Beach v. Beach
| Decision Date | 04 September 1896 |
| Citation | 46 P. 514,4 Okla. 359,1896 OK 48 |
| Parties | BEACH v. BEACH. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. That cruelty which is contemplated by the law as being ground of divorce is the cruelty which renders cohabitation intolerable, which destroys the concord, the harmony, and affection of the parties, and renders unsafe the actual existence of the marital relation. The cruelty contemplated by the law must operate upon the husband or wife while living in the relation of husband and wife. It is not upon the individual distinct from the relation that it must operate but upon the individual while he or she is without fault, and in the proper discharge of the duties which the relation of marriage imposes. Therefore, when a husband wrongfully and without fault on the part of the wife abandoned her, in an action for divorce by the husband, charging extreme cruelty consisting in accusations made by the wife, in letters written by her to the husband and others, accusing him of criminal intimacy with other women, it appeared that such accusations were made, and letters written, subsequent to such abandonment, and while the parties were living separate and apart, and not sustaining the relation of husband and wife, held that such accusations under such conditions do not constitute extreme cruelty, to authorize a divorce under the statutes of this territory.
2. Where a husband has wrongfully driven his wife from home without any fault on her part has cast her off, or has himself, without fault upon her part, wrongfully abandoned her, he cannot be permitted to have the bonds of matrimony dissolved upon his complaint charging the wife with extreme cruelty, consisting only in words accusing him of wrongdoing where such accusations are shown to have been made only after such abandonment, and while the parties, by reason of the wrongful conduct of the husband, were not living together as husband and wife. Courts will not hold a deserted and abandoned wife to that degree of prudential conduct that she might be held to if under the protection and care of a loving husband, performing the duties and obligations imposed upon him by the status of marriage.
3. At the common law, to authorize a court to proceed to a separation on the grounds of cruelty, there must have been either actual violence committed, which endangered life, limb, or health, or there must have been a reasonable apprehension of such violence. The element of mental suffering, distress, or injury, unaccompanied by violence or an apprehension of violence, was entirely excluded; but the doctrine is now established that, without physical violence, acts or conduct which, operating upon the mind, and, through the mind, uponthe physical system, produce bodily hurt, may constitute cause for divorce. With reference to acts of physical violence, the rule has always been that a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt was sufficient; but where the conduct complained of operates primarily upon the mind, producing mental pain, it is not sufficient that there should be simply danger that such conduct, thus operating through the mental faculties, may produce injury to the physical system or bodily hurt; but it must be shown that such in fact is the effect, or, at the least, that such effect may be reasonably apprehended as the result, of the conduct.
4. Where the cruelty complained of consists of accusations of infidelity or other violations of marital obligations made by the wife against the husband, though they may not be true, yet, if they were not made from malevolent motives, or through hatred and spite, but were made in good faith, if the wife had reasonable cause for believing that they were true, and they were made for the purpose of inducing the husband to abandon such supposed course of wrongdoing, and to return to a proper observance of his marital obligations, they would not constitute extreme cruelty, to justify a dissolution of the marriage. A wife has a right to bring to the attention of her husband that which she has heard and which she believes concerning his misconduct, if she does so with a proper purpose and in a proper spirit; and it is his duty, if he be innocent, to endeavor to convince her of her error. Husband and wife are bound to greater efforts for reconciliation, for removing misapprehension, for allaying quarrels, and smoothing the road to concord, than are people in any other relation of life. The marriage status is not a mere contract status, in which each of the parties may be justified in demanding the strict letter of the bond. It is the status of the law operating upon the weaknesses as well as the strength of human nature, and will not be dissolved except for grave and substantial causes.
5. The plaintiff in an action for divorce must have been an actual resident in good faith of the territory for 90 days next preceding the filing of the petition, and a resident of the county in which the action is brought at the time the petition is filed. Such residence is a jurisdictional fact, that must be alleged and proven by the plaintiff, and must affirmatively appear in the record. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot be acquired by waiver or consent. Not only the courts look at the matter of jurisdiction without the question being raised by the parties, but in every case they are bound to inquire whether the facts presented give jurisdiction.
6. Where the plaintiff, who was a lawyer and an author of legal text-books, came to the territory from the city of New York, where he had a lucrative practice and large income, and had been present in the territory only during the period which the statute required to precede the application, remaining the greater part of the time in a county other than the one in which the action is brought, coming to the county in which the action is brought for the first time on the day preceding the filling of the petition, leaving said county on the same or next day, returning for one or two days to attend the hearing of a motion for alimony in the cause, departing immediately, and not again returning until the morning of the day the cause is tried upon its merits; when it is shown that for the remainder of the time pending the action he is absent from the territory, and regularly engaged in business elsewhere; where he testified that one object of his coming to the territory was to procure a divorce, and the facts in the record do not show him to have had any other object; when he brought with him only such personal effects as were necessary for one traveling from place to place or sojourning where he made no endeavor to establish any business, and had no friends, relatives, or kindred in the territory or county where the action was brought, or any ties of business or of other nature to bring or keep him there,--notwithstanding that he may swear to the contrary, the presumption is great, if not conclusive, that his only purpose in coming to the territory and to the county where his action was brought was to obtain a divorce, and that he was not a resident in good faith of the territory or of such county. It follows that the court trying the cause did not have jurisdiction, and that its proceedings were a nullity.
Appeal from district court, Cleveland county; before Justice Scott.
Action by Charles F. Beach, Jr., against Anne M. Beach. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
J. W. McLoud, for plaintiff in error.
Green & Strang, for defendant in error.
This is an action for divorce, commenced by the defendant in error Charles F. Beach, Jr., against the plaintiff in error, Anne M. Beach, in the district court for Cleveland county. The petition was filed on the 6th day of April, 1895. The petition was based upon the statutory grounds of extreme cruelty and neglect of duty. There is no specific allegation contained in the petition, or any evidence of neglect of duty; and the allegation relating to extreme cruelty charges such extreme cruelty to consist of accusations made by the plaintiff in error, orally and in writing, to the defendant in error, and by letters written by her to third parties, falsely and maliciously accusing the plaintiff of criminal intimacy with various women. The parties were duly married on the 26th day of December, 1882, in the city of New York, and continued to live together as husband and wife from that date until the latter part of August, 1893. The petition charges that during the winter of 1888 and 1889 the said defendant, without any cause or justification whatever, and solely for the purpose and with the intent to injure, degrade, and ruin the plaintiff, began falsely and maliciously to accuse the plaintiff of criminal intimacy with various women, and has continued such false and malicious charges at frequent intervals to the present time, evincing an unreasoning and morbidly jealous disposition upon her part, which has increased in virulence to the present time; that during the said period of time the said defendant has frequently made false and malicious charges of such criminal conduct on the part of and against plaintiff, both to the plaintiff and divers other persons; that she has at various times and in divers places annoyed, humiliated, and distressed the plaintiff, and rendered his life a burden, by persistent spying upon, pursuing, and watching him, and thereby creating the impression that the plaintiff was and is a wrongdoer; that, in pursuance of said course of conduct, the defendant has, within the two years last past, written and sent through the mail, to various persons, divers libelous and obscene letters, falsely and maliciously charging the plaintiff and the persons to whom the said letters were addressed, and other persons,...
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