Batts v. North Carolina
| Decision Date | 06 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 5:21-HC-02239-M |
| Parties | CLIFTON WILLIAM BATTS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
This cause is before the court on petitioner's motions “for delayed [sic],” Mot. [D.E. 29], “for entry of default,” Mot. [D.E. 30-2], “for notice and request of order,” Mot. [D.E. 50], for a writ of mandamus [D.E. 51, 61, 62], to appoint counsel [D.E. 52, 53 54, 59, 67], for summary judgment, Mot. [D.E. 56], for an evidentiary hearing, Mot. [D.E. 57], for an order, Mot. [D.E 60], and for discovery, Mot. [D.E. 65], as well as respondent's motions for summary judgment, Mot. [D.E 32], and to seal various proposed exhibits, Mot. [D.E. 42]. These motions are ripe for review.
Relevant Procedural History:
On November 15, 2021, Clifton William Batts (“petitioner”), a state inmate, filed pro se a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pet. [D.E. 1]. Petitioner also filed various additional motions seeking to expedite the proceedings [D.E. 7,15,16], appointment of counsel [D.E. 10], and a writ of mandamus [D.E. 17].
On February 9,2022, the court denied petitioner's motions to appoint counsel, to expedite, and for a writ of mandamus, but allowed the action to proceed. Order [D.E. 18].
On February 17, 2022, petitioner moved for reconsideration of that part of the court's February 9, 2022, order that denied appointment of counsel. See Mot. [D.E. 21].
On March 18, 2022, respondent moved for an extension of time until April 20, 2022, to answer the petition, Mot. [D.E. 24], and the court granted the motion, Order [D.E. 25].
On April 4, 2022, the court denied the motion for reconsideration. Order [D.E. 26].
On April 19,2022, respondent moved for an extension of time until May 2,2022, to answer the petition, Mot. [D.E. 27], and the court granted the motion, Order [D.E. 28].
On April 25,2022, petitioner filed a self-styled “motion for delayed [sic],” Mot. [D.E. 29], and a self-styled “declaration for entry of default [sic],” Mot. [D;E. 30-2].
On May 2, 2022, respondent filed an answer [D.E. 31], a motion for summary judgment, Mot. [D.E. 32], a statement of facts [D.E. 33], an appendix [D.E. 34], a memorandum [D.E. 35], proposed sealed exhibits [D.E. 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41], and a motion to seal, Mot. [D.E. 42].
On May 3,2022, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), the court notified petitioner about the motion for summary judgment, the consequences of failing to respond, and the response deadline [D.E. 44].
On June 1, 2022, petitioner filed a self-styled “petitioner's traverse to response to order to show cause [sic].” [D.E. 45].
On June 6, 2022, petitioner filed a self-styled “opposition to a motion to dismiss or deny answer [sic].” [D.E. 46].
On July 29, 2022, petitioner filed a self-styled “motion for notice and request of order [sic].” Mot. [D.E. 50] (asserting his habeas petition should be granted immediately).
On August 1,2022, petitioner moved for a writ of mandamus. Mot. [D.E. 51].
On August 5,12, and 31,2022, petitioner moved to appoint counsel. See [D.E. 52, 53, 54].
On October 4, 2022, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, Mot. [D.E. 56], and a motion for an evidentiary hearing, Mot. [D.E. 57].
On October 27, 2022, petitioner filed a motion to appoint counsel, Mot. [D.E. 59], and a self-styled “request notice of order,” Mot. [D.E. 60] ().
On November 2 and 14,2022, petitioner moved for writs of mandamus. See [D.E. 61, 62].
On December 5, 2022, petitioner moved for discovery. Mot. [D.E. 65].
On December 7, 2022, petitioner filed an affidavit in support of his December 5, 2022, motion for discovery [D.E. 66], and a motion to appoint counsel, Mot. [D.E. 67].
Preliminary Matters:
First, the court DENIES AS MOOT petitioner's motions to expedite [D.E. 29, 50,60]. See United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 2003) ().
Next, because respondent's motion for an extension of time to answer was granted, Order [D.E. 28], the court also DENIES AS MOOT petitioner's motion for entry of default [D.E. 30-2].
Next, in support for his motions for a writ ofmandamus [D.E. 51, 61,62], petitioner asserts that the court has not moved with sufficient alacrity, he is entitled to immediate release, and that this court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit improperly denied his prior motion for mandamus. See Mot. [D.E. 51] at 1-2; Mot. [D.E. 61] at 1-2; Mot. [D.E. 62] at 1-3.
Mandamus is a drastic remedy that may be invoked only in extraordinary situations. See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394,402 (1976); Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc, v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 2016). Mandamus is available only if the movant “exhausted all other avenues of relief' and is owed a “nondiscretionary duty.” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1984); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987) .
Succinctly stated, because petitioner fails to show clear entitlement to this extraordinary remedy, the court DENIES these motions seeking a writ of mandamus [D.E. 51,61, 62], In support of his motions to appoint counsel, petitioner argues, inter alia: the adjudication of this petition has been dilatory; he proceeds in forma pauperis', he cannot afford counsel; he has limited access to a law library; he is “unschooled in law”; counsel could better present his case; and his efforts to obtain counsel have been unsuccessful. See generally [D.E. 52, 53, 54, 59, 67].
No right to counsel exists in civil cases absent “exceptional circumstances.” Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated in part on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989). In pro se civil cases, such “exceptional circumstances” arise when the movant lacks capacity to represent himself; this is a determination by the court that “hinges on [the] characteristics of the claim and the litigant.” Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 163.
Because this action is not complex, and because his filings show he possesses the capacity to proceed pro se, petitioner fails to demonstrate the requisite “exceptional circumstances,” cf. iff, and the court DENIES these motions to appoint counsel [D.E. 52, 53, 54, 59, 67].
Petitioner moves for an evidentiary hearing, see Mot. [D.E. 57] (alleging due process violations), and elsewhere argues that an evidentiary hearing is appropriate because:
1) the merits of his case were not resolved in the state hearing court, 2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole, 3) the factfinding procedure in the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing, 4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence, 5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state hearing, or 6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair hearing.
Pet'r's Mot. Summ. J. [D.E. 56] at 5 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).
Petitioner's reliance on Townsend is misplaced. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5, 9 (1992) (); see also Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S.Ct. 1718,1733-34,1740 (2022) (). As noted in the analysis below, petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of section 2254(e)(2) and, accordingly, the court DENIES the motion for an evidentiary hearing [D.E. 57].
Next, in support of his motion seeking discovery, petitioner argues: “Respondent open the door to the record on appeal and ignored the pleadings [sic]”; “bias exists with pro-se trial counsel, and standby counsel with foresaid Jurisdiction Transfer to Appellate defender and client autonomy settlement of record [sic]”; “respondent has admitted to plainly by not raising a defense nor proper answer that [his] version of event is true ... by opening the door trying to address or resurrect the direct appeal in an effort to waste the court's time [sic]”; “such bias requires discovery under Rule 6(a) where appointed counsel can depose both standby counsel and appellate defenders office”; and the court may determine “the matter resolving the bias which has lend to the respondent to resurrect the direct appeal opening the door as for allowing entire direct appeal into the record to expose trial and appellate scheme to make it appear as though petitioner was afforded a fair trial and direct appeal [sic].” See Mot. [D.E. 65] at 3-6. Petitioner elsewhere states that his appellate counsel failed to raise viable constitutional claims on appeal. See Pet'r's Aff. [D.E. 66] at 2-3.
“A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary...
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