Bauer v. Rutter

• Citation: 256 S.W.2d 294
• Decision Date: 17 March 1953
• Docket Number: No. 28617,28617
• Parties: BAUER v. RUTTER. . Missouri
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 294

256 S.W.2d 294

BAUER v. RUTTER.

No. 28617.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

March 17, 1953

Forrest Boecker, Clayton, for appellant.

Allen H. Whittington and John T. Ross, St. Louis, for respondent.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

This is an action instituted by Henry G. Bauer, doing business as H.G. Bauer Moving & Storage, against James D. Rutter in a magistrate court of St. Louis County for the purpose of collecting a balance due on a bill for moving household goods from New Orleans to St. Louis. Defendant filed an answer denying the claim, pleading full performance, and asserting a counterclaim for an amount within the magistrate's jurisdiction. The counterclaim was based upon libel: that plaintiff had written a letter concerning defendant to a third party (defendant's employer) and that the letter contained libelous matter. After issue joined and for reasons undisclosed by the record plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his petition and thereafter moved in the magistrate court to dismiss defendant's counterclaim. The magistrate judge sustained the motion. Defendant appealed to the circuit court where the counterclaim suffered the same fate, hence this appeal.

The only question presented on this record is whether a magistrate court has jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim for damages based upon libel.

Appellant contends that the magistrate court has such jurisdiction by virtue of Section 517.240(2) RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., which provides that "*** all counterclaims, where the amount involved does not exceed the jurisdiction of such magistrates' courts, allowed in circuit courts, except equitable defenses, may be pleaded in all actions before magistrates" and Section 509.420 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., which prescribes what a counterclaim shall state. This contention cannot be maintained successfully.

Magistrate courts are inferior courts of limited jurisdiction possessing only those powers which are expressly granted by statute. State ex rel. and to Use of Berra v. Sestric, 349 Mo. 182, 159 S.W.2d 786. No presumptions or inferences will be invoked to enlarge their jurisdiction and they cannot assume or take powers by implication. State ex rel. Gordon v. Hopkins, 87 Mo. 519.

Section 517.240(2), supra, does not confer jurisdiction on the magistrate court. It merely regulates the procedure by which a defendant may assert a claim against his adversary. It relates to the remedy, and prescribes the method by which a defendant may invoke the aid of the court in matters over which the court otherwise has jurisdiction. A law which prescribes the method of exercising jurisdiction by an inferior court in a class of cases where jurisdiction has not been conferred cannot have the effect of conferring jurisdiction. State ex rel. Gordon v. Hopkins, supra. Nothing is to be found in Sec. 517.240(2), supra, or in any other section of the statutes expressly or impliedly conferring jurisdiction upon magistrate courts to entertain counterclaims in libel actions. On the contrary, Section 482.100(2) RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. expressly excludes libel actions from the scope of magistrate jurisdiction in the following unambiguous and unequivocal language: "No magistrate shall have jurisdiction to hear or try any action *** of ** libel ***."

Appellant asserts, however, that there is a distinction between the powers conferred upon magistrate courts to entertain libel actions commenced by way of petition and libel actions introduced by way of counterclaim; that restrictions on the original jurisdiction of magistrate courts do not apply to counterclaims; that the use of the term "action" in Sec. 482.100(2), supra, refers to the institution of a suit by a plaintiff, and that it is the legislative intent that the scope of counterclaims in magistrate courts exceed the scope of magistrate courts' original jurisdiction. We cannot agree. The power of a magistrate court to adjudicate a cause of action for libel does not depend upon whether it is introduced by way of petition or counterclaim. A cause of action for libel may be stated either by petition or by counterclaim. A cause of action stated in a counterclaim is an independent cause of action, Usona Mfg. Co. v. Shubert-Christy Corporation, Mo.App., 132 S.W.2d 1101, as fully as a cause of action stated in a petition. Because of Sec. 482.100(2), supra, a magistrate has no jurisdiction over a libel action whether it comes into court by way of the front door or by way of the back door. That subject matter is not the subject of judicial inquiry in a magistrate court, regardless of what procedural device is employed to raise the issue. A very similar situation was encountered in Emery v. St. Louis, K. & N.W. Ry Co., 77 Mo. 339, wherein it was said, loc. cit. 350:

"If the real character of the cross demand is such that the justice could not entertain jurisdiction of it if the defendant were suing upon it, then he certainly cannot entertain it when asserted by a defendant before him, however close it may appear to be connected with plaintiff's cause of action."

Nor do we find any historical basis for appellant's position. From territorial days to the present time the expressed public policy has consistently been to prohibit justice of the peace and magistrate courts from entertaining this type of action. The first statute defining the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts provided that nothing contained in the act should be construed or understood to extend to or embrace actions of slander, etc. ¹ Three...