Battle v. Howard

• Decision Date: 07 April 2022
• Docket Number: SJC-13177
• Citation: 489 Mass. 480,185 N.E.3d 1
• Parties: Freda BATTLE, personal representative, v. Barbara A. HOWARD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

489 Mass. 480

185 N.E.3d 1

Freda BATTLE, personal representative,¹

v.Barbara A. HOWARD.

SJC-13177

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued January 10, 2022.

Decided April 7, 2022.

Daniel B. Walsh, Plymouth, for the respondent.

Denzil D. McKenzie, (Colin Creager also present), Boston, for the petitioner.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

CYPHER, J.

Charles R. Dunn and Barbara A. Howard owned two adjacent parcels of land (property) in the Dorchester section of Boston as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. During the course of proceedings to partition the property, Dunn passed away. Thereafter, Howard filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the decedent's death vested full title in her as the surviving joint tenant. The judge denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

This case presents the question whether the partition proceedings up to the point of the decedent's death, including the acceptance of a buyer's offer to purchase the property, severed the joint tenancy and terminated Howard's right of survivorship. In addition, we are asked to determine whether G. L. c. 241, § 26 ( § 26 ), permits Dunn's heirs to maintain the action for partition and whether G. L. c. 241, § 25 ( § 25 ), grants the Land Court jurisdiction to continue to hear the case. We conclude that the proceedings and the acceptance of the offer did not sever the joint tenancy. We further conclude that § 26 does not confer standing on the heirs of a joint tenant to continue a partition action. Finally, § 25 provides only that the Land Court has supplemental jurisdiction over matters related to an otherwise valid petition for partition. Where, as here, a party lacks standing under G. L. c. 241, § 1 ( § 1 ), § 25 does not permit the Land Court to retain jurisdiction over the defective suit. For these reasons, Howard's motion to dismiss should have been granted. We therefore reverse the order denying the motion.

Background. 1. Facts. The facts are undisputed. On February 23, 1993, Dunn and Howard took title to the property as joint tenants by a deed from the prior owner, recorded with the Suffolk registry of deeds. On July 29, 2020, when he was approximately ninety-three years old, Dunn filed the petition, seeking a partition by sale. At a case management conference on September 4, 2020, the judge found, based on the parties’ stipulation, that Dunn and Howard held the property as joint tenants and that the property could not be advantageously divided, see G. L. c. 241, § 14. The parties informed the judge that they were engaged in settlement discussions and would continue to pursue alternative dispute resolution. Nevertheless, Dunn also made an oral motion for appointment of a commissioner. The judge allowed the motion. On September 14, 2020, the judge issued an interim order (interim order) setting forth his findings and appointing a commissioner. Neither party appealed from the interim order.

After the commissioner filed a report on the value of the property, the judge held another hearing on December 11, 2020, and issued a warrant for sale of the property, which was later amended to correct certain scrivener's errors (amended warrant). The amended warrant authorized the commissioner to market and sell the property, but provided that "[t]he purchase and sale agreement shall provide that the price and other terms of the sale shall be subject to review and approval by the court ... [and] the sale shall not be consummated unless and until approved by this court on application of the Commissioner, subject to the rights of the parties to object." The amended warrant further stated that "[t]he Commissioner shall solicit offers but shall not enter into an agreement with a buyer for the purchase and sale of the [property] ... until further order of [the] court." The amended warrant allowed either party, prior to the judge's authorizing the commissioner to enter into a purchase and sale agreement, to match any offer accepted by the commissioner or to extend their own offer. After approval by the judge, the warrant provided that the commissioner could proceed to execute a purchase and sale agreement, subject to the parties’ further right to object to the commissioner's report of the terms of the sale and the judge's power to "act on" those objections, including by "disapprov[ing] the price and terms of sale." After this final approval by the judge of the price and terms of the sale, the amended warrant authorized the commissioner "to consummate the sale [and] to convey title by commissioner's deed." Finally, the amended warrant provided that the parties were free to reach a consensual resolution of the case at any time, and that the commissioner was to cease work upon receipt of notice of settlement by the parties.

