Bauer v. Elrich

• Decision Date: 25 June 2020
• Docket Number: Crim. No. PJM 20-1212
• Citation: 468 F.Supp.3d 704
• Parties: Sharon BAUER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Marc ELRICH, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

468 F.Supp.3d 704

Sharon BAUER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Marc ELRICH, et al., Defendants.

Crim. No. PJM 20-1212

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed June 25, 2020

Eric William Payne Lee, Michael Bekesha, Pro Hac Vice, Judicial Watch Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Patricia Victoria Haggerty, Patricia Lisehora Kane, Paul F. Leonard, Jr., John Paul Markovs, Marc Pemble Hansen, Office of the County Attorney for Montgomery County, Rockville, MD, Alexandra Tucker Stewart, (USA/FPD), Silver Spring, MD, Catherine M.A. Carroll, Pro Hac Vice, Paul Reinherz Q. Wolfson, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PETER J. MESSITTE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

As part of Montgomery County, Maryland's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, its County Council appropriated $10 million for an Emergency Assistance Relief Payment (EARP) program. As the County Council explained, the public health emergency "has resulted in the immediate loss of income for many households as businesses have been required to close and people have been told to stay home," causing, it says, "a financial crisis for many County residents" that "may not be addressed through financial assistance provided by the federal or State government." ECF No. 28-4 at 66 (Resolution 19-439). The EARP seeks to address this crisis by providing one-time emergency assistance checks to individuals or families who (1) live in Montgomery County and need financial assistance to pay for food and essentials, (2) are not eligible for federal COVID-19 stimulus checks or state benefits, (3) are not eligible to receive unemployment benefits, and (4) have an income equal to or below 50% of the federal poverty level. See ECF No. 28-9.¹ The County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), which administers the program, distributes payments of $500 to eligible single adults, $1,000 to eligible families with a child, and an additional $150 to families for each additional child, up to $1,450 total. Id.

Sharon Bauer and Richard Jurgena are Montgomery County taxpayers who seek to bar County Executive Marc Elrich and DHHS Director Raymond Crowel from implementing the program. They assert that the County specifically designed the EARP's eligibility criteria so that unlawfully present aliens are the primary recipients of the cash payments. As such, they say, the program runs afoul of 8 U.S.C. § 1621, which prohibits the provision of cash benefits to "unlawfully present aliens."

On May 15, 2020, the Court heard Oral Argument pertaining to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. See ECF No. 19. On May 29, 2020, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ request for the temporary injunction, but in doing so required Montgomery County to preserve at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the remaining EARP funds to ensure that that an appropriate amount of money remains undistributed so that the case may be effectively resolved after full airing of the issues on the merits. ECF No. 33.

The parties have now briefed the merits in full and have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 28 and 29, Responses in Opposition, ECF Nos. 38 and 39, and Reply briefs, ECF Nos. 41 and 42. No further hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6.

For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants.

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court will grant summary judgment when, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, each motion is to "be considered individually, and the facts relevant to each must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Mellen v. Bunting , 327 F.3d 355, 363 (4^th Cir. 2003). Here the parties are in agreement as to the underlying facts. See ECF No. 39, p. 2 n.2.

B. 8 U.S.C. § 1621

This case centers four-square on 8 U.S.C. § 1621, enacted by Congress as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2260 (1996). The statute has four subparts. Subsection (a) of § 1621 declares that, generally, unlawfully present aliens are "not eligible for any State or local public benefit." 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) ; see also Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Trump , 416 F.Supp.3d 452, 498 (D. Md. 2019) (" Section 1621 provides that immigrants who lack lawful status are not eligible for any State or local public benefit"). The full text of 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) reads:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in subsections (b) and (d), an alien who is not (1) a qualified alien (as defined in [ 8 U.S.C § 1641 ] ), (2) a nonimmigrant under the Immigration and Nationality Act [ 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. ], or (3) an alien who is paroled into the United States under [ 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) ] for less than one year, is not eligible for any State or local public benefit (as defined in subsection (c)).

8 U.S.C. § 1621(a).

Subsection (b) enumerates particular categories of benefits that are excepted from this prohibition, including "[a]ssistance for health care items and services that are necessary for the treatment of an emergency medical condition", "[s]hort-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency disaster relief," "[p]ublic health assistance for immunizations with respect to immunizable diseases and for testing and treatment of symptoms of communicable diseases," and certain "[p]rograms, services, or assistance (such as soup kitchens, crisis counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter) specified by the Attorney General ..." 8 U.S.C. § 1621(b).

Sub-section (c) defines a "State or local public benefit" to include "any grant, contract, loan ... retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government." 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A)-(B).

Subsection (d) sets out a generalized exception to subpart (a), that:

A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible under subsection (a) only through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.

8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) ; see also Texas v. U.S. , 809 F.3d 134, 148-49 (5^th Cir. 2015), aff'd , 577 U.S. 1101, 136 S.Ct. 906, 193 L.Ed.2d 788 (2016) ("Unlawfully present aliens are generally not eligible to receive ... state and local public benefits unless the state otherwise provides").

Plaintiffs, in the sole count of their Complaint, allege that "Defendants’ program to disburse direct cash payments to unlawfully present aliens violates 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a)." ECF No. 11, ¶ 23.

Defendants do not dispute that the EARP benefits unlawfully present aliens.² They also do not assert that any of the exceptions of 8 U.S.C. § 1621(b) extend to the EARP's financial assistance payments nor do they argue that the EARP's disbursement of checks is somehow excluded from the definition of "State or local public benefit" within 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c). Instead, they aver that the EARP complies with the exception articulated in subsection (d) that "[a] State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit ... through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility." 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). Even though the Maryland General Assembly was not directly involved in the enaction of the EARP, Defendants submit that under the home-rule provisions of the Maryland Constitution, Montgomery County has the authority to enact locally applicable laws that have the force of state law. Any holding that § 1621(d) prohibits the use of EARP funds for the benefit of unlawfully present aliens, they say, would violate principles of federalism derived from the federal Constitution, including a State's right to structure its government in a manner of its choosing as well as the Tenth Amendment's anti-commandeering doctrine.³

Based the statute's text, structure, and legislative history, Plaintiffs argue that the EARP fails to comply with subsection (d)’s exception concerning "the enactment of a State law." 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). They assert that Montgomery County is not a "State" and the Council's appropriation resolutions are not "State laws."⁴ In terms of the Constitutional attack, Plaintiffs submit that 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) does not command anything of States; rather it creates a mechanism for them to provide certain benefits to unlawfully present aliens within Congress's regulatory framework if they choose to do so. That framework, they say, is pursuant to Congress's exclusive authority over immigration and naturalization and is textbook cooperative federalism.⁵

These are unquestionably serious arguments. But whether it is appropriate for the Court to assess them, it must first address whether Plaintiffs have satisfied standing to bring this suit. The Court indicated in its ruling on the requested Temporary Restraining Order that it would consider the matter of standing in connection with its merits ruling.

C. Jurisdiction and Standing

Plaintiffs originally filed suit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County. See ECF No. 1. On May 13, 2020, the same day that they were served with the Complaint, Defendants removed the case to this Court, submitting that "[t]he Complaint alleges a federal question (alleged violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1621 ),...