Bay v. South Carolina Highway Dept., 20137

• Decision Date: 29 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 20137,20137
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: James T. BAY, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Appellant.

Page 106

221 S.E.2d 106

266 S.C. 9

James T. BAY, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Appellant.

No. 20137.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 29, 1975.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Deputy Atty. Gen. Joseph C. Coleman and Asst. Atty. Gen. Richard P. Wilson, Columbia, for appellant.

Henry F. Floyd, Pickens, for respondent.

LEWIS, Chief Justice:

The issues to be decided involve the effect of a pardon upon the right to restoration of a driver's license which had been revoked because of conviction for the pardoned crime.

Respondent, James T. Bay, was convicted in June 1970 of the crimes of reckless homicide (Code Section 46--341) and leaving the scene of an accident (Code Section 46--321), receiving a concurrent sentence of five (5) years on each charge. In addition, his license to drive a motor vehicle was suspended as a mandatory consequence of his conviction.

After serving twenty (20) months of his sentence, respondent was paroled and thereafter, on February 19, 1975, received a full pardon. Upon receiving the pardon, he applied to appellant, South Carolina Highway Department, for the immediate reissuance of his driver's license which had been suspended until June 15, 1976. In applying for reissuance of his driver's license, respondent contended that the pardon removed all disqualifications arising from his conviction and entitled him to have his present application considered as if he had never been convicted.

Appellant, however, refused to consider the application of respondent contending that the period of his license suspension had not expired. In doing so, appellant took the position, following the reasoning of Parker v. State Highway Department, 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E.2d 382, that the license suspension, mandated by the statutes upon conviction of the above crimes, is not part of the punishment for the crime and, since it is not a part of the punishment, it is unaffected by the pardon.

Upon the refusal of appellant to consider the application of respondent, respondent filed his petition in the lower court for an order requiring appellant to permit him to apply for the reissuance of his driver's license free of any disqualification from the prior license suspension. This petition was granted and an order issued requiring appellant (1) to allow respondent to apply for driver's license, notwithstanding the suspension currently in effect, (2) to expunge the driving record of respondent of all references to the offenses for which he was pardoned, and (3) to run the suspensions concurrently. This appeal is from that order.

Although respondent has asked that the principles announced in Parker v. State Highway Department, supra, be overruled or, at least, held inapplicable to the present facts, we think the decision is sound and that its rationale applies here, requiring that the order under appeal be reversed.

In Parker, the defendant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. Upon such conviction, the Highway Department was required to suspend the defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle. An appeal was prosecuted from the conviction and the question presented was whether the appeal operated as a supersedeas so as to preclude the Highway Department from suspending the defendant's license until final disposition of the appeal. In holding that the appeal did not prevent the immediate suspension of the driver's license, the court held that a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege which is subject to reasonable regulations under the police power in the interest of public safety and, applicable here, stated:

'The suspension follows as a consequence and effect of committing the offense. It is a...