On January 30, 2021, the commissioner accepted an offer to purchase the property. The commissioner's report and motion for authority to enter into a purchase and sale agreement, which was filed with the court on February 1, 2021, stated that the offer "ha[d] been accepted by the [commissioner] subject to approval by this Court." The judge requested that the commissioner file a proposed purchase and sale agreement and scheduled a hearing to take place on February 17.

Dunn passed away on February 16, 2021. His attorney filed a notice of death with the court the following day. On February 19, Howard filed a motion to stay proceedings. At a hearing on the commissioner's motion for authority, the judge asked the parties to submit briefing regarding the effect of Dunn's death on the case. Approximately one week later, Howard filed a motion to dismiss.² She argued that the mere filing of the petition for partition did not operate to sever the joint tenancy, and therefore, on Dunn's death his interest in the property vested solely with her as the surviving joint tenant. Dunn's attorney opposed the motion to stay and the motion to dismiss, purportedly on behalf of Dunn, as it appears that no personal representative had yet been appointed.

On March 4, 2021, the judge denied Howard's motion to stay and her motion to dismiss, approved the proposed purchase and sale agreement, and allowed the commissioner's motion for authority to enter into the agreement. However, the judge stayed execution of the purchase and sale agreement to allow Howard to seek a stay or other relief from the Appeals Court. On Howard's application pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, a single justice of the Appeals Court issued an order staying proceedings in the Land Court to allow Howard to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the order denying her motion to dismiss.³ We then transferred the matter to this court on our own motion. Dunn's daughter, Freda Battle, was appointed personal representative on October 8, 2021, and continues the action on behalf of Dunn's estate.⁴

2. Joint tenancy at common law. A joint tenancy is a form of coownership arising under the common law and characterized by the right of survivorship. See Weaver v. New Bedford, 335 Mass. 644, 646, 140 N.E.2d 309 (1957) ("A joint tenancy is created by the common law[,] and the incident of survivorship grows out of the application of common law principles wholly independent of statute"); Attorney Gen. v. Clark, 222 Mass. 291, 295, 110 N.E. 299 (1915). Joint tenants hold a single estate in the property during their lifetimes. See 2 H.T. Tiffany, Real Property § 418, at 196 (1939) (Tiffany); 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *180. Upon the death of one joint tenant, sole ownership of the property automatically vests in the surviving tenant. See Weaver, supra ("In the absence of a severance of the jointure by the transfer or conveyance in his lifetime of the deceased joint tenant's interest the entire title vested in [the surviving joint tenant]"); Clark, supra. The vesting of a joint interest in a surviving joint tenant is not considered to be a transfer or inheritance, but an interest that came into being at the time the joint estate was created. See Weaver, supra ("The plaintiff's seisin was derived from the instrument establishing the joint tenancy and not by descent"); Clark, supra at 293-295, 110 N.E. 299.

A joint tenancy is created under the instrument of purchase or devise under which the joint tenants take title. See Weaver, 335 Mass. at 646, 140 N.E.2d 309 ; Clark, 222 Mass. at 295, 110 N.E. 299 ; Knapp v. Windsor, 6 Cush. 156, 160, 60 Mass. 156 (1850). The creation and maintenance of a joint tenancy depends on the existence of four "unities": the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time, and the unity of possession. See Knapp, supra at 160-161, 60 Mass. 156, citing 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *180. In sum, a joint tenancy exists so long as the coowners "have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession." Tiffany, supra at § 418, at 196.

A joint tenancy is severed when any one of the four unities is destroyed, including due to a unilateral act of one of the parties. See Weaver, 335 Mass. at 646, 140 N.E.2d 309. See also Tiffany, supra at § 425, at 208-209. Generally, acts that will sever one or more of the four unities and terminate a joint tenancy include alienation of the land by conveyance, including some forms of granting a mortgage by one or more joint owners, and severance by partition. See West v. First Agric. Bank, 382 Mass. 534, 536 n.4, 419 N.E.2d 262 (1981), superseded by statute on other grounds ("joint tenancy is destroyed if [a joint tenant] aliens his interest, or creditors levy on his interest, or he partitions under G. L. c. 241, § 1"); Weaver, supra ; Clark, supra ; Tiffany, supra.

Because joint tenancy and the right of survivorship operate to the disadvantage of heirs, Cross v. Cross, 324 Mass. 186, 188, 85 N.E.2d 325 (1949) ; Stimpson v. Batterman, 5 Cush....