Baugus v. Director of Revenue, 76631
| Decision Date | 21 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 76631,76631 |
| Citation | 878 S.W.2d 39 |
| Parties | Glen BAUGUS, d/b/a Glen's Auto Sales, et al., Appellants, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John Landwehr, Jefferson City, for appellants.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Norman E. Siegel, Asst. Attys. Gen., James A. Chenault, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mo. Dept. of Revenue, Jefferson City, for respondents.
Each of the plaintiffs is an independent used car dealer. They sued the Missouri Department of Revenue seeking to have § 1 of Senate Bill (S.B.) 35, enacted by the General Assembly in the 1993 regular session, declared unconstitutional due to its vagueness and seeking a declaration that the department of revenue's announced method of implementing S.B. 35 was void due to a failure to follow steps for promulgation of a rule under Chapter 536, RSMo. In addition, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. The trial court denied all relief. Because the constitutionality of a statute is at issue, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. Affirmed.
Section 1 of S.B. 35 provides:
The motor vehicle commission may review all title designations. Any designation described in § 301.190, or 301.227, RSMo, placed on a certificate of ownership or certificate of title issued pursuant to § 301.190 or 301.227, RSMo, shall remain on the certificate of ownership of title and any and all subsequent certificates of ownership or title issued for that vehicle shall carry such designation on the face of such certificate of ownership or title.
The title designations found in § 301.190.3, RSMo, include "Reconstructed Motor Vehicle", "Motor Change Vehicle", "Specially Constructed Motor Vehicle", and "Non-USA-Std Motor Vehicle", as defined in section 301.010. Section 301.227, RSMo, does not use the word "designate," but that section authorizes the director of revenue to, under appropriate circumstances, issue a title denominated a "salvage" certificate of title.
Following the enactment of S.B. 35, the director of revenue announced her intent to affix the label "prior salvage" to all titles issued subsequent to a salvage certificate of title with regard to a vehicle.
The plaintiffs first argue that § 1 of S.B. 35 is void for vagueness. The complaint is made that S.B. 35 supplies no standards to help the agency locate or formulate designations described in § 301.227, and the department of revenue is left to guess at what designation should be used. The argument is plainly at odds with the language of the statute. Section 1 of S.B. 35 unequivocally requires that once a title designation described in § 301.227, that is, a "salvage" certificate of title, has been issued with regard to a vehicle, that all subsequent titles issued for that particular vehicle must carry that designation.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3255, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). The vagueness doctrine assures that guidance, through explicit standards, will be afforded to those who must apply the statute avoiding possible arbitrary and discriminatory application. State ex rel. Mo. State Board of Registration for Healing Arts v. Southworth, 704 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Mo. banc 1986). A statute giving an administrative agency the specific duty to "review" title designations and to place historical information regarding the vehicle title on each subsequent issuance of the title, including a notation that the vehicle was issued a "salvage" certificate of title, is not so imprecise and uncertain a duty as to render the statute void for vagueness.
The plaintiffs' second argument is somewhat related to the first. They argue that the department of revenue's proposal to use the phrase "prior salvage" on titles subsequent to a salvage title is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and in excess of the statutory authority granted. Plaintiffs contend that although § 301.227, RSMo Supp.1993, authorizes salvage certificates of title, the salvage certificate of title is not a "designation" as referred to in S.B. 35. They argue that title designations appear only in § 301.190, RSMo Supp.1993. Not only is such a reading of S.B. 35 contrary to its plain and ordinary meaning, such reading renders S.B. 35 superfluous. Section 301.190.3, RSMo Supp.1993, already requires that the director "appropriately designate on the current and all subsequent issues of the certificate" the words " 'Reconstructed Motor Vehicle', 'Motor Change Vehicle', 'Specially Constructed Motor Vehicle', or 'Non-USA-Std Motor Vehicle ...' " Legislative changes should not be construed as useless acts unless no other conclusion is possible. Mo. State Board of Registration for Healing Arts v. Southworth, 704 S.W.2d 219, 225 (Mo. banc 1986). No presumption will be indulged that the legislature intended to perform a futile act by enacting S.B. 35.
Plaintiffs also argue that the legislature only intended to refer to "junking certificates," also provided for in § 301.227, RSMo. Thus, they claim that only vehicles that had previously been the subject of a junking certificate must have that fact included in subsequent title designations. Had the legislature so intended, the statute would have been limited, but it was not. S.B. 35 extends to any title designation described in § 301.227.
Based on the plaintiffs' strained and narrow reading of S.B. 35, they make an associated claim that the addition of the word "prior" as a modifier of "salvage" as a title designation is capricious and unreasonable. While the statute does not specifically authorize the use of the word "prior,...
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