McField v. Lincoln Hotel

• Decision Date: 09 May 1962
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 48501
• Citation: 35 Ill.App.2d 340,182 N.E.2d 905
• Parties: Veletta McFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LINCOLN HOTEL and City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 905

182 N.E.2d 905

35 Ill.App.2d 340

Veletta McFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LINCOLN HOTEL and City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation Defendants-Appellees.

Gen. No. 48501.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

May 9, 1962.

Jurco, Damisch & Sinson, Chicago, Nancy G. McDermid, John W. Damisch, Dennis M. O'Brien, Chicago, of counsel, for appellant.

Berchem, Schwantes & Thuma, Chicago, William E. Phillips, Chicago, of counsel, for appellees.

BRYANT, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from a Summary Judgment granted on the motion of defendant, Lincoln Hotel. This was an action for personal injuries and the Lincoln Hotel pleaded the affirmative defense that at the time and place of the occurrence plaintiff was defendant's employee, and that they were both operating under and bound by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment was based on the undisputed testimony of plaintiff, Veletta McField, given under oath at oral discovery deposition. The deposition had been called for and taken by plaintiff's own counsel with defendant's counsel cross examining. The lower court found that plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and were therefore governed by the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. Thereupon the motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

Plaintiff was maid at defendant's hotel. On December 28, 1957 plaintiff completed her duties as a maid, changed from her uniform to street clothes, and checked out in the basement at about five o'clock. She then waited in the basement check-out room for friends; they exited through the Wells Street door. This was the employees' entrance, and according to plaintiff's deposition it was the only way for her to enter and leave the building. There was a wooden ramp right in front of this doorway, and the ramp extended across about 1/4 of the public sidewalk. The ramp and entrance were also used by various delivery services, such as laundry men and food dealers. The ramp was icy, glassy and wet. Plaintiff stepped out of the door, taking about one step, and fell. Plaintiff fell on the wooden ramp and stayed there until a boy and girl helped her up, and it was from this fall that the injuries here in issue arose.

Plaintiff's argument in substance is that the question of whether the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment is a question of fact, and that a summary judgment cannot be granted when the pleadings put an essential fact in issue, citing Payne & Dolan v. Industrial Com., 382 Ill. 177, 46 N.E.2d 925; Northwestern Univ. v. Industrial Com., 409 Ill. 216, 99 N.E.2d 346; Simaitis v. Thrash, 25 Ill.App.2d 340, 166 N.E.2d 306. Plaintiff asserts that since the risk of falling while off the employer's premises is a risk of a general nature to which the public is equally exposed, the injury does not arise out of and in the course of employment. Thus the instant case would fall under the 'going to and coming from work' rule, and would not be within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Plaintiff has argued incisively numerous Illinois cases, some of which are admittedly difficult to reconcile, and cited recent decisions from other jurisdictions. The principal cases relied upon by plaintiff are: Northwestern Univ. v. Industrial Com., supra; Christian v. C. & I. M. Ry. Co., 412 Ill. 171, 105 N.E.2d 741; Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co., 319 Ill. 344, 150 N.E. 276; Board of Education v. Industrial Com., 392 Ill. 261, 64 N.E.2d 374.

Defendant admits that the general rule in Illinois is that injuries suffered while the employee is going to or returning from work do not arise out of or in the course of employment, but contends that the undisputed facts presented here fall within the inevitable exception where an accident occurs on the employer's premises or adjacent premises and the employee is, by virtue of the employment, peculiarly subject to the danger. Defendant relies primarily on Schafer v. Industrial Com., 343 Ill. 573, 175 N.E. 789; Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Co., 294 Ill. 119, 128 N.E. 290; and Mueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Board, 283 Ill. 148, 118 N.E. 1028, L.R.A.1918F, 891.

The Christian case, supra, and cases cited therein, contains a convenient summary of the rules and exceptions applicable to the present inquiry. Briefly repeated, they run as follows. Because the phrases 'arise out of and in the course of employment' are used conjunctively, there must be a concurrence of both elements for the injury to be within the Workmen's Compensation Act. 'In the course of' refers to the time covered by the employment, as well as reasonable conduct at a place where the employee might reasonably be while employed; this is regarded as a triple test of time, place and conduct. 'Arising out of' means the requisite causal connection between the employment and the accident. As a general proposition, after an employee leaves the employer's premises at the close of working hours he is no longer in the course of employment. This is subject to the exception, under certain circumstances, that the course of employment is extended to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer. For this exception the Christian case cites Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221, 72 L.Ed. 507, and Schafer v. Industrial Com., supra. Whether this exception can properly be extended to cover an employee returning home from the place of employment depends ultimately on the special circumstances of each case.

In distinguishing cases where an injury suffered in the street has been held to be incidental to the employment and therefore under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Supreme Court summarized there cases in the Northwestern case, supra, 409 Ill. at 221, 99 N.E.2d 346, as involving two categories: 1. where the work of the injured employee was in, or partly in, the street when he was injured; 2. where the injury took place on the premises of the employer and was an ordinary incident of the employment. Clearly the first category does not apply to the instant case since the injured maid had no duties in the street, and we must determine whether the undisputed facts fall within the second category.

The fact that the injuries occurred immediately at the employees' entrance, which the employees were required to use, shows a causal connection between the employment and the accident so as to satisfy the 'arising out of' requirement, since leaving the premises where one is employed is so closely connected with the employment as to render it a necessary incident thereto. Wabash Ry. Co. v....