Bradley v. DeWine

• Decision Date: 08 July 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14–110 JDB
• Citation: Bradley v. DeWine, 55 F.Supp.3d 31 (D. D.C. 2014)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: Ralph J. Bradley, Plaintiff, v. Michael DeWine, et al., Defendants.

55 F.Supp.3d 31

Ralph J. Bradley, Plaintiff

v.Michael DeWine, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14–110 JDB

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 8, 2014

Ralph J. Bradley, Canton, OH, pro se.

Kristopher J. Armstrong, Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, OH, Justin Michael Flint, Eccleston & Wolf, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN D. BATES, United States District Judge

PlaintiffRalph J. Bradley, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Ohio Attorney GeneralMichael DeWine; the Honorable Kristin G. Farmer and the Honorable Charles E. Brown, current and retired judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio; Timothy A. Swanson and George T. Maier, current and former sheriffs of Stark County; and John D. Ferrero, a Stark Countyprosecutor.Although the details of Bradley's claims are somewhat unclear, he seeks relief in connection with an allegedly fraudulent foreclosure decree issued by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas.Pl.'s Compl.[ECF No. 1](“Compl.”)at 2.

DeWine moved to dismiss Bradley's claims against him under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.Mot. to Dismiss of Def. Ohio Attorney Gen. Michael DeWine [ECF No. 6](“DeWine's Mot.”)at 2.The remaining defendants(the “county defendants”) collectively moved to dismiss the claims against them under Rules 12(b)(1),12(b)(2), and12(b)(6), challenging this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, its personal jurisdiction over them, and the sufficiency of Bradley's complaint.Def. the Hon. Judge Charles E. Brown, the Hon. Judge Kristin G. Farmer, George T. Maier, Timothy A. Swanson, and John D. Ferrero's Mot. to Dismiss[ECF No. 5](“Defs.'Mot.”)at 1–2.For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant both motions to dismiss Bradley's complaint under Rules 12(b)(1)and12(b)(2).

BACKGROUND

At some point before 2014, Ralph J. Bradley, a self-described “sovereign inhabitant in ... the County of Washington, DC” was subject to a foreclosure proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio.SeeCompl.at 1.In that proceeding, Bradley alleges, the defendants in this action “KNOWINGLY and INTENTIONALLY engaged in a Conspiracy to commit ... a PONZI SCHEME, INSIDER TRADING, INSURANCE FRAUD, REAL ESTATE and MORTGAGE FRAUD, WIRE FRAUD ... [etc.]”Id. at 3.As a result, Bradley claims, a foreclosure decree was “fraudulently” issued with respect to his property.Id. at 2.

Bradley appears to allege that DeWine, in his capacity as Ohio Attorney General, was the architect of this conspiracy.Seeid. at 10–11.He demands that DeWine be made to “answer to the relationship between the State of Ohio and each banking and lending institution” involved.Id. at 10.He further demands that Judge Brown, who issued the allegedly fraudulent foreclosure decree, and Judge Farmer, who affirmed the decree on appeal, “be held in CONTEMPT and PERJURY [for] aiding and assisting JPMorgan in conducting a Ponzi Scheme.”Id. at 12.Because it is allegedly “the policy of the Stark County Sheriff's Department that 99% of all public[ly] auction[ed] properties [be] retained by the banking or lending institution [that] ... ‘finance[d]’ the mortgage,” Bradley also accuses Sheriffs Swanson and Maier of participating in the scheme.Id. at 12.Finally, Bradley alleges that Ferrero, a county prosecutor, fraudulently “approved” what appears to be the judgment lien entered on Bradley's property following the foreclosure.Id. at 14.

