Beach v. Hudson
| Citation | 380 S.E.2d 869,298 S.C. 424 |
| Decision Date | 19 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 1343,1343 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
| Parties | John M. BEACH, John G. Sheffield, Jr., and Sam R. Collins, Plaintiffs, v. Lois Q. HUDSON, Defendant Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Vernon SMITH, C. Jerry Hawkins, Machawk, Inc., and Meybohm Realty, Inc., Third-Party Defendants/Respondents. . Heard |
Richard L. Pearce, of Toole & Toole, Aiken, for defendant third-party-plaintiff/appellant.
Charles W. Coleman, of Coleman & Pettigrew, Edgefield, for third-party defendants/respondents.
John L. Creson, of Surrett, Walker, Creson & Colley, Augusta, Georgia, for plaintiffs.
Lois Q. Hudson appeals from an order striking her third-party complaint against the third-party defendants Vernon Smith, C. Jerry Hawkins, Machawk, Inc., and Meybohm Realty, Inc. We affirm.
The plaintiffs John M. Beach, John G. Sheffield, Jr., and Sam R. Collins brought this action against Hudson seeking specific performance of a contract to sell them approximately 33 acres of land in Edgefield County for $90,000 or, alternatively, damages of $20,000 for breach of the contract to sell.
Hudson's answer specifically denies "there was any contract" between her and the plaintiffs.
Hudson later served, with leave of the court, a summons and third-party complaint upon the third-party defendants, alleging seven causes of action. Hudson alleges in the third-party complaint that she and the third-party defendants entered into an exclusive contract to sell the Edgefield County property, that Hawkins coerced her into signing the contract to sell to Beach, that she changed her mind about selling the property and told Hawkins not to deliver the contract, and that Hawkins nevertheless delivered the contract to Beach.
Her first cause of action alleges the third-party defendants exceeded the scope of their authority under the agreement listing the subject property for sale; the second cause of action alleges they defrauded her; the third cause of action alleges they committed outrage in their handling of the transaction; the fourth cause of action alleges they breached a reasonable standard of care in representing her in the transaction; the fifth cause of action alleges they were negligent, wilful, reckless, wanton, and grossly negligent in certain particulars; the sixth cause of action alleges they breached the listing agreement; and the seventh cause of action alleges their actions violated the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.
By each of the first five causes of action, Hudson seeks actual and punitive damages; by the sixth cause of action, she seeks only actual damages; and by the seventh cause of action, she seeks treble actual damages and attorney fees.
Following service of the summons and third-party complaint, the third-party defendants moved to strike the third-party complaint in its entirety. The trial court initially denied the motion but later granted it after the third-party defendants moved the court to amend its judgment.
Rule 14(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, like its federal counterpart, FED.R.CIV.P. 14(a), allows any party, including a third-party defendant, to "move to strike the third-party claim, or [move] for its severance or separate trial." See 6 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1460 at 320-21 (1971) ( ... ). The question of whether to grant a motion to strike a third-party claim, whether filed with or without the leave of court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Swenson v. Suhl, 19 F.R.D. 517, 519 (D.Neb.1956) (...
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...motion in the first instance for its allowance, is addressed to the mature and informed discretion of the court"); Beach v. Smith, 298 S.C. 424, 380 S.E.2d 869 (S.C.App.1989) (holding whether to grant motion to strike third-party claim is addressed to sound discretion of trial Implicit in t......