Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 100 v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 16 January 1946
• Docket Number: No. 28800.,28800.
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. NO. 100 v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

392 Ill. 261

64 N.E.2d 374

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. NO. 100

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 28800.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 21, 1945.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 1946.

Error to Circuit Court, Coles County; George W. Bristow, judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Nelle M. Gullett, claimant, opposed by the Board of Education of School District No. 100, employer. To review a judgment of the circuit court, sustaining an award of the Industrial Commission which set aside a decision of the arbitrator denying compensation, the employer brings error.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for plaintiff in error.

Harry I. Hannah and Thomas R. Figenbaum, both of Mattoon, for defendant in error.

FULTON, Justice.

Nelle M. Gullett was employed by the plaintiff in error as a school teacher and principal of one of its grade schools in the city of Mattoon, Illinois. She was injured by slipping and falling on an icy street while going to work in the morning of December 10, 1942. She filed an application for adjustment of claim and after a hearing the arbitrator found that she had not sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment and denied compensation.

Upon petition for review, the Industrial Commission set aside the decision of the arbitrator and awarded compensation for the sum of $775 for medical and surgical bills, the sum of $16.50 per week for a period of 38 3/7 weeks for temporary total incapacity, and the additional sum of $16.50 per week for a period of 66 1/2 weeks for permanent and complete loss of use of 35 per cent of the left leg. On certiorari to the circuit court of Coles county, judgment was entered sustaining the action of the Industrial Commission. We have allowed a writ of error to this court.

On the afternoon of December 9, 1942, Nelle M. Gullett attended a principals' meeting called by the superintendent of schools at Mattoon. At that meeting she was given supplies for school purposes by the superintendent. These included an illustrated book, a large bottle of ink and several bottles of mucilage. Miss Gullett took these materials to her home and on the following morning left for school a little before eight o'clock, carrying in addition to the above articles, her notebook, a roll of weekly readers or school magazines and her lunch in a bag. It was a cold, snowy morning and on her way to school she slipped and fell on the icy sidewalk sustaining a compound fracture of her left leg. The weather conditions were general throughout the city.

The facts above stated are not in dispute, but there is some controversy over the extent of the injury. The main question, therefore, as to whether the injuries of the employee arose out of and in the course of the employment, becomes one of law.

It is not alone sufficient that the injury was received by the employee in the course of the employment, but it must arise while he is acting within the duties of his employment, or some act incidental thereto. To entitle the employee to compensation, both elements must be present at the time of the accidental injury. Farley v. Industrial Comm., 378 Ill. 234, 37 N.E.2d 787;Ervin v. Industrial Comm., 364 Ill. 56, 4 N.E.2d 22.

The general rule is that employment does not begin until the employee reaches the place of employment, and does not continue after he has left the place of employment. General Steel Castings Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 388 Ill. 66, 57 N.E.2d 454. This general rule is subject to exception, however, as was shown in the case of Mueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Board, 283 Ill. 148, 118 N.E. 1028, 1032, L.R.A.1918F, 891, Ann.Cas.1918E, 808. The defendant in error, Nelle M. Gullett, has placed much reliance on the latter case for sustaining the judgment of the circuit court. There, a carpenter foreman was the claimant. It was his duty to order all materials for a remodelling and construction job as well as to hire and discharge all the men under him and to have full control of the work. There was no telephone in the building where the work was under way and, for a period of three or four months, the foreman had been accustomed to crossing the street for the purpose of ordering materials over the telephone. It was clearly a part of his duties to order the materials to be used on the job. While in the act of crossing the street for this purpose, he was struck and injured by an automobile. In that case it was stated: ‘If as a part of his duties, he was required to cross the public street for the purpose of telephoning on the business of his employer, and while so doing was struck by a passing vehicle, we are unable to see why, under the facts of this case, such an accident does not arise out of his employment as well as in the course of his employment. He was injured in performing a regular duty that was expected of him.’

There are many cases in Illinois, however, which hold that travel to and from the place of employment is not within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In Landon v. Industrial Comm., 341 Ill. 51, 173 N.E. 49, 51, we said: ‘The cases which hold that an employee injured while going to or coming from his work is within the course of his employment have been cases decided upon the ground that the employment required a particular route to be traveled or the route followed was the...