Bd. of Educ. v. Haworth

Decision Date24 October 1916
Docket NumberNo. 10796.,10796.
Citation113 N.E. 939,274 Ill. 538
PartiesBOARD OF EDUCATION v. HAWORTH.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Vermilion County; Walter Brewer, Judge.

Bill by the Board of Education against Otis P. Haworth. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.Roy H. Brown, of Rockford, John G. Campbell and Herman A. Fischer, Jr., both of Chicago, and Charles Troup, of Danville, for appellant.

John H. Lewman, of Danville, for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

The circuit court of Vermilion county sustained a demurrer to the bill filed by the appellant praying the court to declare the act passed in 1915 (Laws of 1915, p. 631), providing for the payment of high school tuition from the state school fund, in violation of constitutional provisions, and dismissed the bill for want of equity at the costs of the appellant.

Section 14 of the School Law provides that, upon receipt of the amount due the county from the state school fund, the county superintendent of schools shall apportion the same to the townships and parts of townships in his county in which schools are maintained as provided by law, according to the number of persons under 21 years of age returned to him, and shall pay the distributive share belonging to each township and fractional township to the township treasurer or authorized persons, annually. Section 5 of the act of 1915 provides that on or before the 1st day of April in each year the county superintendent of schools of each county, having ascertained the number of pupils from his county attending high schools under the provisions of the act and the amount of tuition due each of the schools attended, shall pay all such tuitions to the clerks of the boards in control of the schools out of the state school fund apportioned to that county before distributing the same as now provided by law. Section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution provides that no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived or the section amended shall be inserted at length in the new act. It makes no difference, in determining whether the act is amendatory of the existing act, whether it professes to be an amendment or not; but the character of the act is to be determined by an examination and comparison of its provisions with prior laws which are left in force. Although an act purports to be complete in itself, if it is merely an attempt to amend a law by intermingling new and different provisions with the old ones or by adding new provisions, cerating out of the prior act and the new act a complete law, the act is amendatory. People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N. E. 155;Badenoch v. City of Chicago, 222 ill. 71, 78 N. E. 31;Hollingsworth v. Chicago & Carterville Coal Co., 243 Ill. 98, 90 N. E. 276. Comparing section 13 of the School Law and section 5 of the act of 1915, it is found that they deal with the same subject-matter and together provide for the distribution of the state school fund by county superintendents, and that the provisions are intermingled with each other. One requires the county superintendent of schools to apportion and distribute the share of the county in the state school fund according to the number of persons under 21 years of age in the several townships or parts of townships in the county, and the other provides, concerning the same fund, that the county superintendent shall first pay out of the fund the tuition to each of the schools and then distribute the balance as provided by the School Law. A county superintendent cannot determine his duty in disposing of the school fund from either act alone, but must take both as his guide, and, after obeying the mandate of the law of 1915, go to the School Law to which he is directed by the act to determine what further shall be done concerning the same subject-matter. The act of 1915 was an attempt to amend the existing law concerning the distribution of the school fund by adding a new provision, and, the Constitution not having been complied with, the section is void. Section 5 of the act of 1915 reaches and covers the entire purpose of the act, and is so connected in purpose and intent with the remainder as to render the whole act void.

The state school fund consists of the proceeds of a state-wide tax levied annually, together with interest on moneys which are part of the common school fund. On the first Monday in January, annually, the auditor of public accounts is required to apportion to each county the fund in proportion to the number of persons in each county under the age of 21 years, and the amount apportioned to each county is to be paid to the county superintendent of schools, to be apportioned and distributed by him as above stated. In 1913 the General Assembly levied a tax by valuation upon the taxable property of the state of $3,000,000 for that year and a like tax for 1914, and in 1915 levied a tax of $4,000,000 for that year and $4,000,000 for 1916 in lieu of the two-mill tax mentioned in section 210 of the School Law, and the proceeds of these taxes were to be designated the State School Fund.’ The act now under consideration provides that graduates of the eighth grade residing in districts which do not provide four years of recognized high school work shall be admitted, upon the payment of tuition, to any public recognized high school for the completion of a four years' high school course not provided by the home district. Parents or guardians are permitted to select the school to be attended, subject to the consent of the high school board and the approval of the county superintendent. On or before March 15th of each year the clerks of the school boards of the districts where tuition pupils reside, and the clerks of the boards of high schools attended by nonresident pupils, are required to report to the county superintendent the names of the pupils, the tuition charges, the school districts in which they reside, and the names of the schools attended. The county superintendent is required to pay out of the state school fund apportioned to the county the tuition of such pupils, and may limit the maximum amount for tuition of each pupil to $40, provided the tuition in no instance shall be greater than the per capita cost of...

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26 cases
  • People v. Monroe
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • July 26, 1932
    ...and comparison of its provisions with the prior law as last in force. Bishop v. Chicago Railways Co., supra; Board of Education v. Haworth, 274 Ill. 538, 113 N. E. 939;Lyons v. Police Pension Board, 255 Ill. 139, 99 N. E. 337;Badenoch v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 71, 78 N. E. 31;People v. K......
  • Schreiber v. Cook Cnty.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1944
    ...because it applies equally and uniformly throughout the State. The statute which this court held invalid in Board of Education v. Haworth, 274 Ill. 538, 113 N.E. 939, relieved some high school districts from the burdens of taxation which were imposed upon the taxpayers of other districts by......
  • People v. McGuire
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 23, 1966
  • Bond v. Burrows, 49835-1
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • November 21, 1984
    ...act as a form of commuting state taxes and, therefore, repugnant to the provision of the constitution. See also Board of Educ. v. Haworth, 274 Ill. 538, 113 N.E. 939 (1916). The foregoing cases are persuasive authority for our construction of Const. art. 11, § 9. They irrefutably demonstrat......
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