Tanges v. Heidelberg North America, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1999
• Citation: 93 N.Y.2d 48,687 N.Y.S.2d 604,710 N.E.2d 250
• Parties: , 710 N.E.2d 250, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 2633 Dennis TANGES, Appellant, and Danbury Printing and Litho, Inc., Intervenor-Plaintiff, v. HEIDELBERG NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 604

687 N.Y.S.2d 604

93 N.Y.2d 48, 710 N.E.2d 250, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 2633

Dennis TANGES, Appellant and Danbury Printing and Litho, Inc., Intervenor-Plaintiff, v. HEIDELBERG NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 30, 1999.

Pinney, Payne, Van Lenten, Burrell, Wolfe & Dillman, P.C., Danbury, CT (Joseph Dimyan and Allen Gary Palmer, of the Connecticut

Bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for appellant

Lavin, Coleman, O'Neil, Ricci, Finarelli & Gray, New York City (Francis F. Quinn of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, J.

This Court is asked, within the boundaries of a certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to answer the question whether Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577a bars plaintiff's products liability lawsuit. The case was lodged in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York and its dismissal there took the case on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

New York State's choice of law principles point the way to the conclusion that the pertinent Connecticut statute (which incorporates a repose provision into the State's codified products liability law) is a part of that neighboring State's substantive law.

I.

In November 1983, Danbury Printing and Litho, Inc. bought a printing press manufactured by defendants Heidelberg et al. and installed that press in its Danbury, Connecticut plant. Ten years and three months later, plaintiff Tanges, a New York resident employed by Danbury Printing, sustained serious injuries while operating the press. He was awarded workers' compensation benefits.

Tanges also started a products liability action, premised on diversity of jurisdiction, against defendants in Federal court. Danbury Printing intervened as an additional plaintiff, seeking to recover the payments it had made to, or on behalf of, Tanges under Connecticut's Workers' Compensation Act. Defendants answered and moved for summary judgment. They urged dismissal of Tanges's complaint as time-barred by Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577a.

The District Court held that, under New York State's choice of law rules, a New York court would apply section 52-577a to this case as a part of the substantive law of Connecticut. Because the claim was brought more than 10 years after the injury-inflicting press left the possession and control of defendants, the District Court ruled that the claim was barred by Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577a (Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., ---F.Supp. ----, 1997 WL 1106673). The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

When plaintiff appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified the following question to this Court: "Does Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577a bar Tanges's claim brought in the Southern District of New York?" (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 3[b]; 22 NYCRR 500.17; see also, Local Rules of 2d Cir. § 0.27.) Our answer is in the affirmative.

II.

Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577a provides, in pertinent part:

"Limitation of action based on product liability claim

"(a) No product liability claim as defined in section 52-572m shall be brought but within three years from the date when the injury, death or property damage is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered except that, subject to subsections (c), (d) and (e), no such action may be brought against any party nor may any party be impleaded pursuant to subsection (b) later than ten years from the date that the party last parted with possession or control of the product " (emphasis added).

For this Court to answer the certified question, we must first address whether Connecticut's section 52-577a is considered procedural or substantive for the purpose of New York choice of law analysis (see, e.g., Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577, 204 N.E.2d 622; see also, Weintraub, Conflict of Laws § 3.2, at 47 [3d ed] ). The classification of section 52-577a is the key analytic step because "under common-law rules matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum" (Martin v. Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 588, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 374 N.E.2d 97; see, Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 41, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526). On the other hand, matters of substantive law fall within the course charted by choice of law analysis (see, Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra, 15 N.Y.2d, at 115, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577, 204 N.E.2d 622; Weintraub, Conflict of Laws § 3.2C, at 53 [3d ed]; 1943 Report of N.Y. Law Rev Commn, at 143).

Before proceeding to classify section 52-577a, however, we should address plaintiff's threshold argument that New York's borrowing statute, CPLR 202, precludes the application of Connecticut's section 52-577a to his claim regardless of its classification. CPLR 202 provides in part that "where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time limited by the laws of the state shall apply" (emphasis added).

