Batti v. Berryhill, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-00059-A

• Decision Date: 17 August 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-00059-A
• Parties: SPERANSA BATTI, PLAINTIFF, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

SPERANSA BATTI, PLAINTIFF, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL,ACTING COMMISIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-00059-A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION

August 17, 2017

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER

This case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b). The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate are as follows:

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Speransa Batti ("Batti") filed this action pursuant to section 405(g) and 1383(c) of Title 42 of the United States Code for judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). On July 8, 2013, Batti protectively filed an application for DIB, alleging her disability began on July 1, 2013.¹ (Transcript ("Tr.") 14; see Tr. 138-140.) After her application for DIB was denied both initially and on reconsideration, Batti requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 14; see Tr. 84-95.) The ALJ held ahearing on June 2, 2015 and issued a decision on September 11, 2015, in which the AJL found Batti was not disabled because she was capable of performing her past relevant work as a housekeeping cleaner and greenhouse worker. (Tr. 14-25, 30-60.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Disability insurance is governed by Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., and numerous regulatory provisions. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 416 (SSI). The SSA defines a "disability" as a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment" lasting at least twelve months that prevents the claimant from engaging in "any substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3)(A); see McQueen v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1999). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, and thus entitled to disability benefits, a five-step analysis is employed. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

First, the claimant must not be presently working at any substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). "Substantial gainful activity" is defined as work activity involving the use of significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); see also Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), cited in Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 392 (5th Cir. 2000). Third, disability will be found if the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the Listing. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if disability cannot be found based on the claimant's medical status alone, the impairment or impairments must prevent the claimant from returning to her past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(f). And fifth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any work, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experiences. Id. § 404.1520(g); Crowley v. Apfel, 197F.3d 194, 197-98 (5th Circ. 1999). At steps one through four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to show she is disabled. Crowley, 197 F.3d at 198. If the claimant satisfies this responsibility, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other gainful employment the claimant is capable of performing in spite of her existing impairments. Id. If the Commissioner meets his burden, it is up to the claimant to then show that she cannot perform the alternate work. See Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000).

A denial of disability benefits is reviewed only to determine whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1988). An ALJ's decision is not subject to reversal, even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported the opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion that was reached by the ALJ. Dollis v. Astrue, No. 4:08-CV-00503-A, 2009 WL 1542466, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 2, 2009). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001). It is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision. Id. This Court may neither reweigh the evidence in the record, nor substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's, but will carefully scrutinize the record to determine if substantial evidence is present. Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000); Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1383.

III. ISSUES

In her brief, Batti presents the following issues:

1. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to provide any discussion of why her intellectual disability impairment does not meet Listing 12.05C; and2. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to properly evaluate the medical opinion of the only examining source in her case.

(Plaintiff's Brief ("Pl.'s Br.") at 2.)

IV. ALJ DECISION

In his September 11, 2015 decision, the ALJ concluded that Batti was not disabled within the meaning of the SSA. (Tr. 25.) In making his determination, the ALJ proceeded to follow the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth above. (Tr. 15-16.) At Step One, the ALJ found that Batti did not engage in substantial gainful activity after July 1, 2013, her amended onset of disability date. (Tr. 16.) Although Batti's earnings records reflect earnings for the third quarter of 2014 and Batti testified she worked for about a week in 2015, the ALJ determined that Batti's "earnings for both periods were nowhere near the level of substantial gainful activity." (Tr. 17.) At Step Two, the ALJ found that Batti had the following "severe" impairments: (1) depressive disorder and (2) borderline intellectual functioning.² (Tr. 17.) At Step Three, the ALJ stated thatBatti did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 17-19.) In his analysis, the ALJ stated:

In activities of daily living, the claimant has a mild restriction. She lives with family. She wakes up, handles her personal care, and has coffee. She spends the rest of the day doing chores about an hour at a time, and she goes to bed at about ten p.m. She can count money slowly, use the microwave and tell time. She knows how to cook and to grocery shop.

In social functioning, the claimant has a mild difficulty. She has a good relationship with her cousin, who helps her fill out paperwork. She denied difficulty with persons in authority. She enjoyed interacting with her young grandchild. She has no friends she interacts with at this time, and she spends free time with relatives.

With regards to concentration, persistence, or pace, the claimant has moderate difficulties. The consultative examiner noticed the claimant responded slowly and had difficulty with academic skills as well as attention, concentration, and short-term memory. The claimant could repeat five digits forward and two digits backwards. In order to perform the task of repeating digits backward, visual cues had to be used. She learned a list of three words after one repetition. She could recall two out of three words after a five-minute interval, and prompting did not improve her performance. She solved basic mathematical calculations slowly.

(Tr. 18-19 (internal citations omitted).) At Step Four, the ALJ found that Batti had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform the full range of work at all exertional levels but had the following nonexertional limitations: (1) she is limited to occupations with a reasoning development level of 1 or 2, as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and (2) she cannot perform an occupation requiring reading or math skills over the second grade level. (Tr. 19 - 23.). At Step Five, the ALJ held that Batti was capable of performing her past relevant work as a housekeeping cleaner and greenhouse worker. (Tr. 23.). Accordingly, the ALJ foundthat Batti was not disabled, as defined in the SSA, from July 1, 2013 through the date of his decision. (Tr. 25.)

V. DISCUSSION³

A. Section 12.05C of the Listing

In her brief, Batti argues that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss why Plaintiff's intellectual disability did not meet section 12.05C of the Listing. Batti argues that, since she has (1) a valid IQ score of 70 or lower; (2) one other "severe impairment" (as defined in the regulations); and (3) evidence of adaptive deficits prior to age twenty-two, she met section 12.05C of the Listing. Thus, Batti claims that the ALJ erred by failing to make such a finding and remand is required. (Pl.'s Br. at 9-10.)

To obtain a disability determination at Step Three, a claimant must show that his impairments meet or equal one of the impairments in the Listing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). As a threshold matter, the ALJ is responsible for ultimately deciding the legal question whether a listing is met or equaled. Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). Whether a claimant's impairment meets the requirements of a listed impairment is usually more a question of medical fact than opinion because most of the requirements are objective and simply a matter of documentation, but it is still an issue ultimately reserved to the Commissioner. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *3 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). When determining whether an impairment medically equals a listing, the...