Bd. Educ. LaGrange School Dist. 105 v. Il. St. Bd., 105

• Decision Date: 29 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-4077,P,No. 105,105,98-4077
• Citation: 184 F.3d 912
• Parties: (7th Cir. 1999) Board of Education of LaGrange School Districtlaintiff-Appellant, v. Illinois State Board of Education and Ryan B., by and through his parents and next friends, Kevin B. and Elaine B., Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 912

184 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1999)

Board of Education of LaGrange School District No. 105, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Illinois State Board of Education and Ryan B., by and through his parents and next friends, Kevin B. and Elaine B., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-4077

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Argued April 9, 1999

Decided July 29, 1999

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 98 C 2973--Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.

Before Bauer, Flaum and Rovner, Circuit Judges.

Flaum, Circuit Judge.

LaGrange School District No. 105 appeals the district court's decision finding that it failed to offer Ryan B. ("Ryan") a free appropriate public education within the meaning of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. sec. 1400 et seq. ("IDEA") and ordering reimbursement to Ryan's parents for the cost of his education in a private pre-school.

I. BACKGROUND

Children age three to twenty-one who are eligible for special education under IDEA are entitled to receive a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") from their home school district. Ryan was born on January 23, 1994 and has Down Syndrome. In 1996, when he was two, his parents placed him in a private pre-school with nondisabled children. When he turned three, his home school district, LaGrange School District No. 105 ("School District"), was asked to evaluate him and determine his eligibility for special education programs pursuant to IDEA. The School District does not have a program for disabled students. The School District convened a multi-disciplinary conference ("MDC") and prepared the statutorily required individualized education program ("IEP"), which, in January 1997, concluded that Ryan was eligible for special education and recommended placing him in a program limited to disabled students at Brook Park Elementary School, five miles from his home and in a different school district.

In February 1997, Ryan's parents rejected the Brook Park placement and requested the creation of a program within the School District that would include nondisabled students or access to similar programs in neighboring districts. A second IEP meeting was held and Ryan's parents again rejected the Brook Park program. On March 19, 1997, the School District offered to have the IEP team consider a state-funded "At-Risk" program, called Project IDEAL, within Ryan's district. This program is available to children who are primarily at risk of academic failure. After Ryan's parents visited Project IDEAL, they requested a due process hearing as provided for in IDEA. There is no evidence that the School District ever evaluated the At-Risk program with reference to Ryan's IEP.

Under IDEA, disputes such as these are first handled administratively through a two-tiered process. The initial hearing is called the Level I Due Process Hearing. Appeal from that decision results in a second administrative hearing, the Level II. From there, a party may appeal to federal court. In this case, the Level I hearing officer found that Ryan's placement for the 1997- 98 school year should have been in the Project IDEAL/At-Risk program. However, since this program was not offered to Ryan until March 19, 1997, the School District was ordered to pay the costs of Ryan's private pre-school from January until March 19, 1997. Both sides appealed the Level I decision--Ryan's parents on the issue of placement in the At-Risk program and the School District on the limited issue of payment for the private school. The Level II hearing officer ruled that neither the Brook Park placement nor the At-Risk program provided Ryan with a FAPE because neither placement satisfied IDEA's requirement that disabled children be educated in the "least restrictive environment." See 20 U.S.C. sec. 412; 34 C.F.R. sec.sec. 330.550-556. The Level II officer also ordered the School District to pay for Ryan's private school.

The School District appealed. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in Ryan's favor and held that the School District had failed to provide a FAPE and affirmed the award of private pre-school costs. The School District now appeals. The United States Department of Education filed an amicus brief in support of Ryan.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review.

As an initial matter, the standard of review in this case differs from that governing the typical review of summary judgment. Heather S. v. State of Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir. 1997). When neither party has requested that the district court hear additional evidence beyond what was in the record at the Level II stage, as is the case here, there is nothing new presented to the district court, and "thus [t]he motion for summary judgment is simply the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record." Id. Therefore, despite being termed summary judgment, the district court's decision is based on a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The party challenging the administrative finding, here the School District, bears the burden of proof. Id. The district court is required to give "due weight" to the results of the administrative proceedings and not to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative hearing officer's. Id. at 1052-1053. Where there are conflicting decisions on an issue between the two levels of a state administrative review, federal courts are required to defer to the final decision--here the Level II determination--of the state authorities. Id. at 1052. Thus, while we review the ultimate decision de novo, in the absence of a mistake of law, we may only reverse the district court if its findings were clearly erroneous. Id.

B. Whether either program was a FAPE.

The central issue in this case is whether either program offered by the School District was a FAPE within the meaning of IDEA. The district court held that neither was because each failed to satisfy the least restrictive environment requirement and that private placement provided Ryan with optimal educational benefit. The School District argues that, in so holding, the district court misapplied the LRE requirement.

Under IDEA, a FAPE is an educational program "specifically designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction." Board of Educ. of Murphysboro Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 186 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). IDEA explicitly provides that states receiving federal funds must:

establish procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children . . . are educated with children who are not handicapped, and that special education, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the regular education environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.

20 U.S.C. sec. 1412 (5)(B). This requirement is known as "main streaming," and, as we have held, this provision creates a strong preference in favor of it. See Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 162 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). In addition to the statutory presumption, IDEA's implementing regulations provide that disabled children are to be educated in the least restrictive environment ("LRE"). 34 C.F.R. sec. 300.550(b)(1). Just as the statute indicates, the regulations provide that a child may be removed from a regular educational environment only when the nature or severity of that child's disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 34 C.F.R. sec. 300.550(b)(2).

According to 34 C.F.R. sec. 300.552, a child is to be educated in the school that he or she would otherwise attend if not disabled unless the IEP for that child requires some other placement. The commentary to this regulation provides:

Public agencies that do not operate programs for nondisabled children are not required to initiate such programs to satisfy the requirements regarding placement in the LRE embodied in Sections 300.550-556. For these public agencies, some alternative methods for meeting the requirements include

(1) Providing opportunities for participation (even part time) of preschool children with disabilities in other preschool programs operated by public agencies (such as Head Start);

(2) Placing children with disabilities in private school programs for nondisabled preschool children or private preschool programs that integrate children with disabilities and nondisabled children; and

(3) Locating classes for preschool children with disabilities in regular elementary schools.

In each case the public agency must ensure that each child's placement is in the LRE in which the unique needs of that child can be met, based on the child's IEP, and meets all of the other requirements of Sections 300.340-300.350 and Sections 300.550-300.556.

The district court concluded, as did the Level II hearing officer, that because neither placement offered by the School District satisfied the least restrictive environment requirement nor met Ryan's unique needs, the School District failed to provide Ryan with a FAPE. The School District argues this was error because each of its proposed programs met one of the alternatives stated in the commentary to 34 C.F.R. sec. 300.552. Therefore, claims the School District, it met its obligation to provide Ryan with a FAPE. We will discuss each placement in turn.

1. Brook Park Placement.

The district court held that...