Baylor University v. Bradshaw
Decision Date | 27 June 1932 |
Docket Number | No. 7653; Motion No. 7364.,7653; Motion No. 7364. |
Citation | 52 S.W.2d 1094 |
Parties | BAYLOR UNIVERSITY et al. v. BRADSHAW. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Williamson County; Harry A. Dolan, Judge.
Action by Wesley Bradshaw against Baylor University, in which defendant impleaded the International & Great Northern Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff against defendant first named, and in favor of such defendant on its plea of contribution against impleaded defendant, both defendants separately appeal.
Reversed and rendered in part, and in part affirmed.
Jos. W. Hale, Nat. Harris, and H. M. Richey, all of Waco, and E. C. Gaines, of Austin, for appellant Baylor University.
Jno. B. Atkinson, of Waco, for appellant International & G. N. R. Co.
Sewell, Taylor, Morris & Garwood, of Houston, for appellee and cross-appellant Bradshaw.
Jos. W. Hale, of Waco, for cross-appellee Union Automobile Ins. Co.
This litigation grew out of the following facts:
January 22, 1927, Wesley Bradshaw (herein called Bradshaw), while riding in a motorbus, was injured as the result of a collision between the bus and a train of the International & Great Northern Railroad Company (called herein the railroad) at a public crossing within the corporate limits of Round Rock, Williamson county. The bus was owned by Baylor University (herein called Baylor), and was used in transporting its athletic teams to and from intercollegiate athletic games in which its teams participated. On the occasion in question the Baylor basket ball team was being transported from Waco to Austin for a game that evening with the University of Texas team. Bradshaw, a former student of Baylor and former member of its team, was traveling in the bus as a guest at the invitation of the Baylor coach.
Bradshaw sued the railroad in McLennan county, alleging various acts of negligence. The railroad impleaded Baylor, seeking (in case judgment went against it) indemnity, or (in the alternative) contribution under R. S. art. 2212. Indemnity was sought on two grounds:
1. That the negligence of Baylor was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
2. That the negligence, if any, of the railroad was passive only, and that of Baylor active.
Contribution was predicated upon the theory that Baylor and the railroad were joint tort-feasors.
The trial court severed the railroad's cross-action against Baylor from the Bradshaw-Baylor suit, and upon a directed verdict, rendered judgment that the railroad take nothing by its cross-action against Baylor.
There was a mistrial in the Bradshaw-Railroad suit; and thereafter (November 23, 1927) the railroad paid Bradshaw $6,500, and the latter executed the following document (formal parts omitted):
Final judgment in the Bradshaw-Railroad suit was thereafter rendered, reading:
This suit was brought in the district court of Williamson county in the name of Bradshaw against Baylor, for compensatory damages for the injuries he received as a result of the collision, several acts of negligence being alleged.
Baylor impleaded the railroad, setting up the Bradshaw-Railroad agreement as a settlement; alleged that the assignment feature of the agreement was void because Baylor and the railroad were joint tort-feasors, that Bradshaw had no substantial interest in the suit, and could recover in no event in excess of $100. Baylor also asserted, in case judgment went against it, that it was entitled to indemnity against the railroad, and in the alternative to contribution, upon the same grounds asserted by the railroad in the McLennan county suit.
The railroad, in defense of the cross-action of Baylor against it, set up the same acts of negligence alleged in the Bradshaw petition (1) as the sole and (2) as the active proximate cause of the collision, and, in the alternative, if Baylor be held to have the right of contribution against it, "that the amount to be paid by said defendant be apportioned as to what amount should be paid by each of them respectively."
The trial was to a jury upon special issues, resulting in the following findings:
1. That Baylor was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision in each of the following particulars:
(a) The bus driver was driving the bus within the corporate limits of Round Rock at a speed in excess of 20 miles per hour as the bus approached the crossing where the collision occurred.
(b) The bus driver failed to turn the bus to the left so as to avoid the collision after discovering the approach of the train.
(c) The bus driver failed to bring the bus to a complete stop before driving upon the track.
(d) The bus driver attempted to beat the train over the crossing by accelerating the speed of the bus after discovering the approach of the train.
2. That the agents, servants, and employees of the railroad were guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause, but not the sole proximate cause, of the collision, in that they operated the "train at the time of the collision at a high and dangerous rate of speed."
3. That $6,500, "if paid presently, would compensate Wesley Bradshaw for the injuries received by him upon the occasion in question."
Other issues of negligence on the part of Baylor and the railroad were submitted, upon which there was either no finding, or a negative finding of actionable negligence. These issues will be noted later as they may become pertinent to the several questions presented.
Upon the above jury findings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Bradshaw against Baylor for $6,500, and in favor of Baylor upon its contribution plea against the railroad for $3,250. The...
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