Baylay v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C.

Decision Date07 February 2018
Docket NumberNos. 16-4113 & 17-1958,s. 16-4113 & 17-1958
Parties Martyn BAYLAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ETIHAD AIRWAYS P.J.S.C., Saravdeep Mann, 909 North Michigan Avenue Corporation, and LHO Michigan Avenue Freezeout, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Craig M. Sandberg, Attorney, Muslin & Sandberg, Chicago, IL, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Steven L. Brenneman, Kelly Smith-Haley, Esq., Attorneys, Fox, Swibel, Levin & Carroll, LLP, Chicago, IL, for DefendantAppellee Etihad Airways P.J.S.C.

Adam J. Sheppard, Attorney, Chicago, IL, for DefendantAppellee Saravdeep Mann.

David J. Olmstead, Attorney, Law Offices of Meachum & Starck, Cathleen Marie McCormick Hobson, Attorney, Meachum Boyle & Trafman, Chicago, IL, for DefendantsAppellees 909 North Michigan Avenue Corporation, LHO Michigan Avenue Freezeout, LLC.

Before Manion, Kanne, and Rovner, Circuit Judges.

Kanne, Circuit Judge.

In 2013, Saravdeep Mann attacked his coworker, Martyn Baylay, with a bronze hotel decoration. The two men, members of a flight crew employed by Etihad Airways, were at a Chicago hotel for the night on a layover.

Baylay sued Etihad, Mann, and the hotel's corporate entities in federal district court. The court dismissed all of Baylay's claims against Etihad on the basis that the claims should be heard by the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission instead. The court entered an order allowing an immediate appeal of that decision, which Baylay filed on December 9, 2016 (No. 16-4113). A few months later, the district court dismissed Baylay's remaining claims. It reasoned that it had no original jurisdiction over the claims and declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. Baylay filed his notice of appeal of that decision on May 5, 2017 (No. 17-1958). The appeals have been consolidated and are before us now. We affirm the dismissal of Baylay's claims.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from Baylay's second amended complaint. See Vesely v. Armslist LLC , 762 F.3d 661, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2014) (when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, we accept the facts in the complaint as true); see also Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div. , 837 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 2016) (when reviewing a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we accept the facts in the complaint as true).

Etihad Airways is a public joint stock company established by Emiri Decree and incorporated in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Martyn Baylay, a British citizen, worked as a pilot for Etihad in 2013.

That October, Etihad assigned Baylay to a flight crew that also included Saravdeep Mann. The crewmembers flew from Abu Dhabi to Chicago. After arrival, Etihad arranged for the crewmembers' transportation to The Westin on Michigan Avenue in Chicago for an overnight layover. Etihad paid for the accommodations.

The crewmembers drank pre-dinner cocktails together that night, where Mann consumed a significant amount. It appeared to Baylay that he had imbibed before meeting the group, too. At dinner, Mann downed even more alcohol and then expressed anti-American and anti-British views while emphasizing his distaste for the British by placing his hands around Baylay's throat. Mann left the restaurant without paying his bill and without his coat. The crewmembers settled Mann's bill, and Baylay offered to take Mann's coat and return it the next day.

Back at the hotel, Baylay heard a knock on the door of his hotel room and saw Mann standing outside his room. Thinking Mann was there to apologize for his earlier actions and collect his coat, Baylay opened the door. Mann struck him on the head and leg with a bronze hotel decoration. During the attack, Mann threatened Baylay, saying, "I'm going to kill you. You f*cking British bastard." Baylay managed to escape, took the elevator to the lobby of the hotel, and was then transported to Northwestern Memorial Hospital. Mann was arrested and transported to the Chicago Police Department.

Mann left the United States with Etihad's help after posting bond on October 14. He never returned, criminally violating his bond.

Baylay filed the second amended complaint on February 25, 2016, in federal district court. He sued Mann; Etihad Airways; 909 North Michigan Avenue Corporation and LHO Michigan Avenue Freezeout, LLC—the Westin's corporate entities; and United Security Services, Inc.—the company that provided security for the Westin at the time of the incident. United Security Services was later voluntarily dismissed from the case.

