Snider v. Heartland Beef, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 August 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:20-cv-04026-SLD-JEH
• Citation: 479 F.Supp.3d 762
• Parties: Tiffanie SNIDER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HEARTLAND BEEF, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

479 F.Supp.3d 762

Tiffanie SNIDER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.HEARTLAND BEEF, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 4:20-cv-04026-SLD-JEH

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Rock Island Division.

Signed August 14, 2020

Aaron M. Zigler, Alex J. Dravillas, Ashley C. Keller, James Dominick Larry, Travis D. Lenkner, Keller Lenkner LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Gary M. Miller, Matthew C. Wolfe, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Chicago, IL, Brian Scott Jones, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Colman Douglas McCarthy, Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.

ORDER

SARA DARROW, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendant Heartland Beef, Inc.’s ("Heartland") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Motion to Dismiss"), ECF No. 17, and Plaintiff Tiffanie Snider's Motion to Cite Additional Authority in Support of Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Cite"), ECF No. 31. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED and the Motion to Cite is GRANTED. The Court finds that Snider lacks standing to pursue her claim under 740 ILCS 14/15(a) and thus grants her leave to amend her complaint within 14 days to properly allege standing, if desired.

BACKGROUND¹

Heartland is an Arby's restaurant franchisee which operates a location in Macomb, Illinois. Snider worked at the Arby's in Macomb from approximately April 24, 2017 to December 4, 2018. Heartland's restaurants "use[ ] a time-tracking system that requires employees to use their fingerprints as a means of authentication." Compl. ¶ 20, Not. Removal Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1. They also use a point-of-sale system that uses fingerprint authentication. Therefore, every time Snider "clocked in or out of a shift or break, or made a sale to a customer, Heartland ... captured, collected, or otherwise obtained [her] biometric identifier," meaning her fingerprint. See id. ¶ 29.

Heartland did not inform Snider "of the specific purposes or length of time for which it collected, stored, and used [her] fingerprints." Id. ¶ 30. Likewise, it "did not obtain a written release authorizing the collection, capture, other obtainment, or subsequent disclosure of [her] biometric identifier." Id. ¶ 31. Moreover, it "does not make publicly available, and has not made publicly available, any biometric data-retention policy" and it has not "informed [Snider] whether it will ever permanently delete [her] fingerprints." Id. ¶ 32.

Snider filed suit against Heartland in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois on October 4, 2019. Heartland removed the suit to the Northern District of Illinois under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Not. Removal, ECF No. 1. The case was subsequently transferred to this Court. See Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 26. Snider alleges that Heartland violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA"), 740 ILCS 14/1–99, by scanning and retaining employee fingerprints without informed consent and failing to maintain and publish a data-retention policy. Compl. ¶¶ 39–46. She asserts claims on behalf of herself and a putative class of "citizens of Illinois who have had their fingerprints collected, captured, received, or otherwise obtained by Heartland ... in Illinois." Id. ¶ 34. Her prayer for relief includes requests for a declaration that Heartland's actions violate the BIPA, liquidated damages for each violation of the BIPA, and injunctive relief "including an order requiring Heartland ... to stop its unlawful collection of biometric data and to delete any such data that was unlawfully obtained." Id. at 11. Heartland moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).²

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Background

a. Legal Standard on a Motion to Dismiss

A court will dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , 665 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2012). A court must "determine whether [the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations] plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The allegations must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Tamayo v. Blagojevich , 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).

b. The BIPA

The BIPA "was enacted in 2008 to help regulate ‘the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and information.’ " Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm't Corp. , 432 Ill.Dec. 654, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1203 (2019) (quoting 740 ILCS 14/5(g) ). The statute defines biometric identifier as "a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry." 740 ILCS 14/10. Biometric information is defined as "any information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual's biometric identifier used to identify an individual." Id.

The BIPA "imposes on private entities ... various obligations regarding the collection, retention, disclosure, and destruction of biometric i[ ]dentifiers and biometric information." Rosenbach , 432 Ill.Dec. 654, 129 N.E.3d at 1203. For example, "[a] private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must develop a written policy, made available to the public," that describes a retention schedule and the entity's procedures for destroying such information. 740 ILCS 14/15(a). Further, a private entity cannot "collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a customer's biometric identifier or biometric information, unless it first:" informs the individual in writing that such information is being collected or stored; informs the individual in writing of the specific purpose and length of time for which such information is being collected, stored, and used; and receives a written release from the individual. Id. at 14/15(b)(1)–(3).

"Any person aggrieved by a violation" of the BIPA has a private right of action "against an offending party." Id. at 14/20. For each negligent violation, a prevailing party may recover the greater of actual damages or liquidated damages of $1,000. Id. at 14/20(1). For each intentional or reckless violation, a prevailing party may recover the greater of actual damages or liquidated damages of $5,000. Id. at 14/20(2). A prevailing party may also be granted injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Id. at 14/20(3)–(4).

II. Analysis

a. Standing

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ; Amling v. Harrow Indus. LLC , 943 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2019). "Standing is an essential component of Article III’ s [sic] case-or-controversy requirement." Apex Dig., Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009). To have standing, a plaintiff must "have suffered an injury-in-fact traceable to the defendant [that is] capable of being redressed through a favorable judicial ruling." Crabtree v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc. , 948 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2020). As a jurisdictional issue, the Court has a responsibility to address standing sua sponte. See Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 141, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) ("When a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented.").

Standing in BIPA suits was recently considered by the Seventh Circuit, see Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc. , 958 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020), so the Court finds it prudent to examine the issue here as well. In Bryant , the Seventh Circuit considered whether the plaintiff had standing to bring claims under sections 15(a) and 15(b) of the BIPA. Id. at 619–20. It held that the plaintiff had asserted a concrete, particularized injury that satisfied Article III's requirements with respect to her claim that the defendant violated section 15(b) by failing to "make the requisite disclosures ... or obtain her informed written consent before collecting" her biometric identifier. Id. at 626–27. The court reasoned that by failing to comply with these requirements, the defendant "inflicted the concrete injury BIPA intended to protect against, i.e. a consumer's loss of the power and ability to make informed decisions about the collection, storage, and use of her biometric information." Id. at 627. But the plaintiff's "claim under section 15(a) [that the defendant failed to publicize a data-retention policy and guidelines for destroying biometric information] [wa]s a separate matter." Id. at 626. The court found that "the duty to disclose under section 15(a) is owed to the public generally, not to particular persons whose biometric information the entity collects." Id. Because the plaintiff "allege[d] no particularized harm that resulted from [the defendant's] violation of section 15(a)" the court held that she "did not suffer a concrete and particularized injury" and she therefore lacked standing under Article III. Id.

Snider's Complaint asserts one cause of action alleging broadly that Heartland violated 740 ILCS 14/15. She does not specifically delineate what provisions she claims Heartland violated. Based on the substance of her allegations, however, it is clear that she asserts that Heartland violated section 15(b). See, e.g. , Compl. ¶¶ 42–44 (alleging that Heartland did not inform Snider and the putative class that their identifiers would be collected or stored, did not inform them of the purpose and length of time for which their identifiers were being collected,...