Beach v. Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World

• Decision Date: 05 January 1904
• Citation: 177 N.Y. 100,69 N.E. 281
• Parties: BEACH v. SUPREME TENT OF KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLD.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

177 N.Y. 100

69 N.E. 281

BEACH

v.SUPREME TENT OF KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLD.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 5, 1904.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by Benjamin C. Beach against the Supreme Tent of the Knights of the Maccabees of the World. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (11 N. Y. Supp. 770), affirming a judgment for plaintiff, entered on a verdict directed by the court, and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Haight, J., dissenting.

James L. Quackenbush, for appellant.

George E. Spring, for respondent.

CULLEN, J.

This is an action brought to recover on a certificate of membership issued by the defendant, a fraternal or mutual benefit organization. The certificate stated that the plaintiff would be entitled to receive one assessment on the members of the order not exceeding $2,000 as a benefit to his wife upon satisfactory proof of his death. It contained this further provision: ‘In case of permanent or total disability, or upon attaining the age of seventy years, he will be entitled to receive one-half of said endowment, as provided in the laws of the order.’ When the plaintiff joined the order the endowment laws provided (section 13, art. 4): ‘A member who by reason of a disability incurred after admission to endowment membership becomes unable to direct or perform the kind of business or labor which he has always followed, and by which alone he can thereafter earn a livelihood shall be deemed entitled to disability benefits.’ In 1895 this provision was amended so as to read (section 188): ‘Any member holding a benefit certificate who shall become totally and permanently disabled from any cause, not the result of his own illegal act, to perform or direct any kind of labor or business * * * shall be entitled to receive from the disability fund, annually, one-tenth part of the sum for which his benefit certificate is issued.’ The plaintiff was a farmer, and a part of the time operated a portable sawmill. In 1895, after the adoption of the amendment referred to, his right arm was almost severed by a saw. As a result of this injury the arm became practically useless. The plaintiff testified that he was unable to do any work on the farm or at the sawmill. At the close of the evidence each party requested the direction of a verdict. The court granted the application of the plaintiff, and directed a verdict in his favor for $1,000 and interest, half the amount payable under the certificate in case of death.

As the appellant did not request the cause to be submitted to the jury, he assented to the determination by the court of any question of fact that the evidence presented. The evidence warranted the finding that the plaintiff was permanently disabled within the terms of the by-laws as they stood at the time he joined the order. The language of the by-law is quite similar to that construed in the case of Neill v. Order of United Friends, 149 N. Y. 430, 44 N. E. 145,52 Am. St. Rep. 738. In that case the endowment was payable if a member became disabled ‘from following his usual or some other occupation by reason of accident and disease.’ The plaintiff, a brakeman, had his foot crushed by an accident. It was contended for the defendant that, though the injury may have rendered him unable to act as brakeman, he was not disabled ‘from following some other occupation.’ It was held that ‘some other’ occupation was to be construed in connection with the previousprovision of ‘usual,’ and did not mean ‘any other occupation.’ The opinion there delivered by Judge Haight covers the whole subject, and renders further discussion of the subject unnecessary. Therefore, if the plaintiff's rights were unaffected by the subsequent amendment of the by-laws, the decisions of the courts below were clearly right.

We have quite recently reiterated the doctrine that a general power reserved either by statute or by the constitution of a society to amend its by-laws does not authorize an amendment impairing the vested rights of the members. Parish v. N. Y. Produce Exchange, 169 N. Y. 34, 61 N. E. 977,56 L. R. A. 149;Weber v. Supreme Tent K. of M., 172 N. Y. 490, 65 N. E. 258,92 Am. St. Rep. 753. It is contended that the power of the defendant in this case was enlarged because the constitution of the order at the time the plaintiff joined reserved the right to amend the laws governing the endowment fund. It may be doubted whether this was intended to cover the case of existing members or was applicable solely to those who should join the order after the amendments. But, giving this provision the broadest construction, we are of opinion that it would not relieve the defendant from liability....