Baumann v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
| Decision Date | 26 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | 5586. |
| Citation | 17 A.D.3d 260,793 N.Y.S.2d 410,2005 NY Slip Op 03155 |
| Parties | ELAINE J. BAUMANN, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of FREDERICK BAUMANN, Deceased, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD OF NEW YORK, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff, v. FOREST ELECTRIC CORP., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent, et al., Third-Party Defendants. (And Another Action.) |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Plaintiff's decedent, Frederick Baumann, an experienced journeyman electrician, was electrocuted on the job in 1999. Decedent was employed by third-party defendant Forest Electric Corp. and had been working for a year on office space leased by defendant Credit Suisse First Boston Structured Assets, Inc. (Credit Suisse) at 11 Madison Avenue, in New York City. The building is owned by defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Met Life). Decedent was moving fixtures and came across a "bad splice" in an existing outlet box which apparently electrocuted him.
Plaintiff commenced the instant wrongful death action against, inter alia, Met Life, Credit Suisse and Penguin Air Conditioning Corp., also known as Emcor/Penguin Air Conditioning Corp., and Emcor Group, Inc. (collectively Penguin). Penguin moved for summary judgment dismissing the case against it* and defendants Credit Suisse and Met Life cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's decedent was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. Plaintiff contended that defendants are liable under Labor Law § 241 (6) based upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.13 (b) (4), which requires that workers be protected from electric shock by de-energizing the circuit and grounding it. Plaintiff further argued that decedent's failure to turn off the electricity was consistent with the industry practice and was not so extraordinary or reckless as to make decedent the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The court, however, concluded that decedent was the sole proximate cause of his death.
We now reverse. The court improperly made...
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