Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | D,No. 296,296 |
| Citation | 13 F.3d 40 |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P. 13,739 William L. BAXTER, ppa Andrew T. Baxter, Plaintiff-Appellant, Third-Party-Defendant, v. STURM, RUGER & CO. INC., Defendant-Appellee, Third-Party-Plaintiff. ocket 93-7375. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Before MESKILL, PRATT, and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges.
This appeal from the United States District Court, 827 F.Supp. 96, for the District of Connecticut, Cabranes, C.J., came on to be heard on the transcript of record from said district court and was argued by counsel. On consideration of the briefs, appendix, record and the oral argument in this appeal, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court transmit to the Clerk of the Connecticut Supreme Court a Certificate in the form attached, together with a complete set of the briefs, appendix and record filed with this Court by the parties. This panel retains jurisdiction so that, once we receive a response from the Connecticut Supreme Court, we may dispose of all of the issues raised in this appeal.
Certificate to the Connecticut Supreme Court pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 51-199a ().
In 1990, Andrew T. Baxter, the son of the plaintiff William L. Baxter (Baxter), was shot in the abdomen when a firearm accidentally discharged. The firearm had been designed and manufactured by the defendant, Sturm, Ruger & Co. Inc. (Sturm, Ruger), in Connecticut and had been shipped in 1968 to a distributor in Oregon. The firearm had then been purchased and given to Baxter, an Oregon resident.
On August 30, 1991, Baxter brought this diversity action against Sturm, Ruger, a Delaware corporation with corporate offices in Connecticut, asserting three claims. First, Baxter alleged that Sturm, Ruger was liable for injuries arising from the accidental discharge of the firearm pursuant to the Connecticut Product Liability Act, Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 52-572m to 52-572r. Second, Baxter alleged that Sturm, Ruger had negligently performed a retrofit program, through which certain models of Sturm, Ruger firearms, like that owned by Baxter, were modified to eliminate a design and manufacturing defect that caused those firearms to discharge accidentally. Third, Baxter asserted a claim for punitive damages pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 52-240b.
Sturm, Ruger raised several affirmative defenses, including the assertion that Baxter's claims were barred by the Oregon statute of repose for product liability actions, Oregon Revised Statutes Sec. 30.905. That provision states:
Time limitation for commencement of action
(1) Notwithstanding ORS 12.115 or 12.140 and except as provided in subsection (2) of this section and ORS 30.907, a product liability civil action shall be commenced not later than eight years after the date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption.
(2) Except as provided in ORS 30.907, a product liability civil action shall be commenced not later than two years after the date on which the death, injury or damage complained of occurs.
The Oregon Supreme Court has held that the time limit in subsection (2) is subordinate to that in subsection (1), making eight years the outside time limit within which to file a product liability claim. See Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Ore. 387, 392, 788 P.2d 435, 437, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819 [111 S.Ct. 65, 112 L.Ed.2d 39] (1990). Moreover, the Sealey Court characterized subsection (1) as a statute of repose because its prescribed time limit begins to run on the date of first purchase of the product, regardless of the date of injury. Id. This provision may, therefore, bar an action before an injury is sustained. By contrast, subsection (2) is a statute of limitation because its prescribed time period begins to run on the date of injury. Id.
Baxter moved for partial summary judgment on Sturm, Ruger's statute of repose defense, and Sturm, Ruger also moved for summary judgment on that ground. In deciding these motions, the district court first determined that, under Connecticut choice of law rules, Oregon substantive law would apply to Baxter's claims. The court then considered whether section 30.905 would be characterized as substantive or procedural under Connecticut choice of law rules. If section 30.905 were considered substantive, it would apply and would bar Baxter's product liability claims. If considered procedural, however, it would not apply. Rather, the district court would apply the statute of repose of Connecticut, the forum state. That statute, Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 52-577a, provides in pertinent part:
Limitation of action based on product liability claim
(a) No product liability claim as defined in section 52-572m shall be brought but within three years from the date when the injury, death or property damage is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered except that, subject to subsections (c), (d) and (e), no such action may be brought against any party ... later than ten years from the date that the party last parted with possession or control of the product.
....
(c) The ten-year limitation provided for in subsection (a) shall not apply to any product liability claim brought by a claimant who is not entitled to [workers'] compensation ..., provided the claimant can prove that the harm occurred during the useful safe life of the product.
From Sturm, Ruger's posture on this appeal, we understand it to have conceded that Baxter "can prove that the harm occurred during the useful safe life of the product."
The district court held that Connecticut courts would consider the Oregon statute of repose to be substantive for choice of law purposes. Acknowledging the absence of a controlling decision from the Connecticut Supreme Court, the district court based its decision on "the weight of authority in other jurisdictions," see, e.g., Walls v. General Motors, 906 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.1990), the Oregon Supreme Court's analysis of section 30.905 in Sealey, 309 Ore. at 392-94, 788 P.2d at 437-39, Chief Judge Cabranes' previous decision in a case involving Georgia's product liability statute, Feldt v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 721 F.Supp. 403, 406 (D.Conn.1989), and a scholarly treatise, Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 58 (3d ed. 1986). Accordingly, the district court granted Sturm, Ruger's motion for summary judgment on all of Baxter's claims.
Moreover, the district court decided several other motions, one of which was Sturm, Ruger's motion for certification of the statute of repose issue to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Baxter opposed the...
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