Budrawich v. Budrawich

Decision Date22 September 2020
Docket NumberAC 41125
Citation200 Conn.App. 229,240 A.3d 688
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
Parties Kathleen BUDRAWICH v. Edward BUDRAWICH, Jr.

Edward Budrawich, Jr., self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Kathleen Budrawich, self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff).

Alvord, Bright and Bear, Js.*

ALVORD, J.

The self-represented defendant, Edward Budrawich, Jr., appeals from the trial court's rulings on postjudgment motions filed by both him and the self-represented plaintiff, Kathleen Budrawich. On appeal, the defendant argues that the court improperly (1) denied his motion for reassignment of the plaintiff's motion for order, (2) granted the plaintiff's motion to modify alimony, (3) granted the plaintiff's motion to

correct and issued a corrected memorandum of decision, and (4) modified his alimony obligation pursuant to his motion to modify alimony. We agree with the defendant's first and second claims and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the court. In light of our resolution of the defendant's first two claims, we need not address his third claim and we conclude that his fourth claim is rendered moot.

The following facts, as set forth by this court in a prior appeal; Budrawich v. Budrawich , 156 Conn. App. 628, 115 A.3d 39, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 921, 118 A.3d 63 (2015) ; and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The parties were married in 1982, and had three children. Id., at 631, 115 A.3d 39. "The plaintiff filed an action seeking dissolution of the parties’ marriage in June, 2004. In June, 2006, the parties reached an agreement regarding a parenting plan, which the court [Abery-Wetstone, J. ] found to be in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, it approved and incorporated the agreement by reference into the judgment of dissolution. ... The parties also entered into a binding arbitration agreement in November, 2006, and a corrected decision and award was issued on May 30, 2007, which the court approved at the time of dissolution. ... After approving the parties’ agreement and the decision of the arbitrator, on November 28, 2007, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties’ twenty-five year marriage." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 631–32, 115 A.3d 39. On November 29, 2007, the court amended its memorandum of decision to add a paragraph concerning alimony, which it stated had been deleted inadvertently from the original decision. That paragraph (alimony provision) stated: "The husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $1.00 per year as alimony. Payment shall be made, during the husband's lifetime and until the wife's death, remarriage, or suspension of alimony due to cohabitation pursuant to the statute and case law or

November 28, 2022. Alimony shall be modifiable as to amount if the wife earns less than $100,000 per year. Alimony shall not be modifiable as to term."

Postjudgment proceedings in this dissolution case resulted in two prior appeals. The first appeal is not relevant to our discussion. The second appeal concerned, inter alia, the trial court's order requiring the parties to submit to arbitration to resolve their dispute concerning reimbursement for past expenses that each party had incurred on behalf of their minor children. Budrawich v. Budrawich , supra, 156 Conn. App. at 630, 115 A.3d 39. On April 21, 2015, this court issued its decision, in which it concluded that "the [trial] court erred in ordering the parties to submit to arbitration to resolve their dispute over unreimbursed expenses because the parties did not execute a voluntary arbitration agreement." Id., at 648, 115 A.3d 39. This court reversed the judgment only as to the order requiring the parties to submit to arbitration. Id., at 650, 115 A.3d 39.

The parties also filed several postjudgment motions. The defendant has appealed from the court's rulings on his March 1, 2018 motion for reassignment of the plaintiff's November 25, 2015 motion for order seeking reimbursement for the children's expenses and unreimbursed medical expenses, the plaintiff's April 20, 2017 motion to modify alimony and her December 6, 2017 motion to correct the court's memorandum of decision rendered thereon, and the defendant's March 23, 2018 motion to modify alimony. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant's first claim on appeal is that the court improperly denied his motion for reassignment of the plaintiff's motion for order. Specifically, he argues that he did not consent to the court's requested extension of time to issue its decision on the plaintiff's motion for order and, therefore, his motion seeking to have the

motion for order reassigned to another judge should have been granted. The plaintiff responds that the defendant has "waived any right to claim that matters before the court are reassigned" by his failure to respond to the court's e-mails requesting an extension and to attend a status conference scheduled following his failure to respond to the e-mails. We agree with the defendant that the court improperly denied his motion for reassignment.

