Syllabus
by the Court.
It was
competent for the state to prove that at or about the time at
which, it was alleged, the crime in question was committed
the accused committed with another a crime similar to the one
for which he was being tried.
In
order to render testimony admissible as to handwriting, it is
not necessary for the witness to state that he is an expert
on handwriting. Any witness is competent to testify as to his
belief, who will swear that he knows or recognizes the
handwriting; the weight, force, and credit to be given to
such evidence is a matter entirely for the jury. Pen. Code, §
1042.
A
witness claiming to be an expert on handwriting, who stated
with reference to the handwriting on several papers, that
"the same party wrote all of them," did not state a
conclusion, but simply gave an opinion on a question of fact
based upon expert knowledge.
The
charge of the court with reference to the defendant's
statement at the trial, while not entirely correct, was
harmless. Trial judges cannot improve upon the language of
the Code with reference to the prisoner's statement.
There
was no error in the excerpt from the charge of the court with
reference to uttering and publishing a check.
There
was no error in the charge of the court with reference to
conspiracy on the part of the accused and the codefendant.
The
accused being separately tried, it was not error for the
trial judge to charge the jury that they were not concerned
with the guilt or innocence of the codefendant.
On the
trial of one jointly accused with another of a conspiracy, an
instruction to the jury that, if they should find that there
was a conspiracy, the defendant on trial would be bound by
the acts, words, etc., of the other defendant named in the
indictment, carried with it the converse of the proposition
and it was not error for the court to fail to instruct the
jury that, in the event that there was no conspiracy, the
defendant on trial would not be bound by the acts, words, or
deeds of the codefendant.
The
evidence authorized the verdict.
Error
from Superior Court, Upson County; W. E. H. Searcy, Jr.
Judge.
Matthew
Bates was convicted of fraudulently making, signing, and
printing, and being concerned with the fraudulent passing and
uttering of, a certain check, and brings error. Affirmed.
HODGES
J.
Matthew
Bates was convicted upon an indictment charging that he did
fraudulently make, sign and print, and was concerned with the
fraudulent passing and uttering of, a certain check, together
with one Marcellus Bates. His motion for new trial was
overruled, and he excepted.
1. The
trial judge admitted in evidence a certain conversation
between the sheriff, another witness, and one Dr. Slade,
deceased, in which the doctor in the presence of these
parties and the accused, made a statement, in substance as
follows:
"This defendant, in company with a man who claimed the
name of Williams, came to my office some time ago, and the
defendant had some dental work done. I did the work, and the
defendant paid me $2.50 for the same. A man by the name of
Williams was with the defendant, whom I took to be his
brother. Williams went out of the office while defendant was
having the work done, and it was not long before Williams
returned with a check, purported to have been signed by S. T.
Bently, payable to J. A. Williams, and indorsed on the back
by J. A. Williams, which check he asked me to indorse for
him, as he was not acquainted in Barnesville, which I did.
You have the same check there in your hands, with my
indorsement on it. The defendant paid me in cash out of his
pocket before the man Williams got the check cashed, if he
got it cashed at all. I took the defendant and the man named
Williams to be brothers."
