Bauer v. Bauer

• Decision Date: 12 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18846.,18846.
• Citation: 60 A.3d 950,308 Conn. 124
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Barbara BAUER v. Steven BAUER.

308 Conn. 124

60 A.3d 950

Barbara BAUER

v.Steven BAUER.

No. 18846.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 26, 2012.

Decided March 12, 2013.

Kenneth J. Bartschi, with whom were Kimberly A. Knox, Hartford, and, on the brief, Frederick F. Ward II, West Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Steven R. Dembo, Hartford, with whom was P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C. J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA and HARPER, Js. ^*

NORCOTT, J.

The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court's judgment granting a motion for clarification filed by the plaintiff, Barbara Bauer, constituted an improper modification of the judgment of dissolution. The plaintiff appeals, upon our grant of her petition for certification,¹ from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court's judgment granting the motion for clarification and ordering the defendant, Steven Bauer, to divide his pension accounts equally with the plaintiff. Bauer v. Bauer, 130 Conn.App. 185, 186, 21 A.3d 964 (2011). The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that there was no ambiguity in the trial court's orders with respect to the award of the pension accounts that required clarification and incorrectly determined that the clarification was, in fact, an improper modification of the judgment of dissolution. We conclude that the trial court clarified rather than modified its judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On October 12, 2005, the trial court, Alvord, J., rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. The trial court's judgment contained the following notation: “memorandum of decision incorporated by reference.” In the memorandum of decision, the court set forth the parties' assets, which included a home in Farmington, as well as savings and investments, a boat and two automobiles. After listing the value of these assets, the court indicated that “[t]he parties agree to split equally the defendant's New Britain General Hospital pension and annuity 403(b) plans [pension accounts]....” The court then noted that in making its financial orders, it had considered the relevant statutory criteria,² as well as applicable case law and its findings of fact. At the conclusion of the memorandum of decision, the court issued twelve orders pertaining to alimony, attorney's fees, health insurance, life insurance and the division of assets. These orders did not, however, refer to the pension accounts. Neither party appealed from the trial court's judgment.

On August 14, 2008, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, claiming, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to pay alimony in accordance with the trial court's orders, to transfer certain savings and investments to the plaintiff and “to transfer to the [plaintiff] her 50 [percent] portion of the [pension accounts].” Subsequently, on January 23, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion for clarification asking the court to “reconfirm its previous order requiring [that] the defendant equally split his [pension accounts] with the plaintiff ... via [a qualified domestic relations order].” ³

On June 10, 2009, the trial court granted the motion for clarification and set forth its reasoning in a memorandum of decision (clarification). In the clarification, the court explained that its memorandum of decision issued in conjunction with the judgment had “set forth the parties' agreement to split equally the ... pension [accounts] ... both accrued over the course of the marriage. That agreement was not repeated in the court's subsequent listed orders. Because there is an alleged ambiguity or incompleteness in the decision of the trial court ... [the] court will clarify that, pursuant to the parties' stipulation: The defendant is ordered to split equally his ... pension [accounts] ... accrued over the course of the marriage, with the plaintiff ... via qualified domestic relations order....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant then filed a motion for reargument and reconsideration, but the trial court denied the motion.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court's “clarification regarding the division of his pension accounts amounted to an impermissible modification of the ... judgment.” Bauer v. Bauer, supra, 130 Conn.App. at 186, 21 A.3d 964. After the defendant filed his appeal, the trial court issued an articulation indicating that it had “accepted the representation of both [trial] counsel that the ... pension [accounts] would be divided equally, by agreement, and the trial commenced. The court did not reiterate this agreed upon division in the orders portion of the memorandum of decision.” In its decision, the Appellate Court determined that, because none of the twelve orders addressed the pension accounts, “there was no existing order to clarify or ‘reconfirm,’ as requested by the plaintiff. Thus, through the vehicle of a motion captioned ‘Motion for Clarification,’ the plaintiff, in effect, was asking the court to issue an order regarding a marital asset that had not been made in its original judgment.” Bauer v. Bauer, supra, at 190, 21 A.3d 964. The Appellate Court acknowledged that the trial court “may have intended, at the time of its judgment dissolving the parties' marriage, that the parties would split the ... pension [accounts] ... equally”; id.; but concluded that, because the court did not issue an order to that effect, there was “no ambiguity in the judgment to be resolved by way of clarification.” Id. at 191, 21 A.3d 964. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court's clarification constituted an improper modification of the judgment and reversed the trial court's judgment granting the motion for clarification. Id. The Appellate Court also noted that “it is not at all clear from the record that the parties had, in fact, reached ... an agreement” to divide the pension accounts equally. Id. at 189, n. 3, 21 A.3d 964. The plaintiff's appeal followed. See footnote 1 of this opinion.

In her appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court elevated form over substance and improperly engaged in fact-finding. According to the plaintiff, the trial court's factual finding that the parties agreed to divide the pension accounts equally is inconsistent with the lack of a formal order to that effect and creates an ambiguity with respect to the division of the pension accounts. The plaintiff further argues that the trial court's clarification harmonized the trial court's orders and finding of fact and, as a result, is not manifestly unreasonable.

The defendant argues, to the contrary, that the Appellate Court properly concluded that there is no ambiguity to resolve because the trial court “did not enter an order dividing [the pension accounts].” The defendant further argues that the trial court's clarification, by converting a factual finding into an order, materially altered the judgment and added a thirteenth order that did not exist previously. Moreover, the defendant submits that there was no agreement to divide the pension accounts equally and that the trial court's factual finding to that effect is clearly erroneous. We agree with the plaintiff, and conclude that the trial court's clarification did not alter the substantive terms of the judgment and, therefore, did not constitute an improper modification of the judgment.

“It is well established that [t]he court's judgment in an action for dissolution of a marriage is final and binding[on] the parties, where no appeal is taken therefrom, unless and to the extent that statutes, the common law or rules of [practice] permit the setting aside or modification of that judgment. Under Practice Book [§ 17–4], a civil judgment may be opened or set aside ... [when] a motion seeking to do so is filed within four months from the date of its rendition.... Absent waiver, consent or other submission to jurisdiction, however, a court is without jurisdiction to modify or correct a judgment, in other than clerical respects, after the expiration of [that four month period]....

“Even beyond the four month time frame set forth in Practice Book § 17–4,⁴ however, courts have continuing jurisdiction to fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of a prior ... judgment ... pursuant to [their] inherent powers.... When an ambiguity in the language of a prior judgment has arisen as a result of postjudgment events, therefore, a trial court may, at any time, exercise its continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior [judgment] ... by interpreting [the] ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted.... In cases in which execution of the original judgment occurs over a period of years, a motion for clarification is an appropriate procedural vehicle to ensure that the original judgment is properly effectuated.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mickey v. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 603–604, 974 A.2d 641 (2009).

Although a trial court may interpret an ambiguous judgment, this court has emphasized that a motion for clarification “may not ... be used to modify or to alter the substantive terms of a prior judgment; see In re Haley B., 262 Conn. 406, 413, 815 A.2d 113 (2003); see also AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, [260 Conn. 232, 250, 796 A.2d 1164 (2002) ]; and we look to the substance of the relief sought by the motion rather than the form to determine whether a motion is properly characterized as one seeking a clarification or a modification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mickey v. Mickey, supra, 292 Conn. at 605, 974 A.2d 641.

In order to determine whether the trial court properly clarified ambiguity in the judgment or...