Bath v. State

• Decision Date: 22 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 13-94-460-CR,13-94-460-CR
• Citation: 951 S.W.2d 11
• Parties: Jaime Gonzalez BATH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 11

951 S.W.2d 11

Jaime Gonzalez BATH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 13-94-460-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas Corpus Christi.

May 22, 1997.

Rehearing Overruled Aug. 14, 1997.

David L. Botsford, Austin, for Appellant.

Jose M. Rubio, District Attorney, Monica Z. Notzon, Asst. District Attorney, Laredo, for Appellee.

Before SEERDEN, C.J., and FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr. and YANEZ, JJ.

OPINION

YANEZ, Justice.

This is an appeal of a capital murder conviction by a jury. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon 1994). The jury sentenced appellant to life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. By twenty-two points of error, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of a new trial, the sua sponte transfer of venue and constitutionality of that venue transfer statute, partial voir dire of the jury in his absence, and the denial of a requested sequestration order and requested alibi and identification instructions. We affirm.

Between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on July 29, 1992, a man carrying an AK-47 rifle exited a Ford Crown Victoria that stood amid other cars waiting for the traffic lamp signal to change at the Mann Street intersection of San Dario Avenue in Laredo, Texas. On foot, the gunman approached the driver's side of a Mercury Marquis immediately ahead of him and opened fire on the occupants. The gunman came around the Marquis and shot the passenger who had managed to get out of the back seat of the car but was lying face down on the street. The gunman then got back into the Crown Victoria. The Crown Victoria and a red Camaro were observed fleeing the scene one after the other. All three occupants of the Marquis were killed. At about 5:00 p.m., a private investigator observed a red Camaro approach a toll booth at a Laredo international bridge at a high rate of speed, break through a wooden barrier, and cross into Mexico. Three persons who were in vehicles at the intersection where the shooting occurred testified as eye-witnesses to the shooting and identified appellant, Jaime Gonzalez Bath, as the gunman. The investigator who observed the Camaro breaking through the barrier at the international bridge identified appellant as the driver.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

By his first four points of error, appellant challenges both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence for two aspects of the verdict--appellant as perpetrator of the offense and the identities of the victims.

Appellant as Perpetrator

By points one and two, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence that appellant was the gunman. Appellant maintains that identification of him as the perpetrator of the offense is based primarily on the testimony of two "perjurers," and that other witnesses either were unable to identify him as the gunman or affirmatively stated that the gunman was not him. Noting that the jury has the authority to determine the credibility of witnesses, the State cites the testimony of the three eye-witnesses at trial, each of whom indicated that he or she had a close look at the person who fired the automatic weapon and that appellant was that person.

The standard of review for challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases is that set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The Jackson standard inquires whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. The verdict may be set aside pursuant to a factual sufficiency challenge only if, after viewing all the evidence without the prism of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," it is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129. This standard has been extended to capital cases. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The jury is the sole trier of fact and may judge the credibility of witnesses, reconcile conflict in testimony, and accept or reject any evidence presented by either side to the case. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Garza v. State, 937 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1996, pet. ref'd). The reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the jury's. Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 647; Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 133.

Three eye-witnesses to the murders testified for the State. Juan Adolfo Ramos, a deputy sheriff with Webb County, and his wife, Norma Zavala, a Webb County probation officer, were off-duty and traveling north on San Dario Avenue when they were cut off by a red Camaro apparently attempting to get ahead of cars in its way. Ramos and Zavala arrived at the Mann Street intersection behind and to the right of the Crown Victoria that the assailant exited on his way to shooting the victims. Both testified that they had an unobstructed view of the gunman and identified appellant as that gunman. Ramos, in fact, testified that he knew of appellant prior to the shooting and thereby recognized him as the offense unfolded. He also testified that he saw the Crown Victoria and the red Camaro flee the scene of the shooting together. Jesus Guerra, Jr. testified that his truck was on San Dario Avenue at the Mann Street intersection and next to the victims' car when the shooting occurred. He testified that he had an unobstructed view of the gunman and identified appellant as the gunman. Efrain J. Laurel, a private investigator who was near international bridge number two in Laredo on the day of the shooting, testified that at about 5:00 p.m. he observed appellant drive a red Camaro through a wooden barrier at the bridge into Mexico. We hold that viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the murders. ¹ Point of error one is overruled.

In regard to factual sufficiency, appellant points to many grounds for questioning the credibility of the State's witnesses. Ramos, for example, testified that he and his wife went directly to the police station after the shooting, but for a stop at a convenience store. It was later adduced, however, that before entering the police station, they drove by motels looking for appellant and stopped at a pawn shop to purchase a sawed-off shotgun. Police investigator Jorge A. Almazan testified that when he arrived at the scene of the shooting, Ramos exclaimed that Jaime Gonzalez Bath was the gunman. According to Zavala, however, while at the scene of the shooting, Ramos was unable to recollect the name of the gunman. Some of the State's witnesses saw the red Camaro strike victim Elpidio Pruneda after he exited the back seat of the Marquis and before he was shot in the back while on the street. One of the State's witnesses at the scene, John David Reyna, stated that he never saw a red Camaro. There is conflicting testimony as to where Laurel was standing when he observed the Camaro at the international bridge and perhaps as to what he was able to see. There are disparate accounts as to which automobiles were at the scene, the physical appearance and clothing of the gunman, and his actions during the shooting. Eli Vasquez testified that he had a clear view of appellant from the showroom of the car dealership where he worked and that appellant definitely was not the gunman. Juan T. Alfaro, who was at the carwash adjacent to the scene of the offense when it occurred, testified that appellant was not the gunman. One of Vasquez's co-workers at the car dealership was unable to identify appellant as the gunman. Reyna got a close view of appellant only from the backside and could not identify appellant as the gunman, although he also could not exclude him as the gunman.

Matters of witness credibility and conflicts within the evidence, nevertheless, are matters exclusively within the purview of the jury to resolve, as trier of fact. Chambers, 805 S.W.2d at 461. Cf. Driggers v. State 940 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1996, no pet. h.) (deferring to jury where to "two distinctly different versions of events" were adduced, in consideration of the "jury's job to judge the credibility of the witnesses"); Loserth v. State, 931 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1996, pet. granted) (deferring to authority of jury to resolve conflict in testimony over whether the accused could have jumped several stories off a building, been able to go anywhere fast, and participate in physical activities without signs of being hurt). In consideration of the direct evidence of appellant's guilt, irrespective of the evidentiary conflicts on record, we cannot hold that the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Point of error two is overruled.

Identities of the Victims

By points of error three and four, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence for the identities of the victims. Appellant argues that the State failed to prove the actual identities of the persons killed, irrespective of the identifications found on the victims' bodies. Appellant points to discrepancies between names on driver's licenses or identification cards and other evidence as to the names of the victims. The State maintains that the testimonial and documentary evidence presented regarding the identities of the victims was both legally and factually sufficient.

Sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the indictment as incorporated into the jury charge. Fisher v. State, 887 S.W.2d 49, 55 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (citing Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708, 715 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (opinion on State's second motion for reh'g), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219, 104 S.Ct. 2667, 81 L.Ed.2d 372 ...