Baxter v. Waterville Sewerage Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1951
• Citation: 79 A.2d 585,146 Me. 211
• Parties: BAXTER et al. v. WATERVILLE SEWERAGE DIST. et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 585

79 A.2d 585

146 Me. 211

BAXTER et al. v. WATERVILLE SEWERAGE DIST. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 19, 1951.

William H. Niehoff, Roland J. Poulin, Waterville, for plaintiff.

F. Harold Dubord, Thomas N. Weeks, Waterville, for defendant.

Before MURCHIE, C. J., and FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY, and WILLIAMSON, JJ.

FELLOWS, Justice.

This bill in equity is brought by fourteen residents and taxable inhabitants of the City of Waterville and of the Waterville Sewerage District under Revised Statutes (1944), Chapter 95, Section 4, against the Waterville Sewerage District, a quasi municipal corporation, and its five Commissioners, to enjoin them from carrying out the provisions of Chapter 211 of the Private and Special Laws of 1949. The case comes to the Law Court on report of the evidence, in accordance with the provisions of Revised Statutes (1944), Chapter 91, Section 14.

The bill seeks to have declared unconstitutional this act of the legislature which created the Waterville Sewerage District, as a quasi municipal corporation, and to prevent the District and its Commissioners from incurring any indebtedness, from issuing notes or bonds, and from charging the plaintiffs for the use of the public sewers and drains of the city of Waterville. The defendants deny the allegations of the plaintiffs' bill and contend that the legislative act is constitutional and that the District and its Commissioners are legally empowered to act.

The Chapter 211 of the Private and Special Laws of 1949 was passed by the legislature to remedy, if possible, a condition in the city of Waterville that is described by physicians, sanitary engineers, and health officers as a serious threat to the public health because of an antiquated, insufficient, obnoxious and highly dangerous city sewerage system. The Messalonskee stream, which runs through the city and was sufficient for sewage disposal when the population was small, is now a hazardous peril, and more sewer entrances into it are forbidden. The act provides for the taking over, by the District, of all the public sewers and for their necessary extension, improvement and operation, and for the disposal of sewage. The act was duly adopted by the voters of the city of Waterville at a special election and five Commissioners were appointed by the Mayor with the approval of the City Council, as provided therein. The schedule of the fees that are to be charged to those who use this service has been filed with, and approved by, the Public Utilities Commission of the State.

The plaintiffs claim that Chapter 211 of the Private and Special Laws of 1949 is unconstitutional because (1) the act violates the constitutional provision restricting the debt limit of the city of Waterville to five per cent of the valuation; (2) that the boundaries of the District created by the act are geographically the same as the boundaries of the city; (3) that the act transfers a function of the city to another municipal or quasi municipal corporation with governmental functions of a similar nature, which absolves the city from a legal duty; (4) that the Commissioners of the District are appointed by the Mayor of the city with approval of a majority of the City Council; (5) that the financing of extension and maintanence should be by general taxation and not by rates charged users, as provided in the act; and (6) that the charges for use are in violation of the obligations of a contract and deprives the plaintiffs of vested rights in public sewers.

In passing upon the constitutionality of any act of the legislature the Court assumes that the legislature acted with knowledge of constitutional restrictions, and that the legislature honestly believed that it was acting within its rights, duties and powers. All acts of the legislature are presumed to be constitutional and this is 'a presumption of great strength.' State v. Pooler, alias Poulin, 105 Me. 224, 228, 74 A. 119, 121, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 408; Laughlin v. City of Portland, 111 Me. 486, 90 A. 318, 51 L.R.A., N.S., 1143; Inhabitants of York Harbor Village Corporation v. Libby, 126 Me. 537, 549, 140 A. 382. The burden is upon him who claims that the act is unconstitutional to show its unconstitutionality. Inhabitants of Town of Warren v. Norwood, 138 Me. 180, 24 A.2d 229. Whether the enactment of the law is wise or not, and whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result are matters for the legislature and not for the Court. Kelley v. Brunswick School District, 134 Me. 414, 187 A. 703; Hamilton v. Portland Pier Site District, 120 Me. 15, 20, 112 A. 836.

It is not, and it should not be, a question of testing the constitution to discover whether or not its words have sufficient elasticity of meaning to cover the act under consideration, and to stop within the limits of the breaking point. It is rather the resolving of every reasonable doubt in favor of the proposition that the act is within and under the terms and meaning of the constitution, without exerting strain on the words used to express the fundamental law. New social and economic conditions raise problems that were not dreamed of by the men who drafted and adopted the constitution, but the fundamental doctrines must be adhered to, as if the constitution were made yesterday by those who had full knowledge of present demands and necessities. The Court does not intend to yield to the 'theory of expediency' as was stated by Justice Murchie in Inhabitants of Town of Warren v. Norwood, 138 Me. 180, 195, 24 A.2d 229.

The people of the State of Maine in creating, by the State constitution, the legislative department of government, conferred upon it the whole of their sovereign power of legislation, except in so far as they delegated some of this power to the Congress of the United States, and except in so far as they imposed restrictions on themselves, by their own constitution, and fixed limits upon the legislative authority. The government of the United States is one of enumerated powers and the national constitution specifies them. The people of this State retain all powers not enumerated. The legislature of Maine may enact any law of any character or on any subject, unless it is prohibited, either in express terms or by necessary implication, by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of this State. The Federal and State Constitutions are limitations upon the legislative power of the State legislature and are not grants of power. At any legislative session, therefore, unless restricted by one of these constitutions, the legislators may amend or repeal any law of their predecessors. Constitution of Maine, Article IV, Part III, Section I; Laughlin v. Portland, 111 Me. 486, 90 A. 318, 51 L.R.A., N.S., 1143.

On May 4, 1949 while this bill to create the Waterville Sewerage District was pending in the legislature, the justices of this Court were asked, by the Maine Senate, as provided by the Constitution, to give their individual opinions in regard to its constitutionality. The justices stated unanimously that 'The constitutionality of a legislative enactment depends not only upon whether the same violates some limitation on legislative power imposed by the constitution, but also whether or not its application to existing rights would violate the constitutional guaranties of those possessing the same. Within the limitations set forth in Kelley v. Brunswick School District, 134 Me. 414, 817 A. 703, the legislature may create distinct and separate bodies politic and corporate with identical inhabitants and territory. The identity of inhabitancy and territory existing between the proposed Sewer District and the City of Waterville does not affect the constitutionality of the proposed act; nor is the purpose of the act such that in and of itself it would prevent the creating of the proposed body politic and corporate.' Opinions of the Justices, 144 Me. ----, 66 A.2d 376, 377.

The evidence presented in this case, and now before us, does not indicate that the creation of the Waterville Sewerage District is a 'scheme' or 'subterfuge' to circumvent the constitutional 5% debt limit of the city. Reynolds v. City of Waterville, 92 Me. 292, 42 A. 553. The present financial condition of the city of Waterville does not so indicate. It also satisfactorily appears that the District, with powers separate and distinct from the city, will be able to give better service.

The argument advanced by the plaintiffs, that the act...