The following additional undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. On November 25, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for order, alleging that she was owed reimbursement for the children's extracurricular expenses and unreimbursed medical expenses. The court, Sommer, J. , held hearings over several days, beginning on August 8, 2016, and ending on September 27, 2017. Both parties filed posthearing memoranda of law on October 27, 2017. With the 120 day deadline to issue a decision on the plaintiff's motion for order approaching; see Practice Book § 11-19 ; the case flow coordinator from the Stamford Superior Court e-mailed the parties on February 16, 2018, on behalf of Judge Sommer, to request a waiver of the 120 day deadline. The defendant did not respond to the e-mail. A status conference was scheduled for February 22, 2018. On that date, the plaintiff's counsel appeared before the court, Sommer, J ., in Stamford.1 Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were present. The plaintiff's counsel informed the court that the plaintiff was not present because she was ill, and that counsel did not know why the defendant was not present.

The court stated that the defendant "had been contacted with the request for the extension of time for

the court to have additional time to render its decision. And because he did not reply to case flow, it was necessary for the court to schedule this hearing today to give him an opportunity to come and to be heard on the requested extension." The court indicated that its requested extension was due to the "very, very heavy press of business in the family assignment resulting in the court handling a vast volume of cases" and "the additional complication" of completing a decision in this matter where the physical file remained in Bridgeport and that "it was not clear that all of the exhibits that are related to [the motion for children's expenses] are here with me." Accordingly, the court sought an additional period of time to issue its ruling. The plaintiff's counsel stated that the exhibits submitted were essential for the court to render its decision and indicated that "there's no objection on our part" to the court's proposed March 30, 2018 deadline to issue its decision.

The court then stated: "Well, I will consider that [the defendant] has been duly notified by case flow of the request for the extension. Not having received any response from [the defendant], this court scheduled a hearing this afternoon to provide [the defendant] an opportunity to appear and speak to the requested extension. [The defendant] has not appeared, it now being 2:25, the matter having been scheduled for two o'clock. And the court will proceed on with the agreement of counsel to the extension to March 30, which I would anticipate being able to over the next couple of weeks either have the file, those crucial exhibits, and they are crucial, I do remember their production and initial review throughout the testimony. And the exhibits are essential to this court's decision. So that matter will be addressed."

On March 1, 2018, pursuant to Practice Book § 11-19, the defendant filed a motion for reassignment of

the plaintiff's motion for order on the ground that the court had not rendered a timely decision on the plaintiff's motion. On March 22, 2018, the plaintiff filed an objection, representing that the "Family Caseflow Coordinator for Judge Sommer in Stamford, CT, e-mailed all parties 3 times on this matter on 2/16/18 and twice on 2/21/18. The plaintiff replied on 2/19/18, making that 4 e-mails sent to [the defendant]. The defendant ... failed to reply to any of the e-mails ...." The plaintiff attached to her objection what she represented were copies of the e-mails2 and further argued that the defendant had failed to appear for the February 22, 2018 status conference, which had been scheduled because of the defendant's failure to respond to the e-mails.

The parties appeared before the court, Wenzel, J ., on March 21, 2018. The defendant argued that he missed the status conference because he had appeared at the courthouse located at 1061 Main Street in Bridgeport, the courthouse identified as the location of the status conference in the JDNO notice. Following argument on the motion for reassignment, the court confirmed that the only issue for its consideration was "whether or not Judge Sommer's finding that there was consent to the extension was proper." The court then stated: "I am put in the unfortunate position of being asked to second-guess Judge Sommer's decision. I am not in any position to do that. I'm not saying that her finding of consent that the extension should be allowed is right or wrong. I'm in no way as well equipped as she was to address that issue or make that finding .... So based on another judge's...

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  • Renstrup v. Renstrup
    • United States
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    • January 17, 2023
    ...with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Budrawich v. Budrawich , 200 Conn. App. 229, 246, 240 A.3d 688 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 909, 244 A.3d 561 (2021). It is clear from the court's reasoning that the defendant's ......
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