Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., Civil Action No. 13–1995 ABJ

• Decision Date: 08 July 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–1995 ABJ
• Citation: 55 F.Supp.3d 43
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: Demetra Baylor, Plaintiff, v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, P.C., et al., Defendants.

55 F.Supp.3d 43

Demetra Baylor, Plaintiff

v.Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, P.C., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13–1995 ABJ

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 8, 2014

Radi Dennis, Consumer Justice Esq, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Ronald S. Canter, Law Offices of Ronald S. Canter, LLC, Rockville, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Demetra Baylor brought this case against defendants Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, P.C., and Rubenstein & Cogan, P.C.,¹ alleging that defendants violated various provisions of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., the D.C. Debt Collection Law, D.C.Code § 28–3814 et seq ., and the D.C. Consumer Protection and Procedures Act, D.C.Code § 28–3901 et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 28–48 [Dkt. # 1]. Defendants moved to dismiss the three count complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and they also sought dismissal of defendant Rubenstein & Cogan on the ground that it is not a separate legal entity, but the trade name of defendant Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 7]; Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Mem.”) [Dkt. # 7–1]. Plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss. Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.'s Opp.”) [Dkt. # 8]. Because the Court finds that Rubenstein & Cogan is not a separate legal entity, it will grant defendants' motion to dismiss that defendant from this case. The Court will also grant in part and deny in part defendants' motion to dismiss Counts II and III because it finds that all but two of plaintiff's claims under the D.C. Debt Collection Law fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted (Count II), and because it finds that the D.C. Consumer Protection and Procedures Act does not regulate defendants' conduct here (Count III).

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

In February 2013, plaintiff Demetra Baylor received a letter dated February 21, 2013, from defendants Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, P.C., and Rubenstein & Cogan, notifying her that she owed an alleged debt of $26,471.07. Compl. ¶ 21; Feb. 21, 2013 Letter to Pl., Ex. E to Compl. (“Ex. E to Compl.”) [Dkt. # 1–1]. The letter, which was typed on the letterhead of the Law Offices of Rubenstein & Cogan, explained that plaintiff's account “ha[d] been referred to [defendants'] office for collection,” and it listed “Arrowood Indemnity Company” as the creditor to whom plaintiff owed the stated amount. Compl. ¶ 21; Ex. E to Compl. It did not list the name of the original creditor or the address of the original and current creditor. Compl. ¶ 21; Ex. E to Compl. The letter also noted that the debt was linked to defendants' file number “R80465,” and that the amount due could change based on “interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day.” Ex. E to Compl. Finally, the letter informed plaintiff that she had thirty days to dispute the validity of the debt and to request written verification, and that if the debt was “not paid or otherwise resolved,” defendants had “been instructed by [their] client to review the matter for possible legal action.” Id.

Plaintiff disputed the debt and sent a letter dated March 21, 2013, to defendants. Compl. ¶ 22; Mar. 21, 2013 Letter to Defs., Ex. F to Compl. (“Ex. F to Compl.”) [Dkt. # 1–1]. She requested verification of the debt, and specifically sought the following information: “the owner of [the] debt;” defendants' “connection with collecting this debt;” and “an itemization of how [the] amount was calculated and where it came from and a clear breakdown of all fees, interest, and other charges.” Ex. F to Compl.

Defendants responded in a letter dated March 26, 2013.² Compl. ¶ 23; Mar. 26, 2013 Verification Letter to Pl., Ex. D to Compl. (“Ex. D to Compl.”) [Dkt. # 1]. The letter—sent on the letterhead of the Law Offices of Rubenstein & Cogan—listed the creditor as “Arrowood Indemnity Company/Tuition Guard,” and it named and provided the address of the original creditor: “Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.” Compl. ¶ 23; Ex. D to Compl. The letter also provided a breakdown of the original disbursements to plaintiff that comprised the debt as well as an indication of the interest rate per annum. Ex. D to Compl. By adding up the subtotals listed in the verification letter, the total amount due came to $31,268. Id.

By May 2013, plaintiff had retained counsel regarding the debt described in the February 21 and March 26 letters. Her attorney sent a letter to defendants on May 21, 2013, advising defendants that plaintiff had retained counsel regarding the debt associated with defendants' file number R80465 and reiterating plaintiff's request for additional information. May 21, 2013 Letter to Defs., Ex. B to Compl. (“Ex. B to Compl.”) [Dkt. # 1–1]. The letter included a request that defendants “not contact my client in reference to this matter” and instructed that “[a]ny future communications regarding this matter should be directed to [counsel's] firm.” Id.