Bradley's requested remedies are many, and the legal theories underlying them are difficult to discern.¹He requests “a full scale investigation and independent State Audit” of the financial crimes alleged in his complaint.Compl. at 1.He contends that “[a]ny county or state positions of employment [held by defendants], to include retirement benefits[,] must immediately be SUSPENDED.”Id. at 4.He seeks a writ of quo warranto to “inquire into the authority by which [defendants hold] public office.”Black's Law Dictionary 312–13 (9th ed. 2009);seeCompl.at 4(citingD.C. Code § 16–3501 ).He demands money damages in the amount of $104,799,059.54 against each defendant.Compl. at 8.He seems to request injunctive relief voiding the sheriff's deed and judgment lien on his property.Id. at 13–14.And he seeks an injunction against “acts of domestic Violence that would forcibly remove ‘BRADLEY’ from the premises in question,” by which he presumably means eviction.Id. at 19.

DeWine moved to dismiss Bradley's claims against him for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.DeWine's Mot.at 2.DeWine raised three independent grounds for his subject-matter jurisdiction defense: sovereign immunity, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, and insubstantiality.²Id.The county defendants collectively moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim.They also raised qualified and judicial immunities as affirmative defenses.Because the Court holds that it does not have jurisdiction over either the subject matter of this action³ or over those defendants who raised a personal jurisdiction defense, the Court will grant DeWine's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and the remaining defendants' motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1)and12(b)(2).⁴

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal courts have leeway to “choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp.,549 U.S. 422, 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15(2007)(quotingRuhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil,526 U.S. 574, 585, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760(1999) ).“[C]ertain nonmerits, nonjurisdictional issues may be addressed preliminarily, because ‘[j]urisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.’ ”Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia,486 F.3d 1342, 1348(D.C.Cir.2007)(quotingSinochem,549 U.S. at 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184 )(alterations in original).Where, as here, a party challenges both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, the Court must address both before proceeding to the merits.Sinochem,549 U.S. at 430–31, 127 S.Ct. 1184(citingSteel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't,523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210(1998) ).In most cases, “expedition and sensitivity to state courts' coequal stature” will lead courts to analyze subject-matter jurisdiction first.Ruhrgas,526 U.S. at 587–88, 119 S.Ct. 1563.

a. Subject–Matter Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391(1994)(citations omitted).It is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction,” which, in this instance, is Bradley.Id.(citations omitted).And “[b]ecause subject matter jurisdiction focuses on the court's power to hear the claim,”a court“must give the plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.”Bailey v. WMATA,696 F.Supp.2d 68, 71(D.D.C.2010).Nevertheless, the court must still “accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.”Jerome Stevens Pharms. v. FDA,402 F.3d 1249, 1253(D.C.Cir.2005).If “a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.”Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097(2006)accordFed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

b. Personal Jurisdiction

A plaintiff also bears the burden of establishing the Court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant who moves to dismiss the claims against him under Rule 12(b)(2).SeeMwani v. bin Laden,417 F.3d 1, 7(D.C.Cir.2005).Where, as here, there has been no jurisdictional discovery, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts to meet that burden.Seeid.;see alsoBrunson v. Kalil & Co., Inc.,404 F.Supp.2d 221, 226(D.D.C.2005).“Moreover, to establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs are not limited to evidence that meets the standards of admissibility required by the district court.Rather, they may rest their argument on their pleadings, bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.”Mwani,417 F.3d at 7.Nevertheless, a plaintiff must allege “specific facts upon which personal jurisdiction may be based,”Blumenthal v. Drudge,992 F.Supp. 44, 53(D.D.C.1998), and cannot rely on conclusory allegations, seeElemary v. Phillipp Holzmann AG, 533 F.Supp.2d 116, 121(D.D.C.2008).

DISCUSSION

Defendants have moved to dismiss all of Bradley's claims against them.DeWine has filed a motion to dismiss Bradley's claims against him, while the county defendants together have filed a separate motion to dismiss the claims against them.DeWine argues that because he is an official of the state of Ohio, the Eleventh Amendment deprives this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against him for money damages.DeWine's Mot.at 2–3.In addition, the county defendants argue that because they are residents of Ohio who lack sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia, this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them.Defs.' Mot.at 3.All defendants argue that because Bradley seeks review of a state-court judgment, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire action under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.DeWine's Mot.at 3;Defs.' Mot.at 4–5.The Court will address each argument in turn.

I.Sovereign Immunity Under The Eleventh...