Batiste v. Quarterman

• Decision Date: 31 July 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. G-07-0544.
• Citation: 622 F.Supp.2d 423
• Parties: Roderick Allen BATISTE, TDCJ # 1265531, Petitioner, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

Page 423

622 F.Supp.2d 423

Roderick Allen BATISTE, TDCJ # 1265531, Petitioner, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

Civil Action No. G-07-0544.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

July 31, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Roderick Allen Batiste, Tennessee Colony, TX, pro se.

Elizabeth A. Goettert, Attorney Generals Office, Austin, TX, for Respondent.

Nathaniel Quarterman, Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Huntsville, TX, pro se.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NANCY F. ATLAS, District Judge.

State inmate Roderick Allen Batiste (TDCJ # 1265531) seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge a state court conviction. The respondent has filed an answer, arguing that Batiste is not entitled to relief. (Doc. # 11). Batiste has filed more than one response and he has also filed a motion for discovery. (Docs. # 14, # 16, # 17, # 18, # 19). After considering all of the pleadings, the state court records, and the applicable law, the Court denies relief and dismisses this case for reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

A Galveston County grand jury returned an indictment against Batiste in cause number 03-CR-3199, accusing him of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm. The State enhanced the indictment for purposes of punishment with allegations that Batiste had at least one prior felony conviction. The record shows that the trial court heard a variety of pre-trial motions on the morning of August 9, 2004, with jury selection taking place that afternoon. Batiste pleaded guilty to the charges against him on the morning of August 10, 2004, after the jury had been empaneled, but before the trial commenced. In a hearing outside the jury's presence, the 405th District Court of Galveston County, Texas, found Batiste guilty as charged after determining that his plea was voluntarily and knowingly made.

Having conceded his guilt, Batiste elected to have the empaneled jury determine his sentence. During the punishment phase of the trial, the victim (Jana Reed) testified that Batiste shot her once in the stomach as she sat in his vehicle on September 14, 2003, causing her to lose her unborn child. Batiste also shot her again in the head and face, causing extensive injuries, before he fled the scene. The State presented evidence of an unadjudicated offense that Batiste committed approximately one month later when he shot at another woman. An eyewitness (Alice Roy Bellard) testified that she saw Batiste shoot at her friend (a woman identified as "Victoria," also known as "Little Bit") as the two women sat at a bus stop in Houston on October 13, 2003. Batiste's ex-wife (Sandra Waller) testified that Batiste was using crack cocaine during this time and that a firearm was later recovered from his vehicle. In addition, the State presented evidence that Batiste had a prior felony conviction from California for possession of a controlled substance, making him eligible for an enhanced sentence of up to ninety-nine years or life in prison as a repeat offender.¹ At the conclusion of the punishment proceeding, the jury sentenced Batiste to serve eighty years in prison.

On direct appeal Batiste complained that the trial court erred by (1) denying him access to jury records kept by the district attorney's office and used by the State during the jury selection process; (2) denying his pretrial motion for a psychiatric examination; and (3) failing to exclude Alice Roy Bellard's testimony about the extraneous offense. The intermediate court of appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the conviction. See Batiste v. State, No. 14-04-00867-CR, 2005 WL 3065882 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 15, 2005) (unpublished). Thereafter, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Batiste's petition for discretionary review.

Batiste challenged his conviction further by filing a state habeas corpus application under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In that application, Batiste complained that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during his trial, that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by introducing evidence of an extraneous offense, and that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by making erroneous rulings and giving an incorrect jury instruction. The state habeas corpus court, which also presided over Batiste's guilty plea and trial, concluded that the application was without merit after considering an affidavit from Batiste's defense counsel. Following the state habeas corpus court's recommendation, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief without a written order. See Ex parte Batiste, No. 68,667-01 (Tex.Crim.App. Oct. 31, 2007).

Batiste now seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pending petition, Batiste raises essentially the same or similar claims as those that were rejected on state habeas corpus review. The respondent maintains that Batiste is not entitled to relief under the governing federal habeas corpus statutes. Batiste disagrees. The parties' contentions are addressed below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal review of the pending habeas corpus petition is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the "AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (holding that the AEDPA applies to those habeas corpus petitions filed after its effective date of April 24, 1996). Embodying the principles of federalism, comity, and finality of judgments, the AEDPA "substantially restricts the scope of federal review of state criminal court proceedings." Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir.2000). Specifically, the federal habeas corpus statutes amended by the AEDPA, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), set forth a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, ..., which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (internal citation omitted).

The federal habeas corpus statutes require applicants for relief to first present their claims in state court and to exhaust all state court remedies through proper adjudication. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To the extent that the petitioner's claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, the AEDPA standard applies. For claims adjudicated on the merits, the AEDPA provides that a petitioner is not entitled to relief unless the state court's ultimate decision:

(1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir.2001) (observing that the AEDPA standard is restricted to the reasonableness of the state court's "ultimate decision, not every jot of its reasoning") (citation omitted). The burden is on the petitioner to show that he is entitled to relief under the highly deferential AEDPA framework. See DiLosa v. Cain, 279 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir.2002).

Claims presenting pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are governed by § 2254(d)(1). See Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court has clarified that "clearly established Federal law" or precedent for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta," of decisions from the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to one reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently from the Supreme Court "on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case. Id.

Pure questions of fact are governed by § 2254(d)(2). See Martin, 246 F.3d at 475. In addition, a state court's factual findings are entitled to deference on federal habeas corpus review and are presumed correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), unless the petitioner rebuts those findings with "clear and convincing evidence." Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Hughes v. Dretke, 412 F.3d 582, 589 (5th Cir.2005) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). This deference extends not only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court as well. Garcia, 454 F.3d at 444-45 (citing Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 876 (5th Cir.2005); Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir.2004)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Batiste's Guilty Plea

The respondent correctly notes that a review of Batiste's claims is constrained by his guilty plea, which is presumptively valid. As noted above, after the jury was selected and empaneled, Batiste elected to plead guilty to the charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See Court Reporter's Record, vol. 4, at 13. Batiste does not challenge his decision to plead guilty. The respondent maintains, therefore, that any claim concerning the guilt/innocence phase of the proceeding is waived.

As a general rule, "[a] voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel,...