Baumgardner v. County of Cook

• Decision Date: 03 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99 C 5788.,99 C 5788.
• Citation: 108 F.Supp.2d 1041
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: Robert BAUMGARDNER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF COOK and William Krystiniak, Defendants.

108 F.Supp.2d 1041

Robert BAUMGARDNER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF COOK and William Krystiniak, Defendants.

No. 99 C 5788.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

August 3, 2000.

Jonathan C. Goldman, Goldman & Ehrlich, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Katherine A. Paterno, Assistant State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MORTON DENLOW, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case raises the issue of whether a plaintiff who brings a claim alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA") against his county government employer can also bring a claim alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his supervisor individually when the same facts and circumstances form the basis for both claims. The Court holds that he can. The rights conferred on Americans by the Constitution do not ebb and flow like the tide depending on whether a civil rights lawsuit has been launched. Rather, constitutional rights are those fundamental rights that are the very foundation of American society. They follow us wherever we go, especially into the courtroom and the workplace.

Plaintiff Robert Baumgardner ("Baumgardner" or "Plaintiff") brought a three count complaint against his employer County of Cook ("Cook County") and his supervisor individually, William Krystiniak ("Krystiniak") (collectively "Defendants"). Counts I and II are brought against Cook County alleging (I) discrimination in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 and § 12201 and (II) retaliation in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203. In Count III, Baumgardner also brings a complaint against Krystiniak individually, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court has previously denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I, II & III. In the present action, Defendants move this Court to reconsider its previous holding, denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Count III for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P.12(b)(6). For reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for reconsideration is denied.

I. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his or her claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must assume that all facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true, and must liberally construe those allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

"A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102. A court should dismiss the action under 12(b)(6) "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). The Rule does not countenance dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

II. STATUTE AT ISSUE

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not confer substantive rights; it provides a remedy, that is, a private cause of action, for violations of constitutional rights and rights created by federal statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Thus, in order to establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 1) the action occurred "under color of law" and 2) the action is a deprivation of either a constitutional right or a federal statutory right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Section 1983 is available to enforce violations of the Constitution and federal statutes by agents of the state. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). However, when the alleged violation is statutory, as opposed to Constitutional, in nature, the Supreme Court recognizes "two exceptions to the application of a § 1983 claim to remedy statutory violations: 1) where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself, and 2) where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983." Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). In exceptional cases, the Court has held that when a statutory scheme is "unusually elaborate" and "sufficiently comprehensive," it demonstrates Congress' intent to foreclose a plaintiff from bringing a statutory claim under § 1983. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 13 & 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2623 & 2626, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981).

Contrary to Defendants' assertions, these exceptions apply only to statutory violations brought under § 1983. In the case at bar, Plaintiff does not attempt to bring an ADA claim under § 1983, but rather a constitutional claim. Thus, the statutory exceptions do not apply to this case.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED

Thus, the issues presented are (1) whether this is one of those exceptional cases in which Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement under § 1983, either in the text of the ADA statute or by providing a sufficiently comprehensive and effective remedial scheme under the ADA, so as to raise a clear intention of foreclosure, and (2) if Congress did not intend foreclosure, whether a § 1983 claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been sufficiently pled so that, under some set of facts consistent with his claim, Plaintiff would be entitled to relief.

The parties have agreed that the issue of qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is an issue that is best decided after discovery. Therefore, the Court declines to address the issue of Krystiniak's qualified immunity at this time.

IV. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND THE ADA TO FORECLOSE SEPARATE § 1983 CLAIMS BROUGHT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

A. Language of ADA and Legislative History

As always, the legal analysis begins with the language of the statute. Based on the express language of the statute and the subsequent judicial interpretations thereof, Congress did not intend for the ADA to foreclose private claims alleging constitutional violations brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Congress clearly stated its purpose in enacting the ADA:

(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).

To achieve these goals, the ADA includes provisions in five separate areas to protect the rights of the disabled: Title I — Employment, Title II — Public Services, Title III — Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities, Title IV-Telecommunications, and Title V— Miscellaneous Provisions. Plaintiff has alleged violations of Title I regarding employment discrimination, and Title V regarding retaliation. Thus, the Court will focus on those two titles in its analysis.

1. Congress Intended The ADA to Incorporate Many of the Rights, Powers, Procedures, and Remedies of Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Throughout Title I, the ADA incorporates by reference many of the definitions, powers, procedures, and remedies set forth in specified sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The definitions of "Commission" and "Person," used in the context of an "Employer," refer to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12111. Posting notices must be done in the manner prescribed by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12115. And the powers, remedies, and procedures provided by the ADA are those provided for by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12117. In addition, the remedies and procedures for retaliation violations under Title V of the ADA are the same as those provided for in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(c).

The legislative history of the ADA also indicates that Congress intended the ADA to follow Title VII in many respects. Many members of Congress directly compared the ADA to Title VII. "The ADA provides many of the same rights to individuals with disabilities that have been available to others because of their race, national origin, sex, and age through earlier civil rights laws." 136 CONG.REC. 10858 (1990)(statement of Rep. Bartlett) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 101-336 THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT at 621 (Comm.Print.1991). The chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and...