In
admitting this testimony the trial judge did not err. In the
case of Farmer v. State, 100 Ga. 43, 28 S.E. 26,
Simmons, C.J., said:
"It is further complained that the court erred in
admitting the testimony of the witness Stovall, to the effect
that, about the same time that the alleged misrepresentations
which were the basis of this prosecution were made by the
accused, similar representations were made by him to the
witness. The objection made to this testimony was that there
was no connection between the representations of the accused
to Stovall and those alleged to have been made by him to the
prosecutor, the representations to Stovall not having been
communicated to the prosecutor when his firm extended credit
to the accused. The testimony was offered and admitted as
tending to illustrate the intent of the accused in the
transaction for which he was then being tried, and for this
purpose we think it was properly received. While it is the
general rule that, upon the trial of a person for a criminal
offense, other and distinct criminal transactions cannot be
given in evidence against him, yet, according to the weight
of authority, evidence of other representations or
transactions may be received, as tending to show motive or
intent, when the transactions are so connected in time and so
similar in their other relations that the same motive may
reasonably be imputed to all. See 1 Jones, Ev. § 143, and
cases cited; 1 Greenleaf, Ev. (15th Ed.) § 53, and notes;
Wharton, Crim. Ev. § 53; 1 Bishop, New Crim. Proced. §§ 1126,
1127; 2 Bishop, § 189. Justice Story states the principle
thus: 'In all cases where the guilt of the party depends
upon the intent, purpose, or design with which an act is
done, or upon his guilty knowledge, I understand it to be a
general rule that collateral facts may be examined into in
which he bore a part, for the purpose of establishing a
guilty intent. In short, whenever the * * * guilty knowledge
or intent of the party is a material ingredient in the issue
of a case, these collateral facts--that is, other acts and
declarations of a similar character, tending to establish
such intent or knowledge--are proper evidence. In many cases
of fraud it would be otherwise impossible satisfactorily to
establish the true nature and character of the act.'
Bottomby v. United States, 1 Story, 135. A
well-considered case in which the question is discussed at
length, and authorities bearing upon it reviewed, is that of
Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 31 Grat. (Va.) 862. In that
case it is said: 'Upon a prosecution for obtaining goods
by false pretenses the indictment
must aver the fraudulent intent, and the commonwealth must
prove it. It is the very gist of the offense. * * * It is not
sufficient that the accused knowingly states what is false.
It must be shown that his intent was to defraud. Such intent
is not a presumption of law, but a matter of fact for the
jury. Being a secret operation of the mind, it can only be
ascertained by the acts and representations of the party. A
single act or representation in many cases would not be
decisive, especially where the accused has sustained a
previous good character. But when it is shown that he made
similar representations about the same time to other persons,
and by means of such representations obtained goods, all of
which were false, the presumption is greatly strengthened
that he intended to defraud.' See, among other cases on
this subject, Regina v. Francis, 2 C. C. R. 128, 12
Cox's Crim. Cases, 612; Wood v. United States,
16 Pet. 342, 10 L.Ed. 987; Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 7
Allen (Mass.) 548, 83 Am.Dec. 712; Commonwealth v.
Eastman, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 189, 48 Am.Dec. 596;
Commonwealth v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481; Mayer v.
People, 80 N.Y. 364; People v. Shulman, 80 N.Y.
373; State v. Walton, 114 N.C. 783, 18 S.E. 945;
State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558, 52 Am.Rep. 389;
State v. Bayne, 88 Mo. 604; State v.
Rivers, 58 Iowa 102, 112 N.W. 117, 43 Am.Rep. 112;
Rafferty v. State, 91 Tenn. 655, 16 S.W. 728. See
note to Strong v. State, 44 Am.Rep. 292."
The
doctrine recognized by the learned Chief Justice, in Farmer
v. State, supra, long ago had the approval of the Supreme
Court of the United States. In the case of Thomas Wood,
Jr., v. U.S. , 16 Pet. 342, 10 L.Ed. 987, it was said:
"It has always been deemed allowable, as well in
criminal as in civil cases, to introduce evidence of other
acts and doings of the party, of a kindred character, in
order to illustrate * * * his intent or motive in the
particular act directly in judgment."
The
same rule was applied by the Supreme Court of this state in
the case of Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243, 80 S.E.
1016, where it was said:
"The general rule on this subject has been stated by the
Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Place, 157
N.Y. 584, 52 N.E. 576, as follows: 'It is an elementary
principle of law that the commission of one crime is not
admissible in evidence upon the trial for another, where its
sole purpose is to show that the defendant has been guilty of
other crimes, and would, consequently, be more liable to
commit the offense charged. But if the evidence is material
and relevant to the issue, it is not inadmissible because it
tends to establish
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