rules. (§ 1170.126.) “An inmate is eligible for resentencing if [¶] ... [t]he inmate is serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed pursuant to [the Three Strikes law] for a conviction of a felony or felonies that are not defined as serious and/or violent....” (§ 1170.126, subd. (e)(1).) Like a defendant who is being sentenced under the new provisions, an inmate is disqualified from resentencing if any of the exceptions set forth in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C) and section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C) are present. (§ 1170.126, subd. (e).) In contrast to the rules that apply to sentencing, however, the rules governing resentencing provide that an inmate will be denied recall of his or her sentence if “the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)

In construing statutes adopted by the voters, we apply the same principles of interpretation we apply to statutes enacted by the Legislature. (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 307, 299 P.3d 1263.) “ ‘The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ ” (Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927.) We begin with the language of the statute, to which we give its ordinary meaning and construe in the context of the statutory scheme. If the language is ambiguous, we look to other indicia of voter intent. (People v. Park, supra, at pp. 796–798, 156...