Bd. of Com'rs of Guadalupe County v. Anaya
| Decision Date | 12 December 1925 |
| Docket Number | No. 3077.,3077. |
| Citation | 31 N.M. 182,242 P. 335 |
| Parties | BOARD OF COM'RS OF GUADALUPE COUNTY et al.v.ANAYA et al. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
An apparent de jure officer, in possession of a public office, may have injunction to protect his possession against an intruder who pretends to act and thus hampers the de jure officer in the discharge of the functions of the office.
An apparent de jure officer is “in possession” of an office, if he is so situated as to be able to fulfill all of the substantial purposes of the office.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
In proceedings by new county board of education, organized under Laws 1925, c. 132, against old board, organized under Laws 1923, c. 148, subc. 8, granting perpetual injunction against old board was error, since court could only protect possession of new board until question of office could be litigated.
Error to District Court, Guadalupe County; Armijo, Judge.
Action by A. P. Anaya and others, as the Guadalupe County Board of Education, against the Board of County Commissioners of Guadalupe County, composed of Juan Sena and others, for an injunction. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Granting perpetual injunction against old board held error.
Chester Hunker, of East Las Vegas, F. Faircloth, of Santa Rosa, and C. J. Roberts, of Santa Fé, for plaintiffs in error.
Tom W. Neal, of Las Vegas, for defendants in error.
By subchapter 8 of chapter 148, Laws 1923, the boards of county commissioners of the respective counties were constituted the county boards of education of their counties. By chapter 132, Laws 1925, the whole plan was changed, and it was therein provided that all county boards of education, as they were formerly constituted, should cease to exist upon the date when the members of the county boards of education, as provided in that act, shall have been selected and should qualify. It was further provided in section 3 of the act that on or before the 15th day of June, 1925, and biennially thereafter, the district judge of each judicial district should select from among the qualified electors of the respective counties in his district eight qualified electors from such county, no more than four of whom should belong to any one political party, and no more than three of such persons should be selected from any one county commissioner's district, and no more than two of such persons should reside in an incorporated municipality. It was further provided that, on or before the third Monday in June, the county clerk should cause notice to be served upon such eight persons advising them to assemble in the office of said county clerk on the fourth Monday in said month of June for the purpose of selecting the members of the county board of education, which is to consist of four members.
In this case the district judge appointed the committee of eight, who in turn selected four persons to constitute the board of education, and they qualified by taking the oath of office and executing the bond required by the statute on June 30, 1925.
On July 24, 1925, the board of county commissioners met and by resolution requested the county school superintendent to notify the teachers who had contracts to teach in the county during the school year 1925-1926 to disregard the action of the new board, and that they, the old board, held the office of the county board of education until its successor should be legally selected and qualified. This notice was on said day sent out to said teachers by the county school superintendent. The old board was proceeding upon the theory that the new board had not been legally organized because the commissioners appointed by the district judge were not qualified to act in the appointment of a new board. The new board thereupon filed its complaint in the district court on the 28th day of July, 1925, for an injunction against the old board to prevent its interference with the new board in the discharge of its duty as such board of education. It alleged that the plaintiffs were “the duly qualified and acting members of, and constituted, the Guadalupe county board of education”; that the defendants were assuming to act by virtue of their office as members of the board of county commissioners of Guadalupe county, and constitute themselves as the Gaudalupe county board of education; that the said defendants did meet pretending to be such board on the 24th of July, 1925, and threatened to continue to meet as such board, and had notified the school teachers and other officers of the public schools of Guadalupe county that they were the Guadalupe county board of education; that such action on the part of the defendants hampered the plaintiffs in such exercise of their duty as such Guadalupe county board of education and was destructive of the efficiency of the public school system of the county. They obtained an order to show cause why injunction should not issue.
The defendants filed what they styled a motion to dismiss the complaint, in which they urged that there was a defect of parties plaintiff in that the Guadalupe county board of education was not a party plaintiff, and that it was a necessary and indispensable party to the cause; that the members of said board had no right to bring any action in their individual names in behalf of the Guadalupe county board of education; that the complaint filed therein showed on its face that it was a suit in equity between two parties, each claiming to be the Guadalupe county board of education; that it was a contest between the parties for the office; and that the court had no jurisdiction to try the title to an office in such a proceeding. This motion, which was in effect a demurrer, was overruled by the court, and thereupon the defendants answered. They alleged in the answer that they were the legally constituted board and set up that the new board was illegally appointed because the committee appointed by the district judge to select the new board was illegally constituted, for the reason that three of the committee were residents of incorporated municipalities, contrary to the...
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State v. Patten
...to qualify him as a suitor? “If one's own right to an office is not such a right as equity recognizes (Guadalupe County Commissioners v. Anaya [31 N.M. 182, 242 P. 335], supra), the right of a third person certainly cannot be subject-matter of a suit. The plaintiff can have no higher standi......
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Olson v. Grilly
...the right to hold public office is not a property right and can be asserted only in a court of law. See Guadalupe Co. Com'rs et al. v. Anaya et al., 1925, 31 N.M. 182, 242 P. 335; Tadlock v. Smith, 1934, 38 N.M. 288, 31 P.2d 708; and compare State v. Patten, 1937, 41 N.M. 395, 69 P.2d 931; ......
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Tadlock v. Smith
...to the office, but to protect an actual incumbent from interference, so that the public business may go on. Board of Com'rs of Guadalupe County v. Anaya, 31 N. M. 182, 242 P. 335. One prima facie entitled to an office may have mandamus to obtain possession. See cases reviewed in Jaramillo v......