Batson v. Higginbothem
| Decision Date | 14 June 1910 |
| Docket Number | 2,235. |
| Citation | 68 S.E. 455,7 Ga.App. 835 |
| Parties | BATSON et al. v. HIGGINBOTHEM. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied July 5, 1910.
Syllabus by the Court.
A suit to recover damages for trespass to land is not one "respecting titles to land," within the meaning of the Constitution, conferring upon the superior court exclusive jurisdiction of suits "respecting titles to land," although the title to the land in question may be incidentally or collaterally involved.
Proof of a tortious invasion of one's property rights, where the injury inflicted is small and insignificant, will warrant a recovery of only nominal damages, and in some cases of punitive damages.
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
Damages for aggravating circumstances in actions of tort, to deter the wrongdoer, or as compensation for wounded feelings, given by Civ. Code 1895, § 3906, are called "punitive damages."
"Nominal damages" is defined as some small amount, sufficient to cover and carry the costs.
Error from City Court of La Grange; Frank Harwell, Judge.
Action by W. B. Higginbothem against W. C. Batson and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Reversed.
B. H Hill and A. H. Thompson, for plaintiffs in error.
Hutton Lovejoy and E. T. Moon, for defendant in error.
Mrs Higginbothem brought suit against W. C. Batson and three others in the city court of La Grange to recover damages for trespass to her real estate. She sued for $1,000 as general damages and $500 as punitive damages, and the jury gave her a verdict for $350 as general damages and $180 as punitive damages against W. C. Batson and one of the other defendants W. H. Huguley; a nonsuit having been granted as to the other two defendants. A motion for a new trial was made by the two defendants, which was overruled, and they excepted. Defendants filed also a demurrer to the petition, on the ground that the city court of La Grange was without jurisdiction, as the suit was one respecting title to land, of which the superior court of the county had exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution of the state. The court overruled the demurrer and exceptions pendente lite were filed.
The suit arose on the following facts, briefly stated: Plaintiff alleged that she held title to a described lot of land in the city of West Point, Ga., and that she had been in the quiet, peaceable, and uninterrupted possession of this land, under a fee-simple title, for a period of more than 30 years, having it inclosed by a fence for that length of time; that on September 11, 1908, it was entirely inclosed by a wire fence; that on that date the defendants went to it in person, with a force of hands, and instructed them to tear down the plaintiff's fence around the lot and take possession of a strip of the lot, 24 feet in width and 173 feet in length, for the purpose of opening a street or alley, and in pursuance of these directions and instructions they did tear down the fence, took possession of this strip of land from the lot, leveled it off, and converted it into a street or alley of the city. She alleges that these acts were without her consent, and constituted a willful and malicious trespass.
The defense relied upon was that the land in question was not the property of the plaintiff, and was not in her lawful possession; that it was a street or alley of the town of West Point, and had been used as a street or alley for many years; that the plaintiff, without authority, had taken possession of this street or alley, and had placed a fence around it; that the city council, of which the defendants were members, composing the street committee of the council, had directed them to have the fence removed, as an obstruction to the public street or alley of the city; and that they had removed the fence and opened up the street or alley in pursuance of their authority as members of the street committee of the council, and in obedience to instructions given to them by the mayor and council of the city of West Point. There was no evidence as to the value of the strip of land in question, either before or after the alleged acts of trespass. It was shown that the value of the wire fence taken down, with the cost of restoring the same, was about $12.
The view that we entertain of this case makes it unnecessary to decide many of the numerous assignments of error raised by the record, and we will confine ourselves to a decision of the question of jurisdiction, made by the demurrer to the petition, and of the question as to the character of damages recoverable under the facts and the law applicable thereto.
1. The suit is not one "respecting titles to land." The title to the land was not necessarily involved; but, if involved, it was only incidental or collateral to the main issue. The suit was brought to recover damages for trespass to real estate. In the case of Smith v. Bryan, 34 Ga. 53, it is said that "cases respecting title to land in the intendment of the Constitution, are cases in which the plaintiff asserts his title to the land in question, and depends for a recovery...
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