On August 22, 2013, defendants sent another letter to plaintiff on the letterhead of the Law Offices of Rubenstein & Cogan. Compl. ¶ 24; Aug. 22, 2013 Letter to Pl., Ex. A to Compl. (“Ex. A to Compl.”) [Dkt. # 1–1]. The address block of the letter contained the name and address of plaintiff's attorney, but it began “Dear Ms. Baylor,” and plaintiff avers that the letter was mailed directly to her rather than to her counsel. Compl. ¶ 24; Ex. A to Compl. The letter states that, according to a different file number—R83798—plaintiff owed a debt of $27,459.48 to “Tuitionguard Arrowood Indemnity.” Compl. ¶ 24; Ex. A to Compl. Defendants did not name the original creditor or provide an address for either the original or named creditor. Compl. ¶ 24; Ex. A to Compl. The letter informed plaintiff that her “account ha[d] been referred to [defendants] for collection” and that the amount due was subject to change based on “interest, late charges and other charges that may vary from day to day.” Ex. A to Compl. It also informed plaintiff that she had thirty days to dispute the debt, and that if the debt was “not paid or otherwise resolved,” defendants had “been instructed by [their] client to review the matter for possible legal action.” Id.

Plaintiff's counsel responded to the August 22 letter on September 12, 2013. Compl. ¶ 25; Sept. 12, 2013 Letter to Defs., Ex. G to Compl. (“Ex. G to Compl.”)[Dkt. # 1–1]. Counsel informed defendants that plaintiff disputed the debt and did not owe any money to Tuitonguard Arrowood Indemnity, and counsel requested verification of the debt that was described in defendants' August 22 letter. Compl. ¶ 26; Ex. G to Compl. The letter indicated that it was sent in response to the August 22 letter and related to plaintiff's alleged debt that was associated with defendants' file number R83798, and it reminded defendants that plaintiff was represented by counsel and should not be contacted directly. Compl. ¶ 25; Ex. G to Compl.

Defendants responded to counsel's September 12 letter on September 26, 2013. Compl. ¶ 26; Sept. 26, 2013 Verification Letter to Pl., Ex. C to Compl. (“Ex. C to Compl.”) [Dkt. # 1–1]. The verification letter stated that the current creditor was “Tuitionguard/Arrowood Indemnity” and that the original creditor was “Student Loan Corp.” Ex. C to Compl. It also provided Student Loan Corp.'s address, and it reiterated that the amount due for the debt contained in defendants' file number R83798 was “$27,459.48 plus interest from 10/21/11 at the rate of 3.75% until paid.” Compl. ¶ 25; Ex. C to Compl.

Of the four letters sent by defendants to plaintiff, one concludes “Very truly yours, Rubenstein and Cogan,” see Ex. E to Compl; two conclude “Very truly yours, Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, P.C.,” see Ex. A to Compl; Ex. C to Compl.; and one concludes “Very truly yours, Mitchell Rubenstein.” See Ex. D to Compl.; see also Compl. ¶ 9.

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the three count complaint in this case on December 17, 2013. Count I alleges that defendants violated various provisions of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”), a federal statute designed to ensure fair debt collection practices. Compl. ¶¶ 28–30. Count II claims that defendants also violated the D.C. Debt Collection Law, which like the FDCPA sets expectations for how debt collectors may fairly collect alleged debts under D.C. law. Id. ¶¶ 31–35. And Count III asserts that defendants violated various portions of the D.C. Consumer Protection and Procedures Act by engaging in unfair trade practices when attempting to collect plaintiff's alleged debts. Id. ¶¶ 36–48.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and they also argued that defendant Rubenstein & Cogan should be dismissed because it does not exist as a separate legal entity from defendant Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates. Defs.' Mem. While that motion was pending, plaintiff accepted an offer of judgment from defendants on the FDCPA claim asserted in Count I, which eliminated the only federal claim in this case.³ The Court therefore denied the motion to dismiss Count I as moot, Mar. 27, 2014 Minute Order, leaving only defendants' motion to dismiss Rubenstein & Cogan as a defendant as well as its motion to dismiss Counts II and III for the Court to decide.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6) ] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly : “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations...