Baynesan v. Wayne State Univ.
Decision Date | 04 August 2016 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 326132. |
Parties | BAYNESAN v. WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Deborah Gordon Law and Gordon & Prescott, Bloomfield Hills (by Deborah L. Gordon ) for Joseph Baynesan.
Law Office of Daniel J. Bernard (by Daniel J. Bernard, Bingham Farms) for Wayne State University.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and K.F. KELLY and O'BRIEN, JJ.
Defendant Wayne State University (WSU) appeals by leave granted an order of the Court of Claims transferring plaintiff Joseph Baynesan's claim under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq., from the Court of Claims back to the Wayne Circuit Court. This Court limited the appeal to the issues raised in the application and supporting brief, "as well as the question whether the construction of the [C]ourt of [C]laims [A]ct as advocated by appellant violates plaintiff's jury trial right." Baynesan v. Wayne State Univ., unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 7, 2015 (Docket No. 326132). We affirm the Court of Claims on the limited basis that it did not abuse its discretion by transferring this action back to the Wayne Circuit Court in the exercise of its inherent authority to control its docket and sanction litigants. See Banta v. Serban, 370 Mich. 367, 368, 121 N.W.2d 854 (1963).
In December of 2012, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint in the Wayne Circuit Court that alleged a violation of the WPA, for which he sought money damages, and a public policy tort claim, for which he sought equitable relief. Regarding the latter claim, plaintiff sought to be returned to his former position with WSU, and he sought an injunction prohibiting WSU from committing any further actions of retaliation or discrimination. Defense counsel then notified plaintiff that the Court of Claims, and not the Wayne Circuit Court, had jurisdiction over his public policy tort claim. Upon stipulation of the parties and by order entered on March 18, 2013, the circuit court dismissed plaintiff's public policy tort claim.
Plaintiff subsequently filed his tort claim in the Court of Claims, then residing in the Ingham Circuit Court. Plaintiff also filed a motion to join the tort action with the WPA action still pending in the Wayne Circuit Court. The Court of Claims, by order of June 19, 2013, granted the motion, directing that plaintiff's tort claim be joined with the WPA action in the Wayne Circuit Court.
Moreover, the act created a new mechanism for the transfer of cases pending before the circuit court to the Court of Claims. This mechanism is codified in MCL 600.6404(3), and provides in part:
Beginning on the effective date of the amendatory act that added this subsection [November 12, 2013], any matter within the jurisdiction of the court of claims described in section 6419(1) [MCL 600.6419(1) ] pending or later filed in any court must, upon notice of the state or a department or officer of the state, be transferred to the court of claims described in subsection (1). The transfer shall be effective upon the filing of the transfer notice....
On December 18, 2013, 2013 PA 205 became law. This amendatory act preserved the rights of parties to secure jury trials in actions that now came within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in light of the expanded jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Claims by 2013 PA 164. As amended by 2013 PA 205, MCL 600.6421 provides in part:
Despite these late 2013 changes in the law, the parties continued to litigate plaintiff's claims in the Wayne Circuit Court through most of 2014. Then, with a final pretrial conference scheduled for November 5, 2014, and a jury trial scheduled for December 1, 2014, WSU filed a "Notice of Transfer to Court of Claims" on November 3, 2014, notifying plaintiff and the circuit court that it was transferring the entire case to the Court of Claims " pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3), 2013 PA 164."
On November 4, 2014, plaintiff filed an emergency motion in the Court of Claims to transfer the case back to the Wayne Circuit Court and for sanctions. The Court of Claims heard oral arguments on the motion on January 12, 2015, and granted plaintiff's motion for transfer by opinion and order entered on January 30, 2015. After relating the case's procedural history and the changes in the law made by 2013 PA 164 and 2013 PA 205, the Court of Claims opined in part:
The parties continued to litigate the matter in the Wayne Circuit Court until November 3, 2014, when defendant filed a notice of transfer pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3), transferring the matter to this Court. The Court finds that doing so was inappropriate and impermissible, for two reasons. First, although the Court recognizes, and plaintiff concedes, that MCL 600.6404(3) does not have a time limit, defendant's act of continuing to litigate the matter in the Wayne Circuit Court for almost a year after the option of transferring to this Court became possible and known constitutes an unequivocal act of approval to the matter being joined for trial in that court. MCL 600.6421(3) does not require any particular manner of expressing approval; under the circumstances, the Court finds that such approval was clearly and unambiguously expressed. That statute therefore provides that the action therefore "shall be tried and determined by the judge even though the trial court action with which it may be joined is tried to a jury under the supervision of the same trial judge." MCL 600.6421(3).
The Court of Claims continued, making comments on the new legislation, and noting "that the Legislature could [not] have intended to permit parties to have an unrestricted ability to forum-shop at their convenience with no regard to the effect thereof on other parties, the efficient administration of the involved courts, [and]
the pursuit of justice...." The Court of Claims further stated:
Having elected to remain in the Wayne Circuit Court for almost a year, defendant committed itself to that venue, and the notice of transfer was untimely and impermissible because by the time it was filed, MCL 600.6421(3) has already established that the matter shall be heard in the Wayne Circuit Court. Therefore, MCL 600.6421(4)(b) never became effective. The Court does not purport to be able to say with certainty "how long is too long" for a party to wait, but this was clearly beyond the pale. The Court declines, however, to speculate that defendant's transfer was...
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