Bd. of Com'rs of Clinton Cnty. v. Davis

• Decision Date: 27 January 1904
• Citation: 162 Ind. 60,69 N.E. 680
• Parties: BOARD OF COM'RS OF CLINTON COUNTY v. DAVIS.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

162 Ind. 60

69 N.E. 680

BOARD OF COM'RS OF CLINTON COUNTY

v.DAVIS.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Jan. 27, 1904.

Appeal from Superior Court, Tippecanoe County; H. H. Vinton, Judge.

Action by Robert Davis against the board of commissioners of the county of Clinton. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.H. C. Sheridan, Hanly & Wood, D. S. Holman, and Benjamin Crane, for appellant. Palmer & Palmer, Stuart, Hammond & Simms, and Finley P. Mount, for appellee.

MONKS, J.

This action was brought by appellee, under section 2 of the act of March 4, 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 381, c. 166; being section 2330, Burns' Rev. St. 1901), to recover nine separate rewards for furnishing information which secured the conviction of nine persons for a violation of section 1 of said act; being section 2329, Burns' Rev. St. 1901. It is provided by section 1 of said act of 1899 (being section 2329, supra) that “any one who sells, barters or offers to sell or barter his vote or offers to refrain from voting for any candidate or candidates at any general, special or primary election or convention, *** or who shall accept any money, property or thing of value with the promise or pretense of voting for or refraining from voting for any candidate or candidates, shall upon conviction therefor be,” etc. The second section (being section 2330, supra) provides that “any person or persons having knowledge or information of the violation of the provisions of this act, who shall procure or furnish or cause to be procured or furnished the testimony necessary to secure a conviction of the person or persons violating the same shall be entitled to a reward of $100.00 payable out of the treasury of the county in which such conviction shall be had and the right to such reward shall be a valid claim against such county.” Appellant's demurrer for want of facts to each of the nine paragraphs of complaint was overruled. Appellant filed an answer in five paragraphs, the first of which was a general denial. The court sustained appellee's demurrer for want of facts to each paragraph of answer, except the first. A trial of said cause resulted in a verdict, and, over a motion for a new trial, a judgment, in favor of appellee. The court's rulings on the demurrers, and the action of the court in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial, are called in question by the assignment of errors.

It is claimed by appellee that the pleadings are not in the record, and that for this reason the judgment must be affirmed. The reasons urged by appellee to sustain this contention are the same as those set forth in Southern, etc., R. Co. v. Martin (Ind. Sup.) 66 N. E. 886, and Perry, etc., Co. v. Wilson (Ind. Sup.) 67 N. E. 183; and, upon the authority of those cases, we hold that the pleadings are properly in the record.

The objection urged against each paragraph of the complaint is that it is not averred that appellee “rendered the services with a knowledge that the reward was offered, or with the intention to recover the same.” Such allegations are unnecessary in this state-at least, when the reward is offered in a public statute. Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199, 200;Board, etc., v. Wood, 39 Ind. 345, 351;Everman v. Hyman, 26 Ind. App. 165, 167-169, 28 N. E. 1022, 84 Am. St. Rep. 284, and cases cited. See, also, Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush, 572, 15 Am. Rep. 728; Eagle v. Smith, 4 Houst. 293.

It appears from the allegations of the second, third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of answer that appellee procured each person named in the nine paragraphs of complaint to violate section 2329, Burns' Rev. St. 1901 -to sell his vote; that he induced each of said persons to commit said crime; and in some of said paragraphs of answer it is alleged that he induced them to commit said crime with the intention of furnishing the testimony necessary to secure a conviction, and, when convicted, to recover from the county the reward provided by section 2330, Burns' Rev. St. 1901. Said paragraphs of answer proceed upon the theory that while the law offers a reward to any person who shall procure and furnish, or cause to be procured or furnished, the testimony necessary to secure a conviction of the offender, it was not intended to reward the person who bought the vote, or who procured the same to be done, or in any way aided or abetted therein. Appellee insists that the vote buyer comes within the terms of the statute, and for that reason the demurrer for want of facts was properly sustained to said paragraphs of answer. Said section 2330, supra, provides that “any person or persons having knowledge or information of the violation of the provisions of this act, who shall procure or furnish or cause to be procured or furnished the testimony *** shall be entitled to a reward.” As counsel for the parties do not challenge the validity of said section, we may, without considering that question, determine its proper interpretation. Lewis v. Albertson, 152 Ind. 693, 49 N. E. 34;Williams v. Citizens' Enterprise Co., 153 Ind. 496, 55 N. E. 425;Boyd v. Brazil Block Coal Co., 152 Ind. 543, 544, 49 N. E. 797. The language employed is broad enough to include not only the vote buyer, as contended by appellee, but also the vote seller. Was this the legislative intent? The natural import of the words of a statute according to their common use, when applied to the subject-matter, is to be considered as expressing the legislative intent, unless it is repugnant to the acknowledged principles of justice and sound public policy, in which case the words ought to be restrained or enlarged so as to comport with those principles, unless the intention of the Legislature is clearly and manifestly expressed to the contrary. This is because it will not be presumed that the Legislature will violate principles of public policy, but, if such intention is clearly expressed, and is not obnoxious to any provision of the Constitution, it must have the force of law. Opinion of the Justices, 7 Mass. 523-526;Hittinger v. Inhabitants of Westford, 135 Mass. 258, 259;Dixon v. Western Union Tel. Co., 68 Fed. 630, 634, 635;Maxwell v. Collins, 8 Ind. 38; Black on Interpretation of Laws, pp. 107, 108.

