Baxter v. Stevens
| Decision Date | 27 June 1911 |
| Parties | BAXTER v. STEVENS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
James M. Swift, Atty. Gen., and Fred T. Field, Asst. Atty. Gen for appellant.
Irish & George, for appellee.
Helen F. Baxter, a single woman, died in October, 1909, leaving a will giving practically all her property to her nephews Carlton W. Baxter and Lawrence M. Baxter. Florence I. Neale a sister of the testator and an heir at law, contested the probate of the will, and finally an agreement of compromise was made by which the sister was to have one half of the estate and the two nephews were to have each a quarter. This agreement of compromise was confirmed by the probate court and a decree entered thereon under Rev. Laws, c. 148, §§ 15-17. The object of this suit is to ascertain the rule regulating the assessment of the succession tax.
St 1907, c. 563, § 1 (now St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 4, § 1), provides, with some exceptions not here material, that a succession tax shall be imposed upon all property within the jurisdiction of this commonwealth 'which shall pass by will, or by the laws regulating intestate succession,' provided the amount so passing shall exceed $1,000 in value.
The present case raises the general question whether the amount of a tax assessed under this statute shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of a will as written, or in accordance with the result of the will and compromise agreement made by the parties and approved by the court.
It becomes necessary to look into the legislation leading up to Rev. Laws, c. 148, §§ 15-17, and to determine the real nature of the statute. It first appears as St. 1864, c. 173, and has remained substantially the same ever since. Before the passage of this earlier statute a contest over the probate of a will could be settled by the parties interested as well as any other suit, provided they were all of age and sui juris; and the courts looked with favor upon such settlements and by proceedings in equity enforced the specific performance of them. Leach v. Fobes, 11 Gray, 506, 71 Am. Dec. 732. But it frequently happened that possible future contingent interests, especially of persons not in being, stood in the way of a settlement because no one was empowered to represent them. There was also some uncertainty about carrying out the settlement even when made by persons competent to contract. If the contestant agreed to withdraw from the contest and allowed the will to be probated upon a promise by the legatees to pay him something, then it might happen that in a suit to enforce the promise the promisee for some reason might fail to maintain his case even when the promise was in writing. In Leach v. Fobes, ubi supra, which was a suit in equity to enforce such a promise, the defense was that it had been fraudulently obtained. In Seaman v. Colley, 178 Mass. 478, 59 N.E. 1017, which was an action at law to recover a sum of money alleged by the plaintiff to have been promised him by the defendant in consideration that the plaintiff should withdraw his objections to the allowance of a certain codicil, the defense was a general denial and that the promise was void as against public policy. In Blount v. Wheeler, 199 Mass. 330, 85 N.E. 477, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1036, the defense denied the promise and set up lack of consideration. It it is true that the two cases last above cited were since 1864, and there was no confirmation of the settlement by the court, but they illustrate the dangers liable to be met by the promisee in attempting to enforce the promise when there is no statute like the one in question, or where, such a statute existing, the settlement is not confirmed by the court under it. Again the promise was a simple personal undertaking of the promisor, who might prove financially unable to respond.
In this state of the law St. 1864, c. 173, was passed. It did at least three important things. First, it provided the machinery by which any will contest might be settled no matter how complicated might be the provisions of the will as to any possible future contingent interests; second, it made the contract a matter of record, the decree admitting the will to probate specifically stating the terms of the agreement under which the contestants have withdrawn their opposition, thus conclusively establishing both the form and validity of the agreement; and third, it provided that the terms of the agreement should be carried out, not by the parties themselves, but by the person who should administer the will. Under this statute the court does not undertake to admit to probate a part of the will and refuse probate as to another part. The whole will is admitted, but the concessions made by the legatees to the heirs at law or...
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