Batiste v. City of Richmond
| Docket Number | 22-cv-01188-AMO |
| Decision Date | 27 November 2023 |
| Parties | DAVID BATISTE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT CITY OF RICHMOND'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & DENYING DEFENDANT MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: DKT. NOS. 69, 70
Pending before the Court are Defendant City of Richmond's (“Richmond”) and Defendant Hugo Mendoza's (“Mendoza”) (collectively “Defendants”) motions for summary judgment. The Court heard argument on the motions on June 15, 2023. Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant Mendoza's motion for summary judgment and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant Richmond's motion for summary judgment, for the reasons stated below.
Plaintiff David Batiste filed this employment discrimination action against Defendants on February 25, 2022. ECF 1 (Complaint).[1] Batiste is a Black man and a current employee of Defendant City of Richmond who began working for the city in 2007 as a Maintenance Worker I in the Abatement Team. ECF 80 (Batiste Decl.) ¶ 1; ECF 69-2, Ex. D (Admin. Charge) at 101.[2] Defendant Hugo Mendoza worked as a Maintenance Worker II in the same unit. ECF 69-2, Ex. A (Batiste Dep. I)[3] at 10; id., Ex. C (Mendoza Dep.) at 83-84. In the early days of Batiste's employment, Mendoza would receive work assignments from his supervisor Terrance Johnson and assign them to other crew members, including Batiste. Batiste Dep. I at 10-11. Mendoza became acting supervisor in 2009 and permanently obtained the supervisor position in 2013. Mendoza Dep. at 84.
Starting in 2007, when Batiste began working for Richmond, his coworkers referred to him as “Memm” Batiste Decl. ¶ 5. “Memm” is the name of a Mexican comic book character who is a Black boy “drawn to look like a monkey.” Batiste Decl. ¶ 5; see ECF 69-2, Ex. B (Batiste Dep. II) at 52-54; Admin. Charge at 101. For many years, Batiste did not understand the association of this nickname. Batiste Dep. II at 52-53. Throughout the course of Batiste's employment, Mendoza and Batiste had a “good relationship, ” and the two men would engage in friendly banter. Batiste Dep. I at 32; Mendoza Dep. at 95. Mendoza referred to Batiste as “Memm” or “Pelon, ” which Mendoza understands to be Spanish for “bald man.” ECF 69-1 (Mendoza Decl.) ¶ 3. Batiste called Mendoza “Ricky Martin” or “the F-word” or “FU.” Batiste Dep. II at 47. The two used these names in a joking manner, Batiste Dep. I at 34-36, and Mendoza did not know the connotations of the nickname “Memm” Mendoza Dep. at 5-6. Batiste's other coworkers, Rigo Mendoza, Hector Burciaga, and Fernando Chavez each used the nickname to refer to him on a few occasions. ECF 70-11 (Batiste Dep. III) at 39-44; ECF 82 (Batiste Dep. IV) at 13, 18; Mendoza Dep. at 6.
Sometime around August 10, 2015, a coworker in a different unit commented to Batiste that he should not let his coworkers call him that nickname. Batiste Dep. I at 38-39, 50-53. Prompted by this coworker's remark, Batiste searched the internet and discovered that “Memm” is a “racist cartoon depicting Black people as monkeys.” Admin. Charge at 101; see Batiste Decl. ¶5; Batiste Dep. II at 52-54. This was the first time Batiste associated the “Memm” nickname with the comic book character. Batiste Dep. II at 53. He felt humiliated. Batiste Decl. ¶ 6.
Subsequently, on an unspecified date around August of 2015, Batiste complained to his manager, Tim Higares, [4] about his coworkers' use of this nickname. Batiste Decl. ¶¶ 7-8; see Batiste Dep. II at 53. Shortly thereafter, Batiste complained to Richmond's Human Resources Department, which advised him that he could file a complaint directly with the EEOC. Batiste Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. On August 25, 2015, Batiste filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that his coworkers referred to him as “Memm” and that Mendoza witnessed the incidents but did not take any action. Admin. Charge at 101.
Richmond hired an outside investigator in September of 2015 to investigate the EEOC charges, which included allegations beyond the scope of the current action. ECF 70-1 (Chiari Decl.) ¶¶ 3-6. During the investigation, Batiste identified his coworkers Hector Burciaga and Hugo Mendoza as the individuals who used this nickname. Chiari Decl. ¶ 8. As a result of the investigation, Richmond implemented three remedial measures. ECF 70-6 (Higares Decl.) ¶¶ 8-9. First, Hector Burciaga and Hugo Mendoza received verbal warnings that the use of the nickname “Memm” was inappropriate and could not continue. Id. ¶ 9. Second, the Abatement Unit received an informal training on respectful communications. Id. Third, the Abatement staff were required to participate in Richmond's formal two-hour anti-harassment training. Id.
Following the investigation, Batiste did not report any further incidents of his coworkers using the nickname. Higares Decl. ¶ 10; ECF 70-3 (Lindsay Decl.) ¶ 7. Mendoza did not call Batiste “Memm” after 2015. Mendoza Decl. ¶ 5; Batiste Dep. II at 48. Since the investigation, there has been one incident of a coworker referring to Batiste by this nickname, an incident Batiste did not report to Richmond. In 2023, Batiste saw a coworker, Fernando Chavez, mouth “Memm” to him through a car window as he drove past. Batiste Dep. II at 48; Batiste Dep. III at 39.
On February 25, 2022, Batiste filed the instant action, alleging seven causes of action for racial harassment based on his colleagues' use of the nickname “Memm” ECF 1. Following unopposed motions to dismiss, three causes of action remain: (1) racial harassment against the City of Richmond and Hugo Mendoza under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) racial harassment against Richmond under Title VII; and (3) failure to take reasonable steps to prevent harassment against Richmond under FEHA. The motions at bar, for summary judgment on all causes of action against each defendant, were filed on May 4th and 5th, 2023. ECF 69, 70.
Summary judgment shall be granted if the “materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations” show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). “Material facts” are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a “reasonable jury” to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The court “may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). “To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory allegations.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011).
“A moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial-usually, but not always, a defendant-has both the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-23 (1986). Where the moving party will not bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it “must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102. Even if the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the movant “may not require the nonmoving party to produce evidence supporting its claim or defense simply by saying that the nonmoving party has no such evidence.” Id. at 1105.
Where the moving party carries its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party must then produce evidence to support its claim. Id. at 1103. In doing so, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. A nonmoving party must also “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). If a nonmoving party fails to produce evidence that supports its claim or defense, courts should enter summary judgment in favor of the movant. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
In addition to the motions for summary judgement, Defendants submitted objections to some of Batiste's evidence in opposition to their motions. To ensure that the Court considers only admissible evidence to determine whether Defendants have met their summary judgment burden, see Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002), the Court first resolves Defendants' evidentiary objections.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2), “[a] party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact...
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