Against Etihad, Baylay brought state-law claims of negligent retention, negligence, and willful and wanton conduct. Against Mann, he brought state-law claims of negligence and willful and wanton conduct. And against the Westin's corporate entities, Baylay brought a state-law claim of negligence.

In March 2016, Etihad filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Baylay's claims against it. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Baylay's state-law claims against his employer were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act ("the IWCA"). If Baylay wanted to pursue claims against his employer arising from the incident with Mann, he needed to do so in front of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission ("the Commission"). The court entered an order providing for an immediate appeal of this decision, which Baylay timely filed on December 9, 2016 (No. 16-4113).

In early 2017, the district court asked the parties to submit jurisdictional statements addressing whether the district court still had jurisdiction over the case after Etihad's dismissal. After reviewing the submitted statements, the district court dismissed Baylay's remaining claims without prejudice on April 7, 2017. It concluded that it had no original jurisdiction over the claims and declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. With all of the plaintiff's claims dismissed, the district court terminated the civil case. Baylay filed a timely notice of appeal on May 5, 2017 (No. 17-1958).

We now consider the merits of both appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Our central focus in this appeal is on the power and propriety of the federal courts to hear Baylay's claims.

First, Baylay contends that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("the FSIA" or "the Act") requires any claim against a foreign state to be adjudicated in a court. Thus, the district court erred when it concluded that Baylay's claims against Etihad should be heard by the Commission, an administrative body. In the alternative, Baylay argues that the IWCA does not apply to his claims against Etihad, so the district court was nonetheless the proper forum for his claims.

Second, Baylay maintains that the district court had diversity jurisdiction over his remaining claims after Etihad's dismissal. In the alternative, he argues that the district court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the claims.

We take—and reject—each of Baylay's arguments in turn.

A. Baylay's claims against Etihad must be resolved by the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission.

Baylay believes that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act vests the power to decide claims against foreign states in the judicial branch alone. Thus, he argues that the Commission cannot adjudicate his claims against Etihad. In other words, he argues that the FSIA preempts the IWCA. Alternatively, he contends that the IWCA doesn't apply to his claims against Etihad, so the district court should have remained the arbiter of his claims.

The district court rejected these arguments. We review a 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo , viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we are similarly unpersuaded. See Vesely , 762 F.3d at 664.

1. The FSIA does not preempt the IWCA, so the Commission may adjudicate applicable claims.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act "provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country." Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. , 488 U.S. 428, 443, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989). When a plaintiff sues a foreign state, the Act presumes immunity and then creates exceptions to the general principle. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1312, 1320, 197 L.Ed.2d 663 (2017). The parties agree that Etihad is a foreign state and that an exception to immunity exists. The parties disagree, however, about whether the Act requires claims against a foreign state to be heard by a court after that court has concluded that the foreign state is not immune from suit.

"A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States...." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (emphasis added). Baylay believes that this language vests the power to resolve claims against foreign states in the judiciary alone. Thus, even though the IWCA might mandate that certain claims against employers must be adjudicated first in front of the Commission, the FSIA preempts the IWCA and requires claims against foreign-state employers to remain in a court.

But by reading that provision in isolation, Baylay misconstrues the Act as a whole. Congress intended the FSIA to transfer immunity determinations in cases against foreign states from the executive branch to the judicial branch. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 ("Claims of foreign states to immunity should hence-forth be decided by courts."); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , 558 F.Supp. 358, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd , 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that one of the four main objectives of FSIA was to ensure that immunity would be strictly a judicial determination); Nat'l Airmotive Corp. v. Gov't & State of Iran , 499 F.Supp. 401, 406 (D.D.C. 1980) ("A primary purpose of th[e] Act was to depoliticize sovereign immunity decisions by transferring them from the Executive to the Judicial Branch."). Thus, the Act...

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