Bay City v. Frazier

• Decision Date: 10 May 1935
• Docket Number: No. 6645.,6645.
• Citation: 77 F.2d 570
• Parties: BAY CITY v. FRAZIER.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

77 F.2d 570 (1935)

BAY CITY v. FRAZIER.

No. 6645.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

May 10, 1935.

A. W. Black and J. L. McCormick, both of Bay City, Mich., for appellant.

Edward S. Clark, of Bay City, Mich. (Clark & Henry, of Bay City, Mich., on the brief), for appellee.

Before HICKS, SIMONS, and ALLEN, Circuit Judges.

ALLEN, Circuit Judge.

The appellee, assignee of an engineering contract entered into between the Frazier-Ellms-Sheal Company and the appellant, the City of Bay City, Michigan, brought suit against the city upon two counts, one in quantum meruit, and the other for breach of contract. A jury trial was waived in writing, and the District Court rendered judgment for the appellee for $42,865.69.

The action is based upon claimed delay, interference, unreasonable changes and duplications, and the performance of work not included in the contract.

The engineers in October, 1919, agreed with the city to design and supervise the erection of a complete water works with intake, power house and filtration plant, and all necessary accessories in the vicinity of Bay City. The improvement contemplated major changes in pipe lines and river crossings. The clerical work and engineering plans and the details of the map-making, plan-making, etc., were carried on in Cleveland, Ohio. A supplementary agreement was executed upon September 8, 1920.

On November 2, 1920, the city adopted a new charter setting up a city commission, and continuing the citizens' committee which had approved the initial contract, as the "special committee." This committee approved all plans in writing, and the city commission took no steps without its recommendation.

The first commissioners took office under the new charter in April, 1921, and under their instructions, the engineers revised their plans. When the city manager was appointed, the engineers were again instructed to revise their plans. Major changes were made in the plans for the boiler house and pumps, and for the force mains and river crossings.

In November, 1931, four new commissioners were elected and a new city manager was appointed. This caused much extra negotiation. Further delay resulted from the city's deferring for fourteen months the sale of its bonds to finance the project. The city saved over $440,000 by this delay. Twenty-one separate contractors handled the construction, causing delay, extra expense and responsibility for the engineers. Three important contracts were let to a local contractor. After repeated requests made by the engineers, the city manager and the special committee, to the city commission that these contracts be defaulted, they finally were declared in default on December 22, 1924. The contractor was then two years behind schedule on one contract, and fourteen months on another. Another year was consumed in the completion of these contracts. The engineers were then compelled to make new surveys, estimates and specifications under these particular contracts. In 1925 they were ordered to make, and made, a complete topographical survey of the entire bay property. They aided in making an audit of the water works construction account.

The District Court found that the engineers were actively and continuously engaged in the performance of their contract and in the work and expenditures which formed the basis of this suit, for upwards of six years, until 1926; that if it had not been for the grievances complained of, the contract could have been performed by the engineers in approximately three years, and that the engineers were free of any neglect, delay, error or default impairing appellee's right of action. Recovery was allowed for items involving mainly the damage suffered by the engineers through the city's unreasonable delay, duplication of work, and the audit of the construction accounts. A deduction of 10 per cent. was made upon the items allowed, upon the theory that they were incapable of exact calculation.

There is ample evidence in the record to support the findings of the District Court. The only two living members of the citizens' committee and the former city manager testified as to the performance of the work, its quality and the constant demands made by appellee for extra compensation. The plant was built for approximately $60,000 less than the original estimate.

The city was bound not to subject the engineers to unreasonable delay, interference, or duplication of work. There was no time specified in which the work must be done. Under such circumstances the law implies that the work should be done within a reasonable time, and that the city would not unnecessarily interfere to prevent this. United States v. Smith, 94 U. S. 214, 217, 24 L. Ed. 115. That the work was done in pursuance of the plans as altered by the city, resulting in an increase of the work, gives rise to liability against the city. Wood v. Fort Wayne, 119 U. S. 312, 7 S. Ct. 219, 30 L. Ed. 416. The action for unreasonable interference is founded upon breach of contract. Gearty v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 171 N. Y. 61, 63 N. E. 804.

The principal defenses are:

(1) That the claim was barred by the Michigan statute of limitations.

(2) That the engineers waived their cause of action.

(3) That the claim was barred under article 16 of the Michigan Constitution.

(4) That the claim was barred by failure of the engineers, an Ohio corporation, to qualify to do business in Michigan.

As to the statute of limitations, the suit was begun on September 23, 1931. Extensive work was still being carried on under the contract in October and November, 1925, and the final estimate was made on May 2, 1927. The transaction was an entirety, requiring the performance of continuous service, and the action was not barred until six years after the conclusion of the service. Burch v. Woodworth, Adm'r, 68 Mich. 519, 36 N. W. 721; Carter v. Carter, 36 Mich. 207; Wisniewski v. Wisniewski's Estate, 254 Mich. 663, 236 N. W. 899. In the Carter Case, as here, the period of service was indefinite.

None of the items allowed by the District Court was barred by the statute of limitations.

Upon the question of waiver, the District Court found as a fact that the engineers did not waive, nor intend to waive, their cause of action. This finding is supported by the evidence. The engineers protested repeatedly to the citizens' committee, upon whose recommendations both the city manager and the commission acted. The engineers were requested by the members of this committee and...