Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Pelican v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Rock Falls

• Decision Date: 09 August 1892
• Parties: BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF PELICAN v. BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF ROCK FALLS.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

81 Wis. 428

52 N.W. 1049

BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF PELICAN

v.BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF ROCK FALLS.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Aug. 9, 1892.

Dissenting opinion. For majority opinion, see 51 N. W. Rep. 871.

Per Pinney, J., dissenting.

PINNEY, J., ( dissenting).

I cannot concur in the opinion of the court that the word “credits,” as used in section 2, c. 334, Laws 1885, includes school sites, schoolhouses, and furniture and fixtures, or the value thereof, or any tangible property whatever. It clearly signifies in this statute, as it does in bookkeeping and commercial and business transactions, the opposite of “debits,”--that which is due to any person, as contradistinguished from that which he owes; for, without the relation of creditor and debtor, there can be no such thing as a “credit.” Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 572; Barnes v. Treat, 7 Mass. 271, 274. It does not include lands, tenements, and hereditaments, or goods and chattels. No one making or receiving a transfer of any such property would suppose that it would be included by the mere designation of “credits” of the grantor or assignor. I think there is no general or popular or technical use of the word that will make it extend to and include, as used in the statute, specific real or chattel property. The concession in the opinion of the court, that, “as ordinarily used in trade and business, the word ‘credit’ suggests nothing more than a chose in action,” is, I think, fatal to the judgment given in this case. No broader use or signification, by general or popular use of the term, is suggested. Therefore, as used in this statute, its meaning is clear, definite, and unambiguous, and includes only those debts, dues, or items of liability due or coming to the respondent district with which to meet its current liabilities. The statute is a general one, applicable to all cases of division of a county, town, city, or school district, and was doubtless framed upon careful consideration. It is hardly to be supposed that any wish or intention of the legislature in respect to the subject was left without proper consideration or expression. There is no room, therefore, for legitimate construction; and construction not founded upon the words of the act, upon statutes in pari materia, or some other reasonably clear and definite matter of which courts can judicially take notice, is simply mere guesswork and perversion, leading to the most uncertain, and therefore dangerous, consequences. Without some such guide the maxim, as old as Plowden, that “a thing which is within the intention of the makers of the statute is as much within the letter,” becomes merely a jingling proverb, and not an intelligent and practical rule. The preamble and purview of the act, statutes in pari materia, and the like, are the only means by which courts give effect to this maxim, which would otherwise leave matters in the most distressing uncertainty. Statutes are to be construed by the language the legislature has used, and it is only where a statute is capable of two or more meanings that interpretation or any latitude of construction is allowable; and, where the language in question is fairly susceptible of but one construction or meaning, then the office of interpretation or judicial exposition is gone, and the courts have nothing to do but to give effect to the statute in that sense. Courts cannot correct supposed errors, omissions, or defects in legislation. Ogden v. Glidden, 9 Wis. 46;Mundt v. Railroad Co., 31 Wis. 457, 458. It is the expressed intention only of the legislature which the courts are authorized to carry into effect. Endl. Interp. St. § 8. These are familiar rules, fully recognized in the cases cited in the opinion of the court, and it is well settled that the courts have no right to extend a statute, upon their own notions of what is equitable, just, and wise, to matters in respect to which the legislature has given no expression. To do so is the office of legislation, and not of interpretation or construction. Courts cannot imagine an intent, and extend the letter of the act to it. Smith v. State, 66 Md. 217, 7 Atl. Rep. 49; Bradbury v. Wagenhorst, 54 Pa. St. 182; Woodbury v. Berry, 18 Ohio St. 460;Denn v. Reid, 10 Pet. 527. As was said by Lord DENMAN in Green v. Wood, 7 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 185: “Those who used the words thought they had effected the purpose intended. But we, looking at the words as judges, are no more justified in introducing that meaning than we should be if we added any other provision.” By the common law, if a part of the territory of a county, town, or school district is separated from it and annexed to or organized into another, the original corporation or organization retains all its property, property rights, and franchises, and remains subject to its former debts and obligations, unless some express statutory provision is made to the contrary. Crawford Co. v. Iowa Co., 2 Pin. 368;Town of Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93;Briggs v. School...