Baulos v. Roadway Exp., Inc.

Decision Date24 March 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-2880,97-2880
Citation139 F.3d 1147
Parties7 A.D. Cases 1753, 12 NDLR P 111 Richard BAULOS and Stanley Schneider, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Terry R. Boesch (argued), Valparaiso, IN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Michael A. Warner, Jr. (argued), Franczek, Sullivan, Mann, Crement, Hein & Relias, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before ESCHBACH, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

Richard Baulos and Stanley Schneider alleged that they were discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The district court granted Roadway Express' (Roadway) motion for summary judgment finding that the plaintiffs were not disabled or regarded as disabled, and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 1 Baulos and Schneider appeal. We affirm.

I.

Richard Baulos and Stanley Schneider began working as truck drivers for Roadway in August 1992 and January 1993, respectively. In 1994, Roadway incorporated a system known as "sleeper duty" into its operations. Under the sleeper system, truck drivers would drive with a partner. One of the partners would drive while the other would sleep for five to eight hours in the adjacent sleeper cab of the truck. The drivers would then switch positions, thereby preventing the need to spend a night in a motel and avoiding the risk of a single individual driving for too long and falling asleep at the wheel. Sleeper teams were used for truck drivers making long hauls, those over 500 miles, while single drivers were used for shorter distances. Roadway used this arrangement to increase efficiency and improve customer service.

Semi-annually drivers bid for either single-driver, sleeper duty, or a combination of both positions depending on Roadway's varying needs. Plaintiffs both lacked the seniority to successfully bid for single-driver positions.

Prior to his employment with Roadway, Baulos developed a chronic kidney-stone problem. His problem was so severe that on average he passed at least one kidney stone each year. In order to address his urinary tract disorder, Baulos drank two gallons of water a day, took a diuretic, and was prescribed potassium pills. Baulos' need to frequently urinate, approximately every half-hour to two hours, combined with the bumpy ride in the sleeper cab prevented him from getting much sleep. At first he tried urinating into a container while inside the cab so that it would not have to stop, but Roadway subsequently sent a memo to all drivers notifying them that they could no longer urinate inside the truck at any time. Baulos contends that when he was placed on sleeper duty he suffered from a limited sleep disorder, which ultimately became so grave that he began falling asleep while driving. On September 11, 1995, Baulos was placed on an extended leave of absence because he informed management that he could no longer drive sleeper trucks and submitted a letter from his doctor that stated that he could not get sufficient sleep under his current assignment which resulted in sleep deprivation and exhaustion.

In light of his alleged problems, Baulos asked to be taken off sleeper duty and assigned only to shorter, single-driver shifts or various other non-driving positions. Roadway's management informed Baulos that he could not be taken entirely off of sleeper duty because of the union's seniority scheme. Baulos later filed a grievance with his union in a second attempt to be taken off sleeper duty. The union's reviewing body rejected Baulos' request and his grievance was then taken to the next step of being presented to the Joint Area Committee (JAC), which was comprised of three union and three management representatives. The district court found and Roadway asserts that the JAC determined at their December 6, 1995 meeting that Baulos should be offered a specially designed urinal apparatus to use in the sleeper cab as an accommodation. The district court stated that "[s]uch an accommodation was unsatisfactory in Baulos' eyes and, therefore, he never drove for Roadway." However, Baulos argues that neither this accommodation nor any others were offered to him.

On December 6, 1995, Roadway sent a certified letter to Baulos at his residence requesting updated medical information so that it could determine if he was able and willing to return to work. This letter stated that if Baulos failed to provide the requested information within 10 days Roadway would remove him from the company's seniority list. Baulos and his wife refused to sign for and accept this letter. Thereafter, Baulos' wife accepted a certified letter dated December 19, 1995, from Roadway, which stated that Baulos was removed from the seniority list for failing to respond to its request for updated health information.