The Constitution of Massachusetts provided that the elector of a senator must be an inhabitant of the senatorial district in which he votes, and the elector for representative must have resided one year in the town before he could there be a voter. It was held in Opinion of Justices, 7 Mass. 524-526, that, while the words “inhabitants” and “residents” may comprehend aliens, they must be restrained to such inhabitants or residents as are citizens. The justices said at page 526: “This construction of the Constitution is analogous to that given to several statutes. Creditors may levy their execution on lands of the debtors, and hold them in fee simple, unless redeemed. Although the words of the statute are general, yet they are not deemed to include alien creditors. If they were so deemed, then, under color of a judgment and execution, the rule of the common law prohibiting an alien from holding lands against the commonwealth would be defeated. So a general provision is made for dower of widows, yet it is not supposed that a woman who is an alien can claim and have assigned to her dower in lands of her deceased husband.” For this reason, it is held that a statute should not be so construed as to authorize or permit a man to be a judge in his own case, or to determine his right to an office of trust or profit, unless the act so declares in express words. Day v. Savadge, Hob. *85; Queen v. Owens, 2 El. & El. (Q. B.) 86, 91-93, 105 English C. L. Rep. 85, 90-92; The Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. L. 93, 110; Com. v. McCloskey, 2 Rawle, 369, 372-376; Black on Interp. Laws, p. 107; 1 Blackstone's Com. *91; Broom's Legal Maxims, pp. 116-121. It was said in 1 Blackstone's Com. *91: “Thus, if an act of Parliament gives a man power to try all causes that arise in his manor of Dale, yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is a party, the act is construed not to extend to that, because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel. But if we would conceive it possible for Parliament to enact that he should try as well his own cases as those of other persons, there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in such evident and express words as leave no doubt whether it is the intent of the legislature or no.”

It has been held, upon grounds of public policy, that public corporations, such as counties, townships, cities, towns, school corporations, and public officers, are not subject to garnishment under a law providing that “all persons and corporations are subject to garnishment.” To make such corporations and officers subject to garnishment, the act must so provide in express words. Wallace v. Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501, 505-509, 23 Am. Rep. 661, and cases cited; Switzer v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 250, 19 Pac. 620, 10 Am. St. Rep. 196, and note; First Nat. Bank v. Ottawa, 43 Kan. 295, 23 Pac. 485;School Dist. v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484, 33 Am. Rep. 421;McLellan v. Young, 54 Ga. 399, 21 Am. Rep. 276;Dotterer v. Bowe, 84 Ga. 769, 11 S. E. 896; Mayor, etc., v. Root, 8 Md. 95, 63 Am. Dec. 696a, and note; Rood on Garnishment, §§ 18, 19, 25, 26, 27; 2 Shinn on Attachment & Garnishment, §§ 500, 505.

It is also held, upon grounds of public policy, that a law which provides that “mechanics and all persons performing labor or furnishing materials for the construction or repair of any building may have a lien separately and jointly upon the building which they may have constructed or repaired *** and upon the interest of the owner in the lot or land on which it stands,” does not authorize such lien upon public property devoted to public use. Board, etc., v. O'Conner, 86 Ind. 531, 535-538, 44 Am. Rep. 338, and cases cited; Fatout v. Board, etc., 102 Ind. 223,...