For plaintiff to receive the alleged benefit of the resident exception in CPLR 202, a cause of action must first have accrued in his favor. Accrual is a substantive concept and, therefore, the question whether a cause of action accrued in plaintiff's favor reverts tautologically back to the inquiry whether section 52-577a is a part of Connecticut's substantive law. If it is substantive, Connecticut law also applies as to whether a cause of action ever accrued in plaintiff's favor. Thus, if section 52-577a is determinative of the accrual issue, it has the effect of "preventing what might otherwise have been a cause of action from ever arising " (4 American Law of Products Liability 3d § 47:55, at 88 [emphasis added] ), rendering CPLR 202 inapplicable to plaintiff's claim.

At the next level of argument and analysis, plaintiff urges that New York should, in any event, categorize section 52-577a as procedural because the Supreme Court of Connecticut has indicated that it considers its State's enactment as procedural in nature (see, Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 230 Conn. 335, 342-344, 345, n. 6, 644 A.2d 1297, 1300, 1301, n. 6 [1994]; Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 525-527, 562 A.2d 1100, 1110 [1989] ). Though this designation is instructive and should not be ignored, plaintiff's proffer fails to come to grips with the basic precept that " 'the law of the forum normally determines for itself' whether a given question is one of substance or procedure" (Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, supra, 9 N.Y.2d, at 41, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526; see, Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws § 7; Leflar, American Conflicts Law §§ 121, 127 [4th ed]; Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws § 81, at 143). So, ironically in this respect, the forum State (New York) must start with its own law, not the preference of the State (Connecticut) to which the statute in issue belongs.

Because New York is the forum State, we must look to New York choice of law rules to determine whether the nature and effect of Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577a is procedural or substantive (see, Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra, 15 N.Y.2d, at 116, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577, 204 N.E.2d 622; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, supra, 9 N.Y.2d, at 41, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526; see also, McCarthy v. Bristol Labs., 86 A.D.2d 279, 283, 449 N.Y.S.2d 280). New York is not bound by, and principles of comity do not prompt this Court to adopt, the choice of law classification that the Supreme Court of Connecticut may have selected for section 52-577a (compare, Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 230 Conn. 335, 644 A.2d 1297, supra [tellingly, Connecticut rejected Oregon's classification of an Oregon statute of repose]; Champagne v Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., supra ). Simply deferring to Connecticut's approach would contradict standard choice of law principles that require independent forum State analysis, and would render the Second Circuit's certified question to this Court superfluous. As the Second Circuit observed in its order certifying the choice of law question to the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Baxter, "decisions by courts in other jurisdictions about the proper characterization of statutes of repose in the choice of law context are not controlling * * * because district courts in diversity cases must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state " (Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 13 F.3d 40, 43 [2d Cir] [emphasis added] ).

In New York, Statutes of Limitation are generally considered procedural because they are "[v]iewed as pertaining to the remedy rather than the right" (Martin v. Dierck Equip. Co., supra, 43 N.Y.2d, at 588, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 374 N.E.2d 97). The expiration of the time period prescribed in a Statute of Limitations does not extinguish the underlying right, but merely bars the remedy (see, Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N.Y. 295, 297, 28 N.E. 638). Nicely summarized elsewhere, "[t]he theory of the statute of limitations generally followed in New York is that the passing of the applicable period does not wipe out the substantive right; it merely suspends the remedy" (Siegel, N.Y. Prac § 34, at 38 [2d ed] ).

To the extent that section 52-577a (a) provides that no products liability claim "shall be brought but within three years from the date when the injury, death or property damage is first sustained or discovered," it resembles a typical Statute of Limitations (compare, e.g., CPLR 214). Section 52-577a (a), however, does much more. It also declares that no products liability action may be brought against any party "later than ten years from the date that the party last parted with possession or control of the product." This additional feature forges a hybrid; the statute integrates provisions of both limitation and repose (see generally, 4 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability § 25.02, at 25-30.1 to 25-35).

Statutes of...