Bd. of Educ. of Dist. No. 88 v. Home Real Estate Imp. Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1941
• Docket Number: Nos. 26404-26410.,s. 26404-26410.
• Citation: 38 N.E.2d 17,378 Ill. 298
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DIST. NO. 88, COOK COUNTY, v. HOME REAL ESTATE IMP. CORPORATION and six other cases.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

378 Ill. 298

38 N.E.2d 17

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DIST. NO. 88, COOK COUNTY,

v.HOME REAL ESTATE IMP. CORPORATION and six other cases.

Nos. 26404-26410.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 24, 1941.

Appeals from Circuit Court, Cook County; William V. Brothers, judge.

Consolidated suits by the Board of Education of District No. 88, Cook County, against the Home Real Estate Improvement Corporation, against the Chicago Title and Trust Company, against the Westchester Real Estate Company, against the Oak Park Trust and Savings Bank, against Mildred F. Lindop, and against the Chicago Title and Trust Company, and by the Board of Education of Proviso Township High School District No. 209 against the Home Real Estate Improvement Corporation, to obtain judgments for the school districts' share of the unpaid taxes on forfeited property. From a judgment dismissing the complaints, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.Warren H. Orr, Thomas Tighe, and Charles Liebman, all of Chicago, for appellants.

Matthias Concannon, Harold L. Reeve, William B. Garrett, Herrick, Vett & Peregrine, Herbert Decker, David L. Golden, Seymour R. Blankstein, Benjamin M. Becker, and Edward Warden, all of Chicago, for appellees.

FARTHING, Justice.

These consolidated cases, 26404 to 26410, both inclusive, are suits in personam by the boards of education of school districts organized under the provisions of the School law, against owners of property forfeited for non-payment of taxes, to obtain judgments for the school districts' share of the unpaid taxes on the forfeited property. At the close of all the evidence in 26404, and on motion to dismiss in the other cases, the circuit court dismissed the complaints because the boards of education were not the proper party plaintiffs, and because the defendants were not indebted to the boards of education, as such. The revenue is involved, and the boards of education have therefore appealed directly to this court.

Appellants claim they were authorized to sue by section 275 of the Revenue Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 120, par. 756) which provides: ‘The county board may, at any time, institute suit in a civil action in the name of the People of the State of Illinois in any court of competent jurisdiction for the whole amount due for taxes and special assessments on forfeited property; or any county, city, town, school district or other municipal corporation to which any such tax or special assessment may be due, may, at any tiem, institute suit in a civil action in its own name, before any court of competent jurisdiction, for the amount of such tax or special assessment due any such corporation on forfeited property, and prosecute the same to final judgment.’ The appellees contend that the applicable provisions of the School law, and the decisions of this court, require that a suit to recover unpaid taxes on forfeited property must be brought by the trustees of schools rather than by the school district. They also argue that section 275 of the Revenue act authorizes a suit by the school district only where the school district has been organized pursuant to a special act of the General Assembly which gave the district power to collect and receive taxes; and that the board of education of a school district is not a ‘school district or other municipal corporation’ within the meaning of section 275 of the Revenue act.

If the boards of education of these school districts were not school districts or other municipal corporations, within the meaning of section 275 of the Revenue act, the judgments of the circuit court of Cook county must be affirmed.

In support of the contention that the board of education of a school district is a ‘school district or other municipal corporation,’ appellants rely on sections 103, 104, 123, 127, and 91 of the School law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 122, pars. 111, 112, 131, 136, 99) and on our decisions in Cook v. Board of Directors, 266 Ill. 164, 107 N.E. 327, and Sanderson v. Town of LaSalle, 117 Ill. 171, 7 N.E. 114.

Section 103 of the School law provides: ‘In all school districts having a population of fewer than one thousand inhabitants, and not governed by any special act, there shall be elected a board of directors to consist of three members.’ Section 104 provides: ‘The directors of each district shall be a body politic and corporate, by the name of ‘school directors of district No. ... county of ........ and State of Illinois,’ and by that name may sue and be sued in all courts and places where judicial proceedings are had.' Section 123 provides: ‘In all school districts having a population of not fewer than one thousand and not more than one hundred thousand inhabitants, * * * there shall be elected a board of education to consist of a president, six members,’ etc. Section 127 provides: ‘The board of education shall have all the powers of school directors, be subject to the same limitations,’ etc. Section 91 provides: ‘For the purpose of building one or more high schools, conducting and supporting such schools and paying all necessary expenses, the territory for the benefit of which a high school is established under any of the provisions of this Act, and all high school districts organized under any statute in force at the time of their organization, and all high school districts legalized by statute shall be regarded as school districts, and the board of education of each of siad high school districts shall in all respects have the powers and discharge the duties of boards of education elected under the general school law in common school districts having a population of one thousand or more and not exceeding one hundred thousand inhabitants. The board of education of any such high school district shall have the right to build or acquire and maintain one or more sites and erect thereon, buildings, when in their judgment such additional facilities are needed by the district and the site or sites therefor have been lawfully selected.’

Section 127 of the School law gives the board of education the powers of school directors, and school directors are given the power by section 104 to sue in all courts where judicial proceedings are had. The fact that the board of education is authorized to sue does not mean, however, that it is the proper party plaintiff to bring suit to recover unpaid taxes. Whether it is the proper party must be determined by a construction of section 275 of the Revenue act, and the quoted statutes are of no assistance in interpreting the words used in that section.

Cook v. Board of Directors, supra, was a mandamus suit to compel the board of directors of the school district to comply with the provisions of an act of the General Assembly in regard to high school privileges for graduates of the eighth grade, and to compel the board to provide for the payment of the tuition of the students who were sent to high school. The main contention was that the statute on which plaintiff relied contravened section 9 of article 9 of the 1870 constitution, Smith-Hurd Stats. In part it provides that the corporate authoritiesof counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes. We held the statute constitutional. It was not disputed in that case, and no question is raised in this one, that the General Assembly could, if it wished, give to corporate authorities of school districts the power to assess and collect taxes. The question before us is whether that power was, in fact, given to the board of education of the school district by section 275 of the Revenue act. Nothing was said in the Cook case relative to the question whether the board of education of a school district is a school district or other municipal corporation.

Sanderson v. Town of LaSalle, supra, was a suit by the town of LaSalle to obtain a judgment in personam for unpaid taxes on a lot that had been forfeited to the State for non-payment of taxes. The questions raised in the case were whether the attorneys conducting the suit for the town were authorized by a vote of the town to do so, and whether irregularities in the proceeding to forfeit the property for unpaid taxes were a defense to the the action instituted by the town. It was held that neither defense was valid, and the judgent in favor of the town was affirmed. Neither this case, nor Byrne v. Town of LaSalle, 123 Ill. 581, 14 N.E. 679, nor Greenwood v. Town of LaSalle, 137 Ill. 225, 26 N.E. 1089, are in point. The town is named in section 275 of the Revenue act and it brought those suits.

Proviso Township High School v. Oak Park & River Forest Township High School, 322 Ill. 217, 153 N.E. 369, is not in point because there, also, no question was raised as to whether the proper party brought suit and the case dealt with an entirely different statutory provision.

Appellees cite People v. Thomas, 361 Ill. 448, 198...