Batten v. State, A19A0997

• Decision Date: 29 October 2019
• Docket Number: A19A0997
• Parties: BATTEN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

352 Ga.App. 629

835 S.E.2d 686

BATTEN

v.The STATE.

A19A0997

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 29, 2019

Adrianne Alexandra Brown, Waycross, for Appellant.

George E. Barnhill, Waycross, Michelle Chapman McIntire, for Appellee.

Coomer, Judge.

We granted David Gene Batten's application for interlocutory review of the trial court's order denying his special demurrer and motion to quash the second indictment against him on the same charges asserted in an earlier indictment. Batten asserts that the earlier indictment was void as a matter of law and as a result, the statute of limitations for the charges asserted in the first indictment was not tolled. Batten argues the trial court's denial of his motion to quash the second indictment was therefore erroneous because the second indictment was filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

"When considering an appeal of a trial court's order on a motion to dismiss and/or quash an indictment, "[w]e review the trial court's interpretations of law and application of the law to the facts de novo and its findings of fact for clear error."

State v. Scott , 344 Ga. App. 744, 744, 811 S.E.2d 457 (2018) (footnote omitted). So viewed, the record shows that Batten was arrested on November 19, 2011 for offenses that allegedly occurred the day prior. In a September 29, 2015 indictment, Batten was charged with four counts of homicide by vehicle in the first degree, driving under the influence, reckless driving, driving on the wrong side of roadway, and failure to maintain lane. The State nolle prossed the indictment on November 30, 2015 and the trial court approved the judgment of nolle prosequi on December 22, 2015. The State indicated that the reason for the nolle prosequi was because an unqualified grand juror voted on the first indictment.

On January 29, 2016, the State re-indicted Batten with the same charges alleged in the first indictment. The second indictment was filed outside the statute of limitations period, however, in the second indictment the State alleged that the first indictment was filed before the statute of limitation expired, and pursuant to OCGA § 17-3-1, the nolle prosequi of the original indictment extended the limitation period for six months. Batten filed a special demurrer, motion to quash indictment, and motion to dismiss, arguing that because the first indictment was void, it therefore could not extend the limitation period for the charges listed in the second indictment. The trial court denied the motion without explanation, but certified its ruling for immediate review. Batten then filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted. This appeal followed.

Batten argues that because the original indictment was void as a matter of law, OCGA § 17-3-3 is not applicable to the second indictment. We disagree. OCGA § 17-3-3 provides that if an indictment is brought within the applicable statute of limitation for the charged offense, and is later "quashed or a nolle prosequi entered, the limitation shall be extended six months from the time the first indictment is quashed or the nolle prosequi entered." "In other words, the State may re-indict a defendant within six months after the first indictment is nolle prossed without running afoul of the statute of limitation even if the initial statute of limitation period has run." Johnson v. State , 335 Ga. App. 886, 889 (1), 782 S.E.2d 50 (2016).

In support of his argument that the first indictment was void, Batten relies on Georgia Supreme Court precedent that "the incompetency of one grand juror renders an indictment void, no matter how many unexceptionable jurors join with him in finding the bill." State v. Dempsey , 290 Ga. 763, 764 (1), 727 S.E.2d 670 (2012), citing Crawford v. Crow , 114 Ga. 282, 284, 40 S.E. 286 (1901). However, as the State argued before the trial court, a 2015 statutory provision appears to conflict with that precedent: OCGA § 15-12-60 (d) provides that "[i]f an indictment is returned, and a grand juror was ineligible to serve as a grand juror pursuant to subsection (c) of this Code section, such indictment shall not be quashed solely as a result of such ineligibility." Batten may argue that the statute is inapplicable because the text refers to an...