Schneider began driving on sleeper duty in October 1994. Like Baulos, Schneider quickly developed a limited sleep disorder. As a result of the bumpy ride, cramped quarters, constant noise, and his driving partner's smoking and flatulence, Schneider became so exhausted when he was on sleeper duty that he developed heart attack-like symptoms. After Schneider's doctor submitted a report stating that Schneider was "temporarily unsafe to drive," Roadway pulled him off of all driving duties. Several days later Schneider submitted a revised statement from his doctor that stated that it was unsafe for him to drive only when he was on sleeper duty. Schneider informed Roadway that his disorder only manifested itself when he drove sleeper duties and that he would be fine if he was assigned only to single-man trucks. Once again, Roadway management informed Schneider that because of the union's seniority scheme they could not exempt him from all sleeper duty.

In September 1995, Schneider wrote to Roadway requesting accommodations. In this letter Schneider offered to try and continue performing sleeper duties if Roadway installed an air-ride suspension in the sleeper, as well as a Jake brake 2 if the trip would entail crossing the Rocky Mountains. Roadway did not respond to this request for accommodation.

In December 1995, Roadway removed Schneider's name from the drivers list because he had failed to respond to their request for updated health information. However, Schneider contends that he personally drove medical reports to Roadway and then sent them by fax a second time, but that Roadway never acknowledged receiving these documents. Roadway states that it did not receive this information. The information that Schneider allegedly sent only included a current electrocardiograph and the statements that were previously submitted from his doctor in September 1995. Schneider also alleged that he stated that his condition was unchanged from September.

Like Baulos, Schneider filed a grievance with the union but subsequently postponed the grievance hearing indefinitely because he decided to pursue his dispute with Roadway through his attorney rather than the union. Subsequent to their dismissal from Roadway both plaintiffs obtained employment driving trucks with other companies.

The district court found that Baulos and Schneider did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they had an impairment that substantially limited their major life activity of the ability to work. The court also found that Roadway did not regard them as having such an impairment. The district court found that plaintiffs' inability to perform only the particular job of driving sleeper trucks was insufficient to establish a substantial limitation on their ability to work. On appeal Baulos and Schneider argue that they raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were disabled or regarded as disabled. Roadway disputes these contentions and also asserts that summary judgment was appropriate on two alternative grounds not considered by the district court--namely, that Baulos and Schneider were not qualified for their positions because they could not perform sleeper duty and were responsible for the breakdown in the interactive accommodation process.

II.

This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir.1997); Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir.1997). "Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vector-Springfield Properties, Ltd. v. Central Ill. Light Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). In order for a party "to avoid summary judgment that party must supply evidence sufficient to allow a jury to render a verdict in his favor." Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1248 (7th Cir.1995). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute is insufficient to defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether Baulos was actually offered the accommodation of a urinal apparatus being placed in the truck that he used for sleeper duty. The district court found that it was offered to him and that he found it unacceptable. There is nothing in the record to support this finding. Baulos did not attend the December 6, 1995 JAC meeting because it was held in Florida, but did obtain a transcript of the meeting. He asserts that this transcript shows that a doctor at the JAC meeting suggested that Baulos be offered the urinal apparatus so that he could return to work, however there is nothing in the record that shows that the JAC adopted this suggestion and offered it to Baulos. Baulos also states that even if such...

To continue reading

Request your trial
42 cases
  • Ragan v. Jeffboat, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • June 18, 2001
    ...as having such an impairment. See Riemer v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 148 F.3d 800, 806 (7th Cir.1998); Baulos v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1153-1154 (7th Cir.1998); Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 153 F.3d 805, 807, (7th Cir.1998); Hoeller v. Eaton Corp., 149 F.3d 621, 624-25 (7th......
  • St. John v. Town of Ellettsville
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • January 5, 1999
    ...747, 750 (7th Cir.1998). Yet, neither the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties, Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir. 1998), nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 1......
  • McMullin v. Ashcroft, 03 CV 142 JP/LFG.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Wyoming
    • September 1, 2004
    ...to show plaintiff was "substantially limited" in ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs); Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir.1998) (inability of truck drivers to work night shift "sleeper duty" did not substantially limit them in major life activity of ......
  • Lawson v. Csx Transportation, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • December 20, 1999
    ...Commission ("EEOC") regulations implementing Title I of the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 et seq.; see also Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.1998) (utilizing EEOC regulations to define "disability" under the ADA and finding summary judgment proper where